










HYUNJUN MIN, Ph.D. 2008 
  
 




Despite the apparent usefulness for film analysis, the notion of “sensation” 
disappears in Deleuze’s two Cinema books (Cinema 1: The Movement-Image 
[1983] and Cinema 2: The Time-Image [1985]) published right after Francis Bacon: 
The Logic of Sensation (1981), which develops the idea of sensation. By tracing the 
conceptual origin of sensation from “event,” “sense,” and “affect,” this dissertation 
answers the mystery of the disappearance of sensatio  in the Cinema books and 
clarifies the possibilities and limitations of using “sen ation” in the analysis of film. 
It puts Deleuze’s concepts of affect and sensation side by side with Korean director 
Kim Ki-duk’s films so that they can initiate mutually beneficiary discussions. 
Among the fourteen films Kim made, Crocodile, The Isle and Spring, Summer, Fall, 
Winter… and Spring are analyzed in detail. Each of these three films represents 
each stage of Kim Ki-duk’s own transformation as a director, and corresponds to 
Deleuze’s own deployment of the event into affect, sensation, and becomings. In the 
Cinema books, the concept of “sensation” is retained through the discussion of signs 
and images, but buried under the notions of the “affection-image” and the “impulse-
image” because of the way “sensation” is conceptualized n Francis Bacon: The 
   
 
 
Logic of Sensation and because of the worry that “sensation” might be confused 
with the “sensational.” While maintaining the conceptual hrust of event and sense, 
Deleuze reformulates affect and sensation in relation to movement in the Cinema 
books. Thus, “affect” appears when the movement decreases to a minimum, 
whereas sensation appears to mobilize the frozen moveent. The understanding of 
Deleuzian usage of sensation prepares us to move beyond the conventional 
conceptual tools of narrative, symbolization, representation, and signification 
towards the flows of materials, forces and the virtual.  
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Chapter One: the Encounter between Kim Ki-duk and Gilles 
Deleuze  
 
From Crocodile (1996) to Breath (2007), the prolific director Kim Ki-duk 
has made fourteen films thus far. As one of the most well-known contemporary 
Korean directors outside of Korea, his films have be n routinely invited to 
prestigious international film festivals and have received numerous awards, 
including the Silver Bear Best Director’s Award from the Berlin International Film 
Festival (2004) for his tenth film Samaritan Girl (2004), the FIPRESCI (Fédération 
Internationale de la Presse Cinématographique: Interna ional Federation of Film 
Critics) prize and the Special Director’s award at the Venice Film Festival (2004) 
for his eleventh film 3-Iron (2004). He is best known to US audiences for his ninth 
film Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring (2003), which has been 
successfully released in the US. 
While Kim Ki-duk is considered one of the most talented and important 
directors currently working in South Korea by the inter ational film communities, 
Kim Ki-duk’s reputation in his own country has been, at best, mixed – composed of 
a few enthusiastic supporters and many disgruntled detractors. He is praised for his 
uninhibited and painterly images, yet many film critics have been displeased by his 
shocking, bizarre, voyeuristic, gruesome, and violent images, as well as his 
politically suspicious characters and stories. General Korean audiences have been 
equally unsympathetic to his films and none of his films have been commercially 
successful in South Korea, except Bad Guy (2001). Even the marginal success of 
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Bad Guy is attributed to the main character played by actor Cho Jae-hyun, who was 
famous because of his role in a popular television drama that appeared after the 
completion, but before the release of the film.1 
Despite his reputation as an artistic and provocative d rector, the discussions 
of his films are still rare and have centered dispropo tionally on their graphic 
violence, especially violence against women. A quick survey of Kim’s films proves 
why many film critics have been compelled to talk about misogyny in his films. 
His first film Crocodile (1996) features a girl who tries to commit suicide 
after being sexually abused and betrayed. A man called Ag-O, which is literally 
“crocodile” in Korean, saves her only to rape and abuse her. However, despite 
physical and sexual exploitations, the girl remains with h m and forms a family until 
her eventual suicide. His second film Wild Animals (1996) set in Paris includes a 
couple of female characters who hopelessly depend on their male counterparts, 
despite their physical abuse. His third film The Birdcage Inn (1999) features two 
females as main characters; one is a college student, whereas the other is a 
prostitute. The college girl has to live with the prostitute under the same roof 
because her family owns a small inn which hosts the prostitute. Consequently, the 
proud college girl at first despises the prostitute, and then begins to understand, 
sympathize, and imitate the prostitute. At the end of the story, the prostitute 
                                                
1 While Kim finds little difficulty in financing his films thanks to his 
reputation overseas and the low-budget production, the lack of support from a 
domestic audience has troubled him. His recent project Time (2006) was a scandal 
in South Korea because Kim decided not to release the film in his home country.  
He said bluntly in many interviews, “If you want to watch the film, import it.”  The 
film was released eventually in South Korea but disappe red from theatres quickly. 
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becomes ill and is unable to accept a client; thus, the college girl works instead of 
her. The next morning is the lone happy moment in the entire film, with the whole 
family and the prostitute preparing for the day happily exchanging a smile. Korean 
feminist film critics took it personal and were furious about its all-woman-is-
prostitute myth (Ju). 
Violence against women becomes even more graphic in The Isle (2000), 
which features an infamous fishhook scene, in which the main female character 
pushes fishhooks fastened with string into her vagina and then pulls the string. Set 
in a small town located near a US military base in South Korea in the seventies, 
Address Unknown (2001) also depicts gruesome violence against women. In this 
film, one of the main characters loses an eye as a child w ile playing a sort of game 
of William Tell with her brother. Later, she is sexually involved with an American 
male soldier, who promises to fix her eye. After surgery, she regains her eyesight 
and must endure the soldier, who has become relentless and violent. During a fight, 
the soldier decides to carve his name on the girl’s breast, but she returns the favor 
by poking her eye with a knife. Consequently, she owes him nothing and there is no 
reason to endure his violence. Although the film does not graphically show the 
actual poking of her eye, the scene makes most audiences shudder. The film Bad 
Guy (2002), which is an apt title for a director who has ern d the nick name of “the 
bad guy of Korean cinema,” tells a story of a female college student who is trapped 
by a small gang and forced into prostitution. At first she tries to escape, but 
eventually settles down with one of the thugs and accepts her fate. Even after they 
depart the brothel as lovers, the thug continues to profit from her sexual labor. 
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Moreover, the happy ending is given a surprising religious gravity, concluding with 
the gospel Day by Day sung in French. In Samaritan Girl (2004), director Kim Ki-
duk dares to go further by introducing an under-age prostitute, who thinks her 
sexual labor is akin to an Indian prostitute named Vasumitra whose clients, as the 
legend goes, have become devout Buddhists. 
In most of Kim’s films, female characters are prostitutes in one way or 
another and victims of abuse and violence. Their bodies are sadistically violated, 
abused, scarred, raped, and punished. Justifiably, the voice of Korean feminist film 
critics has been the loudest in South Korea. It is understandable that Korean 
feminist film critics, who are fully aware of real life violence against women, have 
become hostile to Kim’s films, which seem to exploit women’s misery without 
punishing the aggressors. I agree that we need to examine the way in which gender 
and sexuality are represented in film images, and the way audiences perceive, 
understand, receive, and utilize them. I am also aware of the necessity of feminist 
film criticism which makes salient the way in which gender and sexuality are 
represented in film images. However, in this study, I am less concerned about the 
degrading portrayal of the female gender p se than the peculiar way director Kim 
presents both men and women apart from their familial and social grids. 
Most of Kim’s characters appear without much personal r social 
background. Even the minimal traits they carry at the beginning of the film soon 
disappear and become inconsequential. Furthermore, their actions often defy their 
roles in society and thus appear to transgress the moral codes set by society. In fact, 
many of Kim’s characters seem to have no moral center. They commit unethical 
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violence without guilt or responsibility, and their actions are not always properly 
punished. In addition, their actions often lack any narrative motivations which 
might make their atrocity acceptable or, at least, understandable. In other words, 
Kim asks his audiences for neither acceptance nor understanding. Rather, Kim 
confronts his viewers by disallowing them to interpolate their sense of morality into 
his films. Consequently, the films of Kim often have no character with which an 
audience can easily identify. Moreover, Kim’s characters refuse to talk and they 
have no interest in explaining their motivations and actions. By foreclosing the easy 
application of the audience’s sense of morality, Kim’s films create a space for a 
new ethics which is not codified beforehand.2 I suggest Kim’s films can be read 
more productively not by engaging in the transcendental morality asking “What 
must they do?” but by grounding in the immanent thics asking “What can they do? 
What are they capable of doing?” Kim’s characters are not moral beings; they are 
ethical bodies involving inter-connection with other forces. Their encounters often 
result in conflicts and clashes. Violence and cruelty are part of this process, the 
process to become.3 
                                                
2  According to Deleuze, morality “presents us with a set of constraining rules 
of a special sort, ones that judge actions and intentions by considering them in 
relation to transcendent values.” Gilles Deleuze, Negotiati ns, 1972-1990 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1995) 100. On the other hand, ethics involves a 
creative connections and an expansion of possibilities of life. For the influences of 
Spinoza and Nietzsche on Deleuzian mmanent ethics, see Daniel W Smith, 
"Deleuze and the Question of Desire: Toward an Immanet Theory of Ethics," 
Parrhesia.2 (2007). 
3  For the relation between “ethics” and “becomings” in Deleuze, see Rosi 
Braidotti, "The Ethics of Becoming-Imperceptible," Deleuze and Philosophy, ed. 
Constantin V. Boundas (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006). 
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Beyond the recognitions of brutality and cruelty, theimages of Kim’s films 
force us to think. They are what Deleuze terms “signs,” which are no longer objects 
of recognition, but objects of a fundamental “encounter.” These images open an 
experiential dimension that is prepersonal and pre-representational. Deleuze’s 
approach to the arts, particularly his concepts of “affect,” “sensation” and 
“becomings,” supplies a set of tools to apprehend this encounter. They allow us to 
weave through Kim Ki-duk’s films in a manner that is otherwise than territorialized, 
constrained, and subsumed by matters of meaning and representation.  
 
Before outlining my specific dissertation chapters, let me discuss more 
generally Deleuze’s relation to film studies and the complexity of the theoretical 
terms he uses in his works both on and beyond the cinema. 
After the death of Gilles Deleuze, Serge Toubiana wrote that “of the great 
French thinkers who have counted these last thirty years, Deleuze was the only one 
who truly loved cinema” (rqt. Bogue 1). However, despite Deleuze’s love of cinema 
and two major publications on cinema, his thoughts on cinema still remain an 
afterthought in the US film communities.4 David Rodowick cites that Deleuze sets 
himself against Saussurean semiology and Lacanian psychology, which are the twin 
pillars of contemporary film theory (Rodowick xi). Gregory Flaxman points out the 
overwhelming breadth that the Cinema books cover and the even more intimidating 
                                                
4  Some may argue otherwise. However the fact that only a dozen or so books 
on Deleuzian inquires on Cinema have been published in English suggests that 
Deleuzian film theory is not exactly flourishing, even taking into account the 
downturn of interest in theories in general in past deca s. 
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Deleuze’s entire oeuvre on which Cinema books are based (Flaxman 2). The 
successful application of Deleuze’s discussion on cinema to an individual film 
analysis is quite rare, partly because, as Robert Stam points out, Deleuze theorizes 
with the cinema rather than giving us theories about the cinema (Stam 258). While 
Deleuze creates concepts such as the “movement-image” and the “time-image” 
alongside the cinema, he leaves little room for his readers to use his discussions for 
analyses of other films.  
Typically, Deleuze was simply added to a chapter at the end of a recent 
anthology, Studying Contemporary American Film: A Guide to Movie Analysis 
(2002). Written by two respected film scholars, Thomas Elsaesser and Warren 
Buckland, it has nine chapters and Deleuze shares the last chapter with Feminism 
and Foucault. Even in the small section in which The Silence of the Lambs 
(Jonathan Demme, 1991) is analyzed, the central concept Elsaesser and Buckland 
borrow from Deleuze is “The Body without Organs,” which s not quite the main 
idea which Deleuze develops in his Cinema books. 
Throughout his writings, Deleuze often uses the term “art” and provides 
definitions such as “art… is not a matter of reproducing or inventing forms, but of 
capturing forces” (Deleuze Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation 56) or “art 
preserves… a bloc of sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects” 
(Deleuze and Guattari What Is Philosophy? 164). However, such key terms as 
“force,” “percept,” “affect,” and “sensation,” which might help us examine our 
everyday experience of cinema, have very limited usage in the Cinema books. In 
particular, “sensation” is mentioned only a few times in passing, even though the 
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notion of sensation was fully developed in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation 
(originally published in 1981) which was published right before Cinema 1: The 
Movement-Image (originally published in 1983) and Cinema 2: The Time-Image 
(originally published in 1985). The disappearance of key terms of arts in the 
Cinema books results in many film theorists and critics using concepts developed 
elsewhere such as “The Body Without Organs” to explain a f lm text, rather than 
using, let’s say, the “reflection-image” from the Cinema books.  
Actually, Deleuze and Guattari state that “Art is a false concept, a solely 
nominal concept” (Deleuze and Guattari A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia 300-1). Although they continue to add that “this does not, however, 
preclude the possibility of a simultaneous usage of the various arts within a 
determinable multiplicity” (302), it would be naïve to think that the philosopher of 
the rhizomatic gives us a system of arts. Deleuze’s strategies set themselves 
precisely against any schemas or systems that are syst matic, ordered, ready-made, 
pre-determined or postulated. Thus, Deleuze describes the objectives of the Cinema 
books: 
 
The job of criticism is to form concepts that… relate specifically to cinema, 
and to some specific genre of film, to some specific film or other. Concepts 
specific to cinema, but which can only be formed philosophically. (Deleuze 
Negotiations, 1972-1990 57-8)  
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Deleuze describes his Cinema books as a logic of the cinema which isolates certain 
cinematographic concepts. Unfortunately, these cinematographic concepts do not 
necessarily refer to either the “percepts,” the “affects” or the “sensations” that art 
preserves as he claims in What Is Philosophy? (1994). The Cinema books do 
consider “percept” and “affect” briefly in a couple of chapters which deal with the 
“perception-image” and the “affection-image.” However the books never give any 
rigorous theoretical attention to the term “sensation.” It seems that Deleuze is so 
occupied with the cinematic issues of the “movement-image” and the “time-image” 
that he considers any inquiry of the aesthetic experience of sensation as a 
distraction. Are Deleuzian thoughts on art and cinema incompatible? Is it wrong for 
a Deleuzian to think cinema as an art and to claim that “cinema preserves a bloc of 
sensations, a compound of percepts and affects”? Why can’t we use “sensation” for 
film analysis? Can we utilize the Deleuzian notion of “sensation” for film analysis, 
even though Deleuze does not endorse such an attempt? Under what conditions can 
we use the notion of “sensation” for cinema? 
I believe that Deleuze’s basic approach to cinema actually opens the door to 
make the study of cinema part of a more general Deleuzian inquiry of art. In the 
preface to the English edition for Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (1986), Deleuze 
states that:  
 
[T]he cinema seems to us to be a composition of images and of signs, that is, 
a pre-verbal intelligible content (pure semiotics), whilst semiology of a 
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linguistic inspiration abolishes the image and tends to dispense with the sign. 
(viiii) 
 
Although Deleuze does not elaborate this statement any further, he returns to the 
assertion in the conclusion of Cinema 2. He claims that “Cinema is not a universal 
or primitive language system [langue], nor a language [langage]” and that “cinema 
is composed of images and signs that come before language” (262).  
This claim goes directly against the cornerstone of tradi ional film theories 
which have been developed, as Stephen Heath famously formulates, through “the 
encounter of Marxism and psychoanalysis on the terrain of semiotics” (Heath 511). 
Deleuze’s complaint against Christian Metz and other advocates of the semiological 
paradigm is that they reduce the image to an utterance, s it were, to part of a 
syntagmatic chain. The syntagmatics apply because the image is an utterance which 
is subject to syntagmatics. The circular relationship between utterances and 
syntagmatics has been substituted for images and signs, to the point where the very 
notion of the sign as an image tends to disappear from the semiology. In other 
words, semiology allows the image to be regulated by linguistic structures in the 
form of syntagmas and paradigms. Thus, the image is reduced to an analogical sign 
belonging to an utterance, which then allows the codification of these signs, in order 
to discover the inevitable linguistic structure underlying the image.  
Deleuze’s hostility toward the Saussurean and Lacani n foundations, which 
is also evident in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateau, helps to explain the slow 
incorporation of Deleuzian film theory in the English-speaking film communities. 
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However, by setting the cinematic image as a “pre-verbal intelligible content,” 
Deleuze allows us to incorporate the cinematic image under the broader 
investigation of the sign. In other words, if “a pre-verbal intelligent content” 
belongs to his study of signs which includes literature, painting, and music, we may 
use the “pre-verbal intelligent content” as a linchpin to connect cinema with other 
forms of art.  
Then, what is “a pre-verbal intelligible content?” Or as Deleuze often 
formulates, what does it do? This question is one of the undamental questions 
Deleuze engages with throughout his oeuvre, although the question appears as a 
different register in a different guise, depending on the subject in which the question 
appears, whether that subject is philosophy, linguistics, painting, literature, or 
cinema. 
As Deleuze starts What Is Philosophy? with “there are no simple concepts” 
(15), his concepts are not always meant to be clear and they are never exactly 
“about” something, but a sort of toolbox. However, how can we pick up a saw from 
the toolbox instead of a wrench if we do not know what a saw does? My strategy is 
to pick up the simplest tool and to move on to a more complicated one. In this way, 
we may establish a connection between those tools, and in doing so we may find the 
possibilities and the limits of each tool. 
The nature of the “pre-verbal intelligible content” is first discussed in 
Deleuze’s oeuvre under the notion of “event” which becomes one of the main 
concepts in The Logic of Sense (originally published in 1969). The event is an 
incorporeal, complex and irreducible entity at the surface of things. It is the logic of 
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the event (and its linguistic expression, sense) that gives his study of signs and 
images in the arts a special status; that is, signs and images are irreducible to 
language or code. Thus the Deleuzian idea of sense entails a pragmatics of language 
prior to the postulates of generative grammar or Saussurian langue.  
His other works further complicate the event or sense by associating them 
with the terms such as affect (cinema), sensation (paiting), and becomings. By 
recapitulating the event, the affect positions itself as a pre-linguistic singularity or a 
pre-verbal intelligible content, which undermines the grip of semiology. The affect 
short-circuits the attempt to interpret images in a film by using an already existing 
set of values, morals, and meanings. Sensation can be discussed in the same way. It 
does not perceive sign as a representation, rather it s es sign in its pure movement, 
duration and rhythm, unhinged by the relation of subject and object. Thus, 
Deleuze’s concept of the event provides an important star ing point for dealing with 
the images in question, without recourse to semiotic or psychoanalytic doctrines.  
The first goal of this thesis is to follow the itinerary of the event in various 
works written by Deleuze and explicate the event’s relationship with other concepts. 
Secondly, while tracing the conceptual movement from the event to affect and 
sensation, this study also shows how each concept is used with a specific emphasis 
in the Cinema books while re-attaining the conceptual thrust of the earlier concept. 
In other words, Deleuze reformulates them in relation o “movement.” Thus, 
“affect” appears when the movement decreases to a minimum, whereas sensation 
appears to mobilize the frozen movement. 
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The third goal is to find an answer to the disappearance of sensation in the 
Cinema books. While a small number of scholars have tackled the issues of affect 
and sensation developed by Deleuze, they often overlook that Deleuze himself uses 
the notion of sensation with a caution in the Cinema books.5 Deleuze admits that 
                                                
5  Steven Shaviro’s polemic The Cinematic Body declares the bankruptcy of 
semiotic and psychoanalytic paradigms and proposes a “non-signifying image,” 
which is the “incorporeal materiality.” Steven Shaviro, The Cinematic Body 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993) 34. Thus, he emphasizes the 
cinematic experience as a bodily experience, primarily tactile and visceral. Shavrio 
says, “We neglect the basic tactility and viscerality of cinematic experience when 
we describe material processes and effects, such as the persistence of vision, merely 
as mental illusions. Cinema produces real effects in the viewer, rather than merely 
presenting phantasmic reflections to the viewer” (51). Shaviro claims that the 
viewing experience is one of physiological excitations, a kind of “physical 
affliction, an intensification and disarticulation of bodily sensation” (52). In fact, 
following Bergson, Deleuze has already claimed that all m tter, including that of 
the human subject, exists as images. Within each living ce ter, there exists a delay 
between the moment of perception and the moment of acti n, in other words, a gap 
between stimulus and response, which Shaviro calls “between the imprinting of a 
sensation and its reception” (51), and this gap is nothi g but the brain – “the center 
of indetermination in the acentred universe of images”. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: 
The Movement-Image (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986) 63. 
Brian Massumi also argues for the primacy and autonomy f affects in the reception 
of images. He equates affect with intensity and emphasizes the gap between the 
affective moment when the image first assaults us and the moment we make 
meaning. Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation, 
Post-Contemporary Interventions (Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002) 23-
45. Barbara Kennedy also expands the cinematic body into physiological human 
body that explains the cinematic as material force, not as a text to be interpreted. 
Barbara M. Kennedy, Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000) 112. She emphasizes the sensation 
“which is based upon the molecularity of matter, and functions through the 
materiality of the body of work in relation to other bodies (115). Recent scholarship 
of digital media emphasizes the role of the audience’s body in the process of affect 
and sensation. For example, Mark Hansen disagrees with Deleuze’s (mis)reading of 
Bergson, claiming, “Deleuze’s neo-Bergsonist account of the cinema carries out the 
progressive disembodying” of the human, reinforcing a notion of the machine or the 
post-human.  Mark B. N. Hansen, New Philosophy for New Media (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 2004) 5. However, despite numerous examples these authors cite 
from various scientific fields such as psychology andphysiology, it turns out to be 
awfully difficult to clarify the complex processes of exchanges between affects, 
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film images as “automatic movement” can communicate vibrations directly to the 
cortex through sensation (Deleuze Cinema 2: The Time Image 156). However, 
Deleuze also cautions that “the shock would be confused, in bad cinema, with the 
figurative violence of the represented” (157). In other words, the shock of the image 
can easily degenerate into figurative violence or glib exploitation, as many 
contemporary Hollywood films attest. Thus, this project claims that Deleuzian 
notion of “sensation” which is developed through Francis Bacon: The Logic of 
Sensation should be used in the context of cinema in conjunction with other 
Deleuzian ideas “event,” “affect” and “becomings.” In the Cinema books, the 
concept of “sensation” is retained through the discussion of signs and images, but 
buried under the notions of the “affection-image” and the “impulse-image” because 
of the way “sensation” is conceptualized in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation 
and because of the worry that “sensation” might be confused with the “sensational.” 
Although many commentators of Deleuzian sensation emphasize the physiological 
and psychological excitement of viewers, Deleuze seem to be reluctant to discuss 
sensation of an audience, at least, in the context of cinema. Cinematic sensation 
might be better called “sensation without organs.”6 
The fourth objective is to put Deleuze’s concepts side by side with Kim’s 
films so that they can initiate mutually beneficiary discussions. Among the fourteen 
                                                                                                                                          
sensations, feelings and cognition. While these authors have significantly advanced 
the Deleuzian theories of affect and sensation, their emphasis on the material impact 
on the viewer (whether it is prepersonal or embodied) is often at odd with the texts 
they analyze. Moreover, the fact that Deleuze uses “nsation” only sparsely in the 
Cinema books complicates their usage of it in film analysis under his name.  
6  This expression first appears in Orrin N C Wang, "Coming Attractions: 
Lamia and Cinematic Sensation," Studies in Romanticism 42.Winter (2003). 479.  
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films Kim made, his first film Crocodile, his fourth film The Isle, and his ninth film 
Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring will be analyzed in detail. Each of these 
three films represents each stage of Kim Ki-duk’s own transformation as a director, 
and corresponds to Deleuze’s own deployment of the event into affect, sensation, 
and becomings. Although each of these films portrays a different story, there are 
remarkable similarities and consistency, just like Deleuze’s concept of the event 
reappears with subtle variations throughout his oeuvre. Finally I move to three 
Hollywood films to see how the tools developed through the encounter between 
Kim Ki-duk and Deleuze can be used for analyses of popular Hollywood films.  
 
Chapter two first illustrates a brief history of Korean cinema and the film 
industry. Since the Korean War, government policies have been the most important 
factor of Korean cinema and the Korean film industry. The Motion Picture Law of 
1962 and its subsequent revisions in the eighties are discussed in relation to their 
impacts on Korean cinema and the Korean film industry.  Since the early nineties, 
Korean film industry has undergone tremendous changes. New production and 
distribution systems have been introduced, and these changes have also invited a 
new generation of filmmakers and producers who are playing pivotal roles today. 
The second part examines the current success of Korean cinema both in Korea and 
abroad. It identifies the success of Shiri (1999) as the turning point of contemporary 
Korean cinema which was able to capture the collectiv  experiences and memories 
of Korean audiences. The next part of Chapter two puts director Kim Ki-duk in the 
context (or the lack of) of Korean cinema. While Kim Ki-duk is considered one of 
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the best-known Korean directors outside of Korea, his relationship with Korean 
cinema and the Korean film industry has been a disjunctive one. This chapter also 
describes the reception of Kim Ki-duk in Korea and abro d. Particular attention is 
given to the Korean feminist film critics who have been the most outspoken 
opponents of Kim’s films. It also recalls several con epts of Deleuze such 
“molecular” and  “micropolitics,” and shows how Kim’s films deterritorialize, 
rather than strengthen, gender binarism. 
Chapter Three explores in detail the Deleuzian notion of event and its 
relationship with sense and affect. Borrowing from the Stoics, Deleuze introduces 
the event as a “surface effect” which does not exist per se but rather subsists on the 
surface of a thing or a state of affairs. Primarily as an ontological term, “event” 
criticizes the foundation of Western philosophy based upon substance and essence. 
Deleuze simultaneously discusses “sense” as a linguistic expression of event in The 
Logic of Sense. As the event anchors substance and its representation ont logically, 
the sense makes our propositions such as denotation, manifest tion, and 
signification possible. The cinematic expression of event/sense comes by way of 
Spinoza’s discussion of “affect (affectus)” and “affection (affection).” Once again, 
Spinoza’s philosophical terms are translated by Deleuze into aesthetical one as the 
“affection-image” which appears as enveloping the affct in Cinema 1: The 
Movment-Image.  
The affection-image is most evident in close-up of face, but Deleuze also 
suggests that the affection-image can be obtained by any-space-whatever. Kim Ki-
duk’s first film Crocodile seems to strive to attain any-space-whatever, a space 
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abstracted from spatio-temporal coordinates. Characters are introduced without 
personal or social backgrounds, and their actions defy narrative causality. The 
setting is also obscured by eliminating all spatio-temporal coordinates. In 
Crocodile, violence and death are thus presented neither for the narrative nor to 
control the audience’s emotional response, but to present them as events. 
Chapter Four first examines the similarities and differences between 
Crocodile and The Isle. While they share many similarities, they also differ in terms 
of the world they respectively present. While Crocodile can be characterized as an 
impersonal space, that is, “any-space-whatever,” the world of The Isle takes an 
“originary world,” the world of instinct and impulse. While the affect is achieved in 
Crocodile by arresting movements through the affection-image, the sensation The 
Isle evokes is attained by freeing movements through the impulse-image. The 
difference between affect and sensation in terms of move ent is confirmed by 
examining Deleuze’s study on Francis Bacon. The second part of Chapter Four 
deals with Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring. While it still investigates its 
similarities and differences with the other two films, it expands the discussions to 
the plane of consistency which characterizes the cinmatic space of Spring. 
Deleuzian ideas of “fold” and “becoming-animal” tie Deleuze’s concepts with 
Kim’s films. 
Chapter Five compares Kim Ki-duk’s films to three popular Hollywood 
films. It considers how Deleuzian ideas surveyed in the discussions of Kim’s films 
can be applied to the images of violence in contemporary Hollywood cinema. Since 
one of the interests of this project is to find a way to utilize Deleuzian concepts in 
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the analysis of popular Hollywood films, I exclude more easily comparable non-
Hollywood films and concentrate on three films which highlight violence against 
the male body. The main criteria of the selections are that each film should be 
considered as violent as Kim’s films I have discussed, but each film should be 
analyzed differently under the limited tools I have.  
At first, Chapter Five introduces the notion of “nooshock,” a broad sense of 
sensation. Deleuze always uses this word with a caution because of the danger of 
misunderstanding it as “the sensational.” Thus, the first film The Passion of The 
Christ (Mel Gibson, 2004) shows how affect and sensation can be easily canceled 
out by the simple shot/reverse shot and becomes “sensatio al”. The second film 
Reservoir Dogs (Quinten Tarantino, 1992) shows how affect and sensation move 
back and forth and how “nooshock” can be a part of that exchange. Finally, the third 
film Fight Club (David Fincher, 1999) is analyzed in terms of sensation and the 
body. While Kim Ki-duk’s films achieve affect, sensation, and becomings by 
making his isolated characters either stop or move, Fight Club achieves the same 
result through the body and pain. It shows that Deleuzian notions of affect and 
sensation not only give us the tools to understand the logic of cinematic images but 
also allow us to avoid the conventional vocabularies such as masculinity and gender 
in dealing with the violence of images.  
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Chapter Two: Kim Ki-duk and Contemporary Korean Cinema7 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, the Korean film industry has witnessed an explosive 
growth, which is evident in both Korea and abroad. Theyear 2004 was particularly 
productive. The domestic market share of Korean cinema reached 60%, surpassing 
Hollywood films. In the same year, both the Berlin International Film Festival and 
the Venice Film Festival gave director Kim Ki-duk the b st director’s awards, 
followed by Park Chan-wook’s Oldboy (2003) which received Grand Prize of Jury 
from the Cannes Film Festival. Within a six-month span, a large scale Korean 
cinema retrospective was held in Washington D.C, New York and Paris. The 
Korean film industry has been billed as the world’s most dynamic, wide-ranging 
and creative film industry for quite some time. 
Although Korean cinema has been enjoying its status as home of the 
national cinema garnering global attention, the Korean film industry was in a 
perpetual crisis from the early 1970s to the late 1990s. Just a decade ago, the 
Korean film industry was on the verge of collapse. Korean cinema had been left 
without oxygen for too long and no life support was in sight. The domestic market 
share of Korean films reached close to a single digitpercent point, and the number 
of domestic film produced in a year had been continuously shrinking from over 200 
films in the 1970s to about 43 films in 1998, its lowest point.8 
                                                
7  Korean cinema refers to “South Korean cinema” throughout this project. 
8  All raw data related to the Korean film industry can be found at the Korean 
Film Council (KOFIC) website: http://www.koreanfilm.or.kr 
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The crisis of Korean cinema, however, was not well-know  outside Korea. 
Although the history of Korean cinema dates back to the 1910s,9 Korean cinema 
was virtually non-existent in the international scene u til the late nineties. Film 
historian Robert Sklar published a nearly 600-page-long world film history book, 
Film: An International History of the Medium in 1993. In this massive book, he 
mentions the word “Korea” only a couple of times: when he discusses a Japanese 
film Death By Hanging (Nagisa Oshima, 1968) which is about a man who was born 
in Japan to Korean parents, The Manchurian Candidate (John Frankenheimer, 
1962) which has the Korean War as its backdrop and Robert Altman’s Mash (1970) 
which is supposedly set in the Korean War, though the ubiquitous conical hats 
suggest otherwise. (The conical hat, which is the iconic image of Vietnam, cannot 
be found in Korea.) Film Scholar Geoffrey Nowell-Smith compiled a massive 
volume of film history book called The Oxford History of World Cinema in 1999. It 
has almost 1,000 pages with two columns on each page. There are sections on 
American Cinema, European Cinemas, and cinemas of rest of the world, which 
includes small chapters on Indian cinema, Chinese cinema, Hong Kong cinema, 
Taiwanese cinema, Japanese cinema, Australian cinema, and Latin American 
cinema, as well as lesser known national cinemas such as Indonesian cinema, 
                                                
9  A kino-drama Uirijok Gutu (Royal Revenge) (Kim Dosan, 1919) is known 
as the first Korean film and Wolhaui Maengse (Promise under the Moon) (Yun 
Baeknam, 1923) is known as the first Korean feature film, although these claims are 
still contested. See Chapter 2 of Eungjun Min, Jinsook J and Han Ju Kwak, 
Korean Film: History, Resistance, and Democratic Imagination (Westport, Conn.: 
Praeger, 2003). 
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Turkish cinema, Arab cinema, cinemas of sub-saharan Africa, and Iranian cinema. 
However, it failed to mention anything about Korean cinema.  
This chapter gives a brief history of Korean cinema with an emphasis on its 
recent success. Since the Korean War, government policies have been the most 
important factor of Korean cinema and the Korean film industry. Since the early 
nineties, Korean film industry has undergone tremendous changes. New production 
and distribution systems were introduced, and these changes have also invited a new 
generation of filmmakers and producers. The Renaissance of Korean cinema started 
with them. The current success of Korean cinema bothin Korea and abroad is 
discussed in detail.  
The next part deals with director Kim Ki-duk and puts him in the context of 
Korean cinema. While Kim Ki-duk is one of the best-know  Korean directors 
outside of Korea, his position in the Korean film history can be best described as an 
“outsider.” Kim does not share his political view and aesthetics with any present or 
past Korean director. He also makes his films mostly outside of Chungmuro 
(Korean equivalent of Hollywood). The final part deals with the reception of Kim 
Ki-duk in Korea and abroad.  
 
2. A Brief History of Korean Cinema 
A large part of early Korean Cinema history remains uknown, even to 
Korean film historians. Under the Japanese occupation (1910 – 1945), filmmaking 
was tightly controlled by the Japanese colonial governmnt. Korean filmmakers 
were forced to use Japanese instead of Korean, and my filmmakers had to work 
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under pseudonym, or without credit. Thus, written rcords are both rare and often in 
dispute. Most of all, other than two recently found and restored films, Turning Point 
of the Youngsters (Ahn Jong-hwa, 1934) and Sweet Dream (Yang Joo-nam, 1936), 
no pre-1945 film has survived in its entirety. A quick build-up of the film industry 
after the Liberation was also crushed by the Korean War (1950 – 1953). Only five 
films have survived from the devastating war.  
After the cease-fire in 1953, then South Korean president, Rhee Syngman, 
attempted to revive the film industry by giving cinema tax exemption and by 
channeling foreign aids into the film industry. The result came quickly, as the South 
Korean film industry enjoyed a boom period, known as The Golden Age of Korean 
Cinema during the late fifties and the early sixties. It was a time when the 
government controlled the number of foreign film imports (this protectionist 
mechanism continued until 1985) and the television set was still a luxury item for 
average citizen, though television broadcasting started in South Korea in 1956. 
Without any strong competition from foreign films or other media, and with the 
influx of young talented people into the film industry, Korean cinema became the 
most important entertainment medium for the general public. The number of 
domestic productions in a year jumped from the single digit to over one hundred, 
and there was an even bigger jump in audience numbers. Pa ticularly during the 
brief period from 1960 to 1961, between the collapse of the Rhee government after 
the student revolution known as April Revolution and the military coup led by 
general Park Jung-hee which toppled the newly elected government, the Korean 
film industry enjoyed what Korean film historians often refer to as “the freest 
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moment” (Min, Joo and Kwak 47), a rare combination of mini al governmental 
regulations and massive creative energy from young directo s. However, Park’s 
regime wasted no time in starting to control the film industry. The Motion Picture 
Law of 1962 required all film companies to register with the Ministry of Culture 
and Information, setting up rigid requirements for registration including: 
 
Studio space of more than 791 square yards, sound recording capabilities, 
film laboratory facilities, a lighting system of more than 60kw of power, 
more than three 35 mm cameras, two full-time exclusively employed film 
directors, and more than two exclusively employed actors and actresses. 
Registered companies were required to produce a minimum of 15 films each 
per year. (47)  
 
While some companies survived by merging, most small companies could not meet 
these requirements and simply disappeared. This Motion P cture Law not only 
restructured the entire film industry but also determined the quality of Korean films 
for decades to come. First of all, the registration requirement made independent 
filmmaking impossible. Secondly, the registration requirement entailed, for the 
registered film companies, a complete cooperation withgovernment ideology and 
policies, since the government could simply revoke the registration of any film 
company. Socially and politically conscious subjects could not pass the initial 
scenario check up, and violence and sexuality were also off-limits (48). Under strict 
censorship, creative minds were stifled, and the Golden Age quickly turned into the 
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Dark Age. The Law was supposed to protect and foster Korean cinema by allowing 
only qualified film companies to produce films and by giving them the right to 
import foreign films as a reward. However, rather than facilitating domestic film 
production, this policy resulted in producing a large number of cheaply and hastily 
made domestic films, because the imported films were fa  more profitable than the 
domestic ones. Since the policy was intended to encourage film companies to make 
high quality films, they were officially called “quality films,” but most Koreans 
derided them as “quota-quickies.” 
 









Korean Film Produced Foreign Film Imported
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As [figure 1] shows, while the number of foreign film imports remained low until 
1985 due to the import restriction, the number of Korean film productions was also 
declining throughout the seventies. The Motion Picture Law forced the film 
industry to structure itself around the high-profit foreign films and the cheaply made 
and unprofitable domestic films. In the seventies, censorship got even harsher; 
filmmakers simply lost their creativity and many of them left the film industry for 
good. The most damaging result was that domestic audiences lost their faith in 
Korean cinema. For many, a Korean film equaled an inferior film. The free fall of 
Korean cinema was evident in the dramatic dip of the number of total admissions 
from the early seventies to the early eighties.  
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In the sixties, the amount of domestic production increased because film companies 
had to meet the government requirements, as did the number of total admissions. 
However from the early seventies, admission numbers sta ted to decline, showing a 
lack of interest from Korean audiences in domestic films. Considering the high 
popularity of Hollywood cinema, the decline of Korean cinema was even greater 
than what [figure 2] shows.  
Conceding to the US demand in 1985, a new Motion Picture Law was 
introduced, which severed the tie between production and import and abolished the 
import quota. In 1987, faced with the pressure from Washington and Hollywood, 
the Korean government revised the same law to allow foreign companies to produce 
and distribute films directly in South Korea rather than working through local 
partners. As [figure 1] shows, the number of imported films skyrocketed from 1986, 
while the domestic film production was stagnant. Although the Korean film 
industry could retain a “screen quota system,”10 many felt that the policy change 
was the final blow to Korean cinema: no proven domestic audience, no export to 
foreign countries, no accumulated capital to weather t  hard times, no 
governmental subsidy, no answer to Hollywood films and other foreign films. 
                                                
10  Screen quota system restricts not the number of imports of foreign films but 
the number of days each theatre must show Korean films in a given year. Since its 
introduction in 1967, screen quota system has undergone ma y changes. In 1985, 
the number of days which South Korean theatres must show Korean films was 146 
days, but reduced to 106 days in 1996. Currently it is 73 days. 
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While film producers, filmmakers, and actors staged a demonstration against 
the new Motion Picture Law for their survival, many South Koreans became 
politicized and started to see the demands from Washington and Hollywood as clear 
signs of cultural imperialism. Hollywood cinema seemed, for many South Koreans, 
to be like the title Fatal Attraction (Adrian Lyne, 1987), the first foreign film 
distributed directly by foreign company. When Fatal Attraction was shown on two 
theatres on the outskirt of Seoul in 1988, filmmakers and protesters picketed 
everyday in front of the theatres. Although these incidents politicized people in the 
film industry and, to some degree, the general public, everybody knew that the 
Korean film industry was in a dire crisis. When the first civilian government was 
established in 1993, the Korean film industry hit rock bottom. Korean film’s 
domestic market share fell to 10% for the first time since the Korean War, and the 
number of films produced that year was also the lowest since the Korean War. 
Although the democratic government loosened censorship, the Korean film industry 
seemed to have passed the critical point for recovery long ago. Domestic audiences, 
while sympathetic to the struggle of Korean film industry, seemed to have lost any 
interest in Korean cinema even before that.  
The revisions of the Motion Picture Law in the eighties shook up the entire 
film industry. The stable production system under the umbrella of government 
protection that was enjoyed by a handful of oligopolistic production companies was 
gone. They had to enter the open market and compete with Hollywood films. 
However this new environment was also a new opportunity for some as a new 
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generation of filmmakers and new kinds of capital started to flow into the film 
industry. 
Except for the Golden Age cinemas which boasted diverse genres and 
experimentation with new approaches to the film medium, the main genre of 
Korean cinema was melodrama. It was not only a commercially safe genre, but also 
was the only genre which filmmakers could work with without worrying too much 
about censorship. As the melodrama genre film often does,11 some of these films 
touched on various social problems without making them too obvious to draw 
censorship. However, new filmmakers who entered the film industry in the mid-
eighties (most notably Park Kwang-soo and Jang Sun-woo) started to address social 
issues more directly. They were the film buff generation and developed their 
interest in film through college cine clubs which saw cinema as a medium of change, 
influenced by theories and practices of Third World Cinema. They started as 
independent/underground filmmakers and eventually enter d the main stream 
known as “Chungmuro,” the Korean equivalent of “Hollywood.” Often dubbed the 
“Korean New Wave” or “New Korean Realism,” they not only addressed social 
issues as a part of the massive political and social move ent of the eighties, but 
also tried to find new aesthetics to express those issu s. While “Korean New Wave” 
showed a possibility to revive Korean cinema and gave birth to auteurism in Korea, 
the current success of Korean cinema started only with the influx of new capital and 
with the advent of the Korean blockbuster. 
                                                
11  See Thomas Elsaesser, “Tales of sound and fury : observations on the family 
melodrama.” Barry Keith Grant, Film Genre Reader Ii, 1st ed. (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1995). 
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From the mid eighties to the mid nineties, many non-tradi ional ways of 
funding for film production, such as “open public investment” and “venture capital,” 
started to appear. However, the main financial influx to film industry came from big 
Korean conglomerates. Particularly, electronics companies such as Samsung and 
Daewoo gave the Korean film industry a temporary life support. As VCR and 
videotape makers, they needed cheap contents to facilitate VCR sales. While they 
usually financed small budget films, they occasionally supported bigger projects. 
When the Asian Financial Crisis (known as the IMF crisis) hit South Korea in 1997, 
most of the companies pulled out their investments from the film industry. 
However, the last project financed by Samsung left a lasting impression on the film 
industry.  
 
3. Resurrection of Korean Cinema 
In 1999, South Korean news headlined with the title, “One small fish called 
‘Shiri’ sunk the Titanic.” After Titanic made new box office records in the United 
States and elsewhere, the South Korean blockbuster Shiri (Kang Jae-Kyu, 1999) 
outperformed the success of Titanic in South Korea, by breaking the box office 
records Titanic had made. As Titanic captured the imagination of the general public 
who rarely visited movie theatres in the US, Shiri became a cultural phenomenon 
which attracted Korean people who rarely went to thea res. In the time when the 
pain of the Asian Financial Crisis was still vivid and when the South Korean film 
industry was hit particularly hard, the financial success of Shiri rescued the Korean 
film industry from its financial hemorrhage. 
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Shiri is for all accounts an average action melodrama between a North 
Korean female spy/sniper and a South Korean special agent. In spite of public 
enthusiasm about the film, the critical reviews were lukewarm. It is perhaps better 
than most other Korean films of that time in terms of production values. For an 
action-melodrama genre film, however, Korean audiences have seen many better 
ones (or at least film critics have thought so).12 However, what every South Korean 
viewer immediately realized, but critical reviewers failed to understand, was that 
there is something uncanny in Shiri. For the first time, South Korean viewers could 
see North Korean characters on a big screen not as “commie bastards,” but as 
human beings who suffer from the burden of ideology, just like many South 
Koreans do. The simple realization that North Koreans are also all human beings 
came as a surprise to many South Koreans, as if they found something hitherto 
unknown for the first time. Although Shiri proved the possibility to make a 
commercially successful film, the meaning of the success was not immediately clear 
to the film industry. It thought that the action-packed Hollywood style thriller was 
the answer to the Hollywood blockbusters, and thus produced several big budget 
action films which eventually failed at the box office. It did not realize that Shiri 
had something that only a Korean film could offer. In other words, Shiri appealed to 
the collective memories, history, and national identities of Korean people, which 
Hollywood films could not offer. Recent top box office films prove this: 
 
                                                
12  J. Hoberman of Village Voice wrote, “the script was reportedly rewritten a 
dozen times… either 11 times too many or else too few” (Village Voice, Feb 6-12, 
2002). 
 






Table 1: Top-grossing films in the South Korean box-office. 
 
1999 Shiri (Korea) 
2000 JSA: Joint Security Area (Korea) 
2001 
Friends (Korea), My Sassy Girl (Korea), Kick the Moon (Korea), My 
wife is Gangster (Korea), Hello Dalma (Korea), Shrek (US) 
2002 Lord of the Rings: Two Towers (US) 
2003 Memories of Murder (Korea) 
2004 Tae Guk-gi: Brotherhood (Korea), Silmido (Korea) 
2005 Welcome to Dongmakgol (Korea) 
2006 Host (Korea), King and the Clown (Korea) 
 
Since 1999, except for Lord of the Rings: Two Towers in 2002, Korean films have 
topped the box office every year. In 2001, the top five lms were all Korean films 
and Shrek was the distant sixth. Among these top grossing films, Shiri, JSA, Tae 
Guk-gi: Brotherhood, Silmido, and Welcome to Dongmakgol are all North Korea 
related films, whether they are about the Korean War, the cold war or re-unification. 
Friends and Memories of Murder appeal to the collective but painful memories of 
the early eighties. King and the Clown, set in the early 16th century, revisits a tragic 
story of Yi dynasty. In other words, Korean cinema has succeeded in attracting 
domestic audiences by recounting their memories, experiences and stories. It might 
seem that there is nothing remarkable that Korean films tell Korean stories to 
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Korean audiences. However this simple realization was precisely the key to success 
of Korean cinema. It allowed the Korean film industry to build its success on the 
domestic market, rather than on a couple of directors or on a particular genre or on a 
particular film movement. In other words, unlike other national cinemas which have 
enjoyed considerable success for some time, Korean cinema did not confine itself 
within a particular genre or a style. Korean cinema is diverse. 
For example, Japanese postwar cinema and Chinese Fifth generation films 
attracted international audiences with their exotic costume dramas. Hong Kong 
films did that with its knack in martial arts films and cop movies. Iran has become a 
cinematic hotbed with its innocent, pollution free films with subtle political 
messages. Taiwanese films did it with an artistic flavor and became art house 
favorites for some time. However, these film traditions a d movements were short-
lived, particularly because their success was not based upon their own domestic 
market. Film history has proven that any film movement without support from the 
domestic audience is fleeting. Particularly when these movements were the only 
viable forces in their respective countries, the entir  film industry went down when 
they started to lose their glamour. 
Unlike other national cinemas, current Korean cinema lacks any unifying 
characteristic. Rather Korean cinema offers all. Director Im Kwon-taek, a father 
figure of Korean cinema who finished his 100th film last year, still makes costume 
dramas; young director Yu Seong-wan, who idolizes Jackie Chan, makes martial 
arts films; female director Lee Jung-hyang was a huge s ccess with The Way Home 
(2002), which is reminiscent of Abbas Kiarostami of Iran. Hong Sang-su, whose 
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films are often compared with Taiwanese filmmaker Hsiao-hsien Hou, makes even 
drier films than Hou does. 
Korean film industry also offers a truly full range of filmmaking, not only in 
terms of diverse genres but also in terms of diverse modes f filmmaking such as 
documentary, animation, experimental film and commercial film. Hong Kong is 
notorious for its lack of non-commerical filmmaking, while Taiwan does not have 
viable commercial filmmakings. Thus, Chris Berry calls Korean cinema a “Full 
service cinema” (Berry). He implies that the Korean film industry and film culture 
are highly diversified. Korean cinema includes mainstream feature films, an active 
documentary movement, art cinema, animation, film festivals, an archive with an 
active screening program, many film schools, and so forth. It is not coincidence that 
the countries which have highly successful film industries, such as the US and 
France, also have this full service cinema model. 
The recent success of Korean cinema domestically and internationally is 
quite impressive. The domestic market share of Korean films has reached almost 
60%, which makes the Korean film industry one of the only three countries (the 
others being U.S. and India) in the world that dominates its own market. What is 
more impressive is that Korea has become the only nation in film history to have 





















These numbers are quite remarkable, if they are compared to other major film 
industries.   
Table 2: Market Share of National Films in Major Film Countries (%).   
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
5 year 
average 
India* n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 95.00 
U.S. 93.4 95.7 94.3 96.3 95.1 94.96 
Korea 39.7 35.1 50.1 48.3 53.5 45.34 
France 32.4 28.9 41.4 35.1 35 34.56 
Japan 31.9 31.8 39.0 27.1 34.0 32.76 
Italy 24.1 17.5 19.4 22.2 21.8 21.00 
Germany 14.0 12.5 18.4 11.9 17.5 14.86 









1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
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England 16.5 19.6 4.9 8.3 10.2 11.90 
Australia 3.0 7.9 7.8 4.9 3.5 5.42 
* The market share of Indian films in India is estimated. 
The success of Korean cinema goes beyond the domestic market. While 
Korean film export was virtually non-existent just a decade ago, the dollar amount 
of the Korean film export has almost doubled every year since 2000, though Korean 
film export is most visible in Asian countries. The dramatic increase of Korean film 
export to Asian countries coincides with the growing influence of hallyu (often 
translated into “Korean wave” or “Korean Fever”) in Asia. Hallyu refers to the 
phenomena that people in Asia (notably Japan, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Vietnam) avidly enjoy and consume Korean pop culture including music, television 
dramas, fashion and cinema since the late nineties. Although Korean cinema joined 
the forces of Hallyu after the success of other pop cultures, it quickly gained 
momentum causing importing countries to feel that the growing popularity of 
Korean cinema was a threat to their own film industrie .  
A couple of years ago, the leading English Newspaper in Viet Nam, Viet 
Nam News, lamented that many film theatre owners refused to show the Vietnamese 
film Song Trong So Hai (Living in Fear) which had received the best director and 
best movie awards from the Viet Nam Cinematography Associati n. According to 
the Newspaper, 
 
Galaxy [theatre] was the only moviehouse willing to screen Living in Fear. 
But after only one day of screening, Galaxy’s cinema management board 
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decided to withdraw the film’s slot to more commercially popular 
Hollywood and South Korean movies. (Thu) 
 
Although the report came from Hanoi, not from New York  Paris, it is still 
remarkable to see another Asian country puts Korean films next to Hollywood 
films, because the same complaint was common in South Korean newspapers just a 
decade ago. 
Because the breathtaking transformation of the Korean cinema from near 
extinction to an unprecedented success is still undergoing, it is difficult to have a 
clear picture of the whole landscape. It is customary to divide contemporary Korean 
cinema into three categories: producer-centered “package cinema,” Korean 
blockbusters and director-centered auteur cinema (B. Kim 8).13 However, the line 
between blockbuster films and art films is far less clear than that of other countries. 
For example, many top-grossing blockbusters such as JSA, Welcome to 
Dongmakgol and King and the Clown were at first produced and financed as 
independent art films, but later were expanded to the multiple theatres and became 
blockbusters. Recent blockbuster film D-War (Shim Hyung-rae, 2007), which was 
the Korean top box office hit in 2007 and opened on more than 2000 screens in the 
US, was initially financed through independent investors. In a sense, Korean cinema 
                                                
13  “Package Cinema” started with remaking of production and distribution 
system in the late eighties. New production companies which lacked both stable 
investments and distribution channels made a package deal with investors and 
distributors with detailed plans including synopsis, market research, star system, 
director, promotion plan and sponsorship. These films became highly market-
oriented and commercial films, though a package sometimes included blockbuster 
films and/or art films. 
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has succeeded in combining commercial appeal and artistic quality, which might 
explain the strength of Korean cinema. 
The aesthetic topography of Korean cinema is murkier than the industrial 
map. Since the late eighties, a great variety of new and talented directors have 
entered the film industry. Unlike pre-1980 directors who were trained in the 
Chungmuro guild system, these new directors were mostly film buffs (most notably 
The Korean New Wave directors) or film school graduates (most post-1996 
directors). While The Korean New Wave directors were inclined towards realism, 
later generations preferred hybrid genre films with their own distinctive style to the 
traditional genre films. Kim Ki-duk debuted in 1996 between these two generations. 
 
4. Kim Ki-duk in the context of contemporary Korean Cinema. 
The year that Kim Ki-duk debuted with Crocodile was an uncertain time in 
Korean film history. While the film industry was reeling, it also started to see new 
talents and capitals coming into the film industry. Hong Sang-soo, who graduated 
from the US film school, made his first film The Day A Pig Fell into the Well 
(1996), which immediately received rave praises at home and abroad. Another 
celebrated director Lee Chang-dong, then already renowned novelist, released his 
first film Green Fish (1997) soon after. Although the real transformation of the 
entire film industry had to wait a couple more years until the release of Shiri (1999), 
these new directors and Korean New Wave directors, who ere re-inventing 
themselves, were the main forces of Korean cinema, and their influences can be 
easily found in many young directors working in Korea today.  
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However, when Crocodile was released in 1996, nobody paid much attention 
to it. Director Kim had no previous experience in filmmaking at any level, had no 
formal education in filmmaking (nor any higher education) as many his 
contemporaries did, and had no visible tie with the filmindustry. The film itself was 
considered a crude and poorly made independent film. Were it not for the steady 
invitations from the international film festivals, Kim could not have made another 
film after that and his name could have been easily buried in the statistics.  
It is not easy to situate Kim Ki-duk within the discusion of contemporary 
Korean cinema. Using Kim Ki-duk’s film as a proof of diversity of current Korean 
cinema is one thing, but putting Kim in the context of cntemporary Korean cinema 
is another. First of all, Kim Ki-duk’s films are different from other Korean films in 
terms of their lack of domestic appeal. While the current success of Korean cinema 
is primarily buttressed by its success at the domestic box office, Kim’s films rarely 
break even at the domestic box office. Rather than referring to actual historical 
events and times in Korean history, as other commercially successful films do, his 
film gives few clues to the actual time and space. Kimmanages to alienate domestic 
audiences enough so that they feel his films are exotic. Furthermore Kim is not 
afraid to go abroad to shoot, as he did with his second film, Wild Animals (1996). 
He also uses non-Korean actors for major roles as in Address Unknown (2001) and 
in Breath (2007). 
In the eighties, Korean New Wave directors started thir career with a strong 
sense of the social responsibility of cinema under th  harsh political oppression of 
that time. Although it was never a unifying movement, they started to make socially 
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conscious films by injecting issues of social injustice. The progressive political 
ideas have been shared by many contemporaries well beyond the eighties and the 
nineties. However, Kim does not fit in this framework, either. At first glance his 
political view seems to point to the opposite direction, si ce his films try to steer 
away from the social/political structures and issues, even when they are the obvious 
themes of his film. (Address Unknown set in a small town near a US military base 
has been analyzed many times unsuccessfully from the point of view of 
postcolonialism.) While Kim usually has working class characters, they never break 
out of their socio-economic positions. While contemporary Korean cinema in 
general pursues both artistic quality and commercial appeal, Kim continues to 
prefer a low-budget independent film to the high production value. Thus, his film is 
often too crude to be artistic and too violent to be commercially successful. No one 
in Korean film history has made a film similar to Kim’s. Thus, Kim is a complete 
outsider of Korean cinema from every angle whether it is politics, aesthetics or a 
production system. Kim’s film is a nuisance, a vexing point which disrupts any neat 
explanation of contemporary Korean cinema. Several books n contemporary 
Korean cinema have been published in recent years. However most of them mention 
Kim only in passing or ignore him completely.  
The first Korean cinema history book, Korean Film: History, Resistance, 
and Democratic Imagination (Min, Joo and Kwak, 2003), never mentions Kim Ki-
duk and his films. Kyung Hyun Kim’s fine work on contemporary cinema, The 
Remasculinization of Korean Cinema (2004), leaves Kim Ki-duk untouched, though 
Kim’s characters seem to fit well into the overall theme of the book: “South Korean 
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cinema renegotiated its traumatic modern history in ways that reaffirm masculinity 
and the relations of dominance” (K. H. Kim 9).14 A recent publication, New Korean 
Cinema (Shin, 2005), analyzes a dozen contemporary Korean films but Kim’s film 
is not one of them. While most agrees that Director Kim i-duk is one of the most 
important directors currently working in South Korea, he is an outsider of Korean 
cinema. He does not belong to the current production/distribution system, nor share 
aesthetics with other past or present Korean directors. It is not an exaggeration 
when New York Post film critic V.A. Musetto writes in a review of Time (2006), “I 
do know that Kim in more popular in New York than in Seoul.” Thus, when Kim is 
discussed as a Korean director in Korea, it is usually in the context of international 
film festivals. 
 
5. The receptions of Kim Ki-duk 
While Kim’s films have been met with polemical reception at home, they 
have enjoyed considerable success on the international f lm festival and art house 
circuit.  Although a serious study on director Kim Ki-duk has yet to be written, it is 
not difficult to find favorable reviews of his films among Western film critics. For 
example, Roger Ebert of The Chicago Sun-Times finds poetic quality in The Isle 
that mixes with a somber warning of brutality (Ebert), and Stephen Holden of The 
New York Times writes, “The Isle… is a movie of extremes, and that goes for its 
aesthetics. As gory as the scenes of torture and self-mutilation may be, they are 
                                                
14  Kyung Hyun Kim explains that the omission of Kim Ki-duk is simply 
because the design of the book was defined too early to include Kim in depth. 
However Kyung Hyun Kim has a chapter on Hong Sang-su who debuted the same 
year with Kim Ki-duk. 
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pitted against shimmering cinematography that lends the etting the ethereal beauty 
of an Asian landscaping painting” (Holden). 
 However, the only lengthy article about Kim Ki-duk in English is less 
celebratory. “Sexual Terrorism: The Strange Case of Kim i-duk,” written by Tony 
Rayns in the November-December, 2004 issue of Film Comment, is an unforgiving 
assault on Kim’s films, his success, and himself. The article was a surprise to many 
because it appeared in a special issue of Film Comment hat was devoted to the 
recent success of South Korean Cinema in conjunction with the New York Korean 
Film Festival held at Lincoln Center in 2004. Additionally, the article was written 
by Tony Rayns, a well-known Asian film expert and film festival organizer, who 
was responsible for introducing Kim’s unknown films to the international film 
festivals.15 In the article, Rayns claims “all of Kim’s movies are directly and 
indirectly autobiographical,” and, “to the best of my knowledge, Kim himself 
doesn’t beat up women or force them into prostitution, but these protagonists are all 
in some sense surrogates for the director” (Rayns 50). After a brief remark on the 
similarities between Fassbinder and Kim, Rayns adds, “If Kim is a Korean 
Fassbinder, he’s a Fassbinder without the questioning itelligence, without the 
cinephile knowledge of his own antecedents, and without the kind of self-awareness 
that allows personal trauma to be turned into viable drama” (51). Rayns blames 
Western film critics for the undeserving international success of Kim, stating: “It’s 
as if they’re so hung up on the ‘otherness’ of Oriental cultures that their bullshit 
                                                
15  Kim Ki-duk’s first film Crocodile was invited to the Vancouver 
International Film Festival in 1996 and Tony Rayns was one of the programmers of 
the festival. 
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detectors stop working” (52). Rayns’ rather harsh comments are oftentimes 
problematic themselves. For example, his reference to Orientalism is puzzling, since 
none of Kim’s films rely on anything remotely resembling “oriental” culture, except 
Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring. 
 The comparison between Fassbinder and Ki-duk is also bamboozling. As is 
well-known among well-versed Korean film connoisseurs, Kim is a junior-high 
dropout, who spent most of his teens and early adulthood in various factories, and 
served a prolonged term in the Marines. On the other hand, Fassbinder spent most 
of his childhood in movie theatres and cultivated his artistic taste and knowledge as 
a member of Munich’s Action-Theatre, later known as Anti-Theater (antiteater). 
(Rayns, as the author of Fassbinder (1980), fully knows of these biographical 
facts.) It might therefore be true that Kim is incapable of articulating his cinematic 
vision with a vast knowledge of film theories and film history. However, it is unfair 
to compare Kim to Fassbinder in terms of their “cinephile knowledge,” when Kim 
claims his first movie going experience was watching The Lovers On the Bridge 
(Leos Carax, 1991) in his thirties in France.   
As Deleuze reiterates in many places, directors invent images just as 
philosophers invent concepts (Deleuze Cinema 1: The Movement-Image x), and 
inventing images is neither less important nor less difficult than inventing concepts 
(Deleuze Negotiations, 1972-1990 125). If Kim can invent images tantamount to 
those of Fassbinder without the knowledge and the history of cinema or the 
intellectual questioning, then Rayns’ claim in fact elevates Kim to the romantic 
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ideal of a genius.16 One might argue that because Kim has been less exposed to 
cinema, he could look through the camera with less clichés burdening him. 
Nevertheless, the loudest outcry against Kim’s films can be heard from 
feminist film critics in Korea. Unlike Rayns’ claims, Korean feminist film critics’ 
displeasure with Kim has more substance. Kim’s film can certainly be condemned 
for its graphical and thematically degrading portrayals of the female gender. In most 
of his films, female characters are prostitutes in one way or another and victims of 
abuse, violence, rape, and humiliation. Kim seems to be fascinated by the rape-is-
so-romantic fantasy and the misogynistic virgin-whore dichotomy. Each time his 
film comes to a theatre, Korean feminist film critics voice their opinions. One such 
critic, Sim Young-sup, who is also a practicing psychiatrist, comments in a Korean 
weekly film magazine Film 2.0, after watching The Isle: “The male desire of The 
Isle resembles the revenge-impulse of a severe psychosis. What I am not so sure is 
that whether it is the impulse of the character or the director” (Sim). Another well-
known militant feminist film critic Ju Yu-sin writes in a review for Bad Guy (2001), 
in the leading South Korean newspaper Dong-A Ilbo (Dong-A daily): “This kind of 
film is a threat to women. If anybody approves this film for any reason, it is an 
insult to all women” (Ju). 
Although I share their concern about the degrading portrayals of women, I 
also worry that the moralistic judgment of image might foreclose any further 
                                                
16 The essential characteristic of genius for Kant is originality. According to 
Kant, originality has two aspects.  One is non imitative production and the other is 
discovering what cannot be taught or learned. See Immanuel Kant and James Creed 
Meredith, The Critique of Judgement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952). §46-49. 
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discussion. I am not suggesting that 1970s feminist film criticism, which concerns 
the negative and positive depictions of women in film, is now irrelevant. The 
practices exemplified by Molly Haskell (From Reverence to Rape 1974) and 
Marjorie Rosen (Popcorn Venus: Women, Movies, and the American Dream 1973) 
are still resonant in the discussions of gender, race, ethnicity and sexuality. 
However, it is not clear to me what it means simply to label a film as misogynistic, 
particularly when the misogynistic images and stories are so evident. If misogyny is 
laid bare, what is the point of uncovering it? It is difficult to believe that the 
misogynistic images of Kim’s films produce a misogynistic audience or that an 
audience blindly accepts and approves any malicious gender politics that Kim’s 
films might suggest. In fact, the misogynistic images and stories are so blatant that 
it is difficult for anyone to take them for granted, without being appalled by them. 
One might argue that feminist film criticism makes salient the category of gender 
and gender hierarchy which could be hidden in the film text. Kim’s films might 
have a more sinister structural imbalance of gender than he simple misogynistic 
images. However, as Steven Shaviro suggests, behind this argument lies an 
assumption that we can free ourselves from ideology and oppression by identifying 
and theorizing our entrapment within them (Shaviro 11). In other words, the more 
people subsume events under transcendental conditions such as gender hierarchy, 
the more they end up reinforcing and amplifying those conditions. Shaviro thus 
writes that “Mulvey’s analyses of fetishism and scopophilia in mainstream 
Hollywood cinema end up constructing an Oedipal, phallic paradigm of vision that 
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is much more totalizing and monolithic than anything the films she discusses are 
themselves able to articulate” (12).   
It might sound reasonable to assume that we are fully equipped in advance to 
gauge and to determine which images constitute misogyny. However, this process 
of recognition, which is based upon what Deleuze might call “common sense” and 
“good sense,” reinstitutes the reified category of the gender binary, which feminism 
presumably intends to overcome. Moreover, the rigid segment between men and 
women cannot be undone by the same binary machine which identifies men and 
women in rigid terms. While many Korean feminist film critics have pointed out the 
negative representations of woman such as female subsrvience, passivity, and 
masochism from the viewpoint of female identity, little has been said about the 
equally degrading portrayals of males in Kim’s films. In fact, Kim’s male characters 
fare far worse than their female counterparts. Kim has no intention to glorify 
misogynistic male behavior or to provide any ground to justify them. For example, 
Bad Guy could be a simple melodrama if the film had ended with the prostitute and 
the thug being separated and the thug’s punishment. Instead, Kim lets the pimp 
continue to profit from her sexual labor and effectively closes off any possibility of 
atonement or salvation. The pimp starts as a villain and remains as one.  
I do not mean to imply that the negative representation of women can be 
somehow compensated by the equally negative representation of men. Instead of 
grounding the female subject by opposing her to the malesubject, I suggest, 
following Deleuze, that we look at the molecular movement which constitutes 
subjectivity that is mobile and active, and which challenges the binary of gender 
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itself.17 Refusing women’s subjectivity to function as a ground, Deleuze suggests 
micropolitics or the molecular line, which analyzes more subtle and flexible flows 
and “escapes the binary organizations, the resonance apparatus, and the overcoding 
machine” (Deleuze and Guattari A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia 216). Deleuze and Guattari insist that both men and women must 
become-woman in order to deterritorialize the binary organization of sexuality 
(276). 
Kim’s films can be read more productively in terms of molecular becomings. 
In fact, Kim’s films make it difficult for an audience to bring already codified 
gender binarism. As I mentioned earlier, one of the most noticeable characteristics 
of Kim’s film is the muteness of main characters. Particularly in The Isle, Bad Guy, 
3-Iron, and The Bow, the main character of each film does not have a single 
                                                
17  The simple way to understand the molar/molecular pair is to think it as 
Physics does; “molar” usually refers a body of matter as a whole and “molecular” as 
a simple or elementary structure pertaining to molecules, although Deleuze and 
Guattari insist that size does not matter in molar/molecular distinction. A clear cut 
definition of molar/molecular is nowhere found in their writings; but Deleuze and 
Guattari tend to use molar in terms of the production of the same (being), while 
molecular is often associated with the disruption of the production-of-the-same 
(becoming). Also, “molar” often refers to a coded whole while “molecular” often 
calls forth a series of other concepts such as haecceity, singularity, and event. In A
Thousand Plateaus, they do point out that “May 1968 event” in France was a 
molecular mass event, because despite social “classes (molarity)” crystallize 
“masses (molecularity)” masses are constantly flowing or leaking from classes. 
Thus, the event of May 1968 is an eruption of pure vi tuality from which something 
new were created; that is why politician, the parties, the unions, and even many 
leftists, who mostly had concerned molar lines such as “class,” could not anticipate 
its development. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) 
213. 
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speaking line.18 These silent faces refuse to accept the social segmentations and they 
engage with each other without the already codified and valorized language. When 
they do speak, their language stutters.19 The male character in Bad Guy first appears 
with his throat marked with the long lash of a scar and never speaks until almost the 
end of the film. When he finally speaks, we hear a shrieking sound, a kind of 
primitive, stuttering language. Language literally stutters. According to Deleuze, 
“stuttering” foregrounds the minority status of language, that is, the becoming-
minor of language itself. In a world devoid of meaning, language remains a surplus. 
By refusing to take a part in major language, Kim’s characters engage in a 
molecular relationship in which the rigid molar binarism is deterritorialized.  
The stuttering signs and images create lines of rupture and escape. Devoid of 
easily recognizable identity, whether it is familial, social, gender or class, Kim’s 
characters collide with each other and frequently become violent. Thus, their 
relationship is not always clear to the audience, and we are often left without a clue 
for apprehending their relationship. It seems to me that what critics really find 
unsettling about Kim’s films are not their political incorrectness but the molecular 
                                                
18  In an informal interview between director Kim and mewhich was held in 
Washington DC in 2004, he attributed the lack of dialogue in his films to his 
experience in France in the early nineties. Before his directorial debut, he was an 
aspiring painter drawing on the street of Paris. He could not speak a single French 
word but could make friends who were also non-French speakers, mostly immigrant 
workers from Africa and the Middle East. He recalled that he had felt strong 
connection, even though verbal conversation had not been possible. 
19  According to Deleuze, “Stutter” is “an affective and i tensive language” 
which disturbs the language system. Stuttering does not tart with words which are 
embedded in the language system. It sets a language system in motion. Gilles 
Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1997) 107-9. 
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becomings which escape our traditional theoretical grids. While film criticism 
attempts to apply concepts already provided by theories, Kim’s films destabilize 
ready-made ideas. 
In The Coast Guard (2002), for example, the main female character Mi-yung 
loses her boyfriend while making love on the beach because a coast guard  
misconceives the boyfriend as a northern spy. After watching her lover brutally 
blown to pieces by a hand grenade, she goes insane. Lter many coast guard troops 
rape her one by one. When she turns out pregnant, the troops kidnap her to perform 
an abortion. After the operation, still bleeding from the crotch, she submerges 
herself in a fishtank, biting the head of live fish and turning the water red. As is 
often the case in Kim’s films, the woman’s body becomes the object of sexual and 
physical violence. It can be conveyed that this is another example of Kim’s 
propensity to brutalize female bodies. However, this particular fishtank scene 
exceeds any semiotic or psychological interpretation. Her action cannot be 
explained by recourse to the psychic mechanism in play, nor semiotic meshes of the 
fishtank, water, blood, live-fish, or biting. There is no narrative or psychological 
logic to explain her action. Instead these images disturb identity, system, and order; 
and thus threaten our complacency to the meaning. Beyond the recognitions of who 
she is and what happens to her, these images force us to think. They are what 
Deleuze terms as signs, which are no longer objects of rec gnition, but objects of a 
fundamental encounter.  
Thus, Kim’s images which are devoid of language open an experiential 
dimension that is presubjective and prepresentational, which Deleuze associates 
   
49 
 
with various terms such as event, sense, affect, sensatio , and becomings. To 
criticize Kim’s films in terms of gender opposition is to re-instate the molar gender 
hierarchy into the molecular plane which belongs to al gic of sense and event, 
rather than of representation, signification, or meaning.  
Kyung Hyun Kim, the author of Remasculinization of Korean Cinema, looks 
at the modern history of Korea as a series of traumas – Japanese colonialism, 
national division, the Korean War, the US presence, military dictatorship, rapid 
Westernization, Asian Financial Crisis, and so forth. He argues that the repressive 
modern history of Korea is represented through male tr umas which become the 
central narrative and visual motif of contemporary Korean cinema. Informed by 
Slavoj Zizek’s definition of “trauma” as “an impossible k rnel which resists 
symbolization, totalization, symbolic integration” (K. H Kim 4), Kyung Hyun Kim 
reformulates the trauma as “lack.” Thus, Korean cinema represents “the desire for 
psychic wholeness and the putative recovery from the male lack” (22). According to 
him, while the female gender has been subject to much more severe social, 
economic and political oppressions as well as patriarchy, Korean cinema finds only 
the psychologically and physically traumatized (thus demasculinized) males and 
their attempts for remasculinization. Kyung Hyun Kim concludes that in 
contemporary Korean cinema “gender roles have remained remarkably consistent 
such that the representation of the woman is still caught between the mother and the 
   
50 
 
whore, and the crisis is a male one – in which the man ust resort to violence in 
order to recover himself from trauma” (258).20 
At first glance, Kim Ki-duk’s male characters seem to be an easy fit to 
Kyung Hyun Kim’s paradigm. Most of Kim’s male characters are marginalized and 
disenfranchised, and cannot find a stable place or relationship in main stream 
society. Stripped from the possibility to re-enter society, they rely on their corporeal 
mastery at the expense of women’s misery. However, th se characters are not such 
molar subjects categorized by class, gender, nation or history that Kyung Hyun Kim 
suggests. They may occupy the lowest ladder of the Koran society, but their 
interest is not in climbing up the ladder. They may gain a control over the female 
counterpart for a moment, but the remasculinization through the establishment of 
patriarchy is not in their agenda. They not only lose their control immediately, but 
also prefer to stay as a minority. To make Kyung Hyun Kim’s thesis work, an 
audience should sympathize with the male character. The viewer should understand 
the character’s trauma and feel bad about his sense of “lack.” However, as I have 
said earlier, it is unlikely that an audience sympathizes with Kim’s male characters; 
nobody feels sorry for their trauma and their lost masculinity. 
Again, Kim Ki-duk is the consummate outsider of Korean cinema. Even the 
very credible gender paradigm cannot contain him. Kyung Hyun Kim bypasses him 
                                                
20  While Kyung Hyun Kim’s book is the most engaging study on Korean 
cinema to date, its heavy reliance on Lacanian psychoanalysis is often too reductive. 
As I wrote elsewhere, “Kim… finds everywhere he goes a phallus, a lack, a fetish. 
When the theoretical framework only allows females the castrated position, it is 
impossible to find a female outside the triad of “father-mother-me.” Hyunjun Min, 
"The Remasculinization of Korean Cinema (Book Review)," The Journal of Asian 
Studies 63.4 (2004): 1157. 
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and wonders why Korean cinema cannot have independent and strong female 
characters. If he has included director Kim Ki-duk in h s inquiry, he might have 
heard the voice from the outside, the voice which undermines the 
masculine/feminine dichotomy itself. 
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Chapter Three: From Event to Affect in Crocodile 
 
1. Introduction 
Deleuze once confessed in an interview with Raymond Bellour and Francois 
Ewald, right after the publication of The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1993): 
“I’ve tried in all my books to discover the nature of events; it’s a philosophical 
concept, the only one capable of ousting the verb “to e” and attributes” (Deleuze 
Negotiations, 1972-1990 141).21 Deleuze is not talking about “event” in terms of its 
dictionary definition, as “something that happens” or “something spectacular,” nor 
in our everyday usages of it, such as “media event” or “p litical event.” Instead, 
Deleuze uses the notion of “event” to constitute his ontol gy by replacing any 
primary appeal to “substances,” which have played a central role in western 
metaphysics, as the fundamental reality qualified by predicates. 
The first section of this chapter introduces the Deleuzian notion of event and 
its relationship with sense through the reading of The Logic of Sense. Following the 
Stoics, who distinguish between actual bodies and incorporeal effects, Deleuze 
introduces event as a “surface effect” which does not exist per se but rather subsists 
on the surface of a thing or a state of affairs. Primarily s an ontological term, 
“event” criticizes the foundation of Western philosophy based upon substance and 
essence. Deleuze simultaneously discusses “sense” as a linguistic expression of 
                                                
21  “Events” also have been a very contentious topic among many contemporary 
philosophers such as Jae-gwan Kim, Donald Davidson, David Lewis, and W.V.O. 
Quine. In the tradition of analytic philosophy, their questions are geared to the 
conditions of event.  
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event: the expressed of the proposition. As the event anchors substance and its 
representation in Ontology, the sense makes our propositions such as denotation, 
manifestation, and signification possible. Although Deleuze does not associate the 
event exclusively with any type of event, his usage of vent clearly signals “a 
traumatic event” such as violence, wound, and death. The event confronts us 
because its meaning cannot be given either subject or object, either essence or 
appearance.  
The next section introduces Kim Ki-duk’s debut film Crocodile and shows 
how it challenges our habitual viewing experiences and calls for a different 
paradigm for analysis. Deleuzian idea of “the affection-image” is introduced to 
meet the challenge. Spinoza’s distinction between “affect (affectus)” and “affection 
(affection)” helps us understand the logic of “the affection-image” which envelops 
the affect. The affection-image is most evident in close-up of face, but Deleuze also 
suggests that the affection-image can be obtained by any-space-whatever freed from 
spatio-temporal coordinates. The final section puts Crocodile and the affection-
image side by side. In Crocodile, characters are introduced without personal or 
social backgrounds, and their actions often defy narrative causality. The setting is 
also obscured by eliminating all spatio-temporal coordinates. Thus in Crocodile, 
violence and death are presented not for the narrative or to control the audience’s 
emotional response but to become events. 
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2. The Deleuzian Event 
The “event” appears in Deleuze’s writings as early as in Nietzsche and 
Philosophy (originally published in 1962) and is further developed in Difference 
and Repetition (originally published in 1968).22 However, it was in The Logic of 
Sense (originally published in 1969), where the “event” becomes one of the central 
subjects of his inquiry. Nevertheless, the task to define the event proves a 
cumbersome job. Deleuze suggests that the attempt to make the event obvious is 
similar to Lewis Carroll’s “Snark Hunt” – the hunt for the fictional monster that is 
unimaginable (Deleuze The Logic of Sense 20). In a lecture humorously entitled “A 
Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event,” Jacques Derrida echoes the 
same sentiment: 
 
The event’s eventfulness depends on this experience of the impossible. What 
comes to pass, as an event, can only come to pass if it’  impossible. If it’s 
possible, if it’s foreseeable, then it doesn’t come to pass… A predicted event 
is not an event. The event falls on me because I don’t see it coming. (Derrida 
451) 
 
                                                
22  In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze introduces the notion of “sense (and 
non-sense)” as “what is expressed by a proposition” (154). To distinguish sense 
from the object and from the proposition, Deleuze claims it should be stated in 
infinitive or participle form such as “to-be-God or God-being, the being-blue of the 
sky” (156). Deleuze calls this complex as an ideal event; “It is an objective entity, 
but one of which we cannot say that it exists in itself: it insists or subsists, 
possessing a quasi-being or an extra-being, that minimum of being common to real, 
possible and even impossible objects” (156).   
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The main reason of the elusiveness of the event is that, according to Deleuze, it 
defies our representational thinking; namely, it cannot be represented by our usual 
propositions, such as denotation, manifestation and signification. 
Let’s say “September eleventh” is an event. The comprehension of the event 
entails the assumption that its meaning (terrorist attack) nd its significance (the 
beginning of the war on terrorism) might be reconstituted by available discursive 
resources (Islamic resentment against the US), concepts (Jihad), images (the 
collapse of the World Trade Center), conventions (national security), and so on so 
forth.  Moreover, this comprehension occurs within a narrative, order, or code that 
is already recognized. Therefore, the comprehension of a  event imply the existence 
of a pre-constituted apparatus which serves not only t provide the instruments for 
naming or explaining what has happened, but also an anticipatory framework to be 
ready for the future event. If one comes to recognize or reckon with the event only 
by recourse to these apparatus, then at bottom we always apprehend the event in 
advance, before it even takes place.23 From the framework we have, we may say 
“9/11 was an event involving a series of coordinated suicide attacks by al-Qaeda 
upon the United States.” However if someone says “9/11 was a victory of Jihadism,” 
that someone has a different framework. The important point is not to claim how 
this insight makes the truth of the event relative but to see how comprehending the 
                                                
23  Right after 9/11, Derrida also says in a dialogue with Giovanna Borradori 
“[9/11] is to a large extent conditioned, constituted, if not actually constructed, 
circulated at any rate through the media by means of a prodigious techno-socio-
political machine… [this event] remains ineffable, like an intuition without 
concept… We do not in fact know what we are saying or naming in this way 9/11.” 
Giovanna Borradori, "9/11 and Global Terrorism: A Dialogue with Jacques 
Derrida," Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and 
Jacques Derrida (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 2003). 
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event tells us more about the framing apparatus of the event than anything purely 
about the event itself. 
This process of comprehension is based upon, according to Deleuze, our 
“common sense” and “good sense,” which he sees as two essential yet unexamined 
presuppositions of Western thought. “Common sense” usually takes the form of 
“everybody knows” and reduces thinking to recognition. For example, we look at a 
“dog” and recognize it as a “dog,” because we have already perceived or 
remembered it as a “dog.” However, in this process of recognition, we dismiss any 
unimportant details of that particular dog. In common se se, we fail to encounter 
that particular “dog” and settle for a general “dog,” which represents our pre-
existing idea of “dogness.” “Good sense” is basically the process of prediction by 
way of maintaining one direction. It is the recognition of a “dog” as a “dog” and the 
expectation to see the same “dog” tomorrow (Deleuze Diff rence and Repetition 
131-34).24  
The subsuming the particular under the universal is sustained by three 
distinct propositions: as “denotation,” which links the proposition to particular 
things or external state of affairs; “manifestation,” which links the proposition to the 
speaker who utters it while expressing desires and beliefs; and “signification,” 
which links the proposition to universal or general con epts. Deleuze argues that 
each of these propositions presupposes the other two; thus when we seek the 
primary relationship we find ourselves in “the circle of the proposition” (Deleuze 
                                                
24  For Deleuze, the event is not something beyond our reach like Kantian 
thing-in-itself. The event belongs to the virtual which is as real as the actual.  
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The Logic of Sense 17). None of these relations will function as the principle of the 
proposition, or as the condition of the possibility of the proposition that links the 
proposition to what is external to it. The insufficiency of these propositions 
becomes evident when we encounter nonsense, absurdity an  paradox. Nonsense 
words, exemplified by the work of Lewis Carroll, have no existence apart from 
language; they do not denote real objects, manifest th  beliefs and desires of real 
individuals, or signify meaningful concepts. Nevertheless, they convey “sense” and 
in so doing affirm the immanence of sense to language itself. This “sense” is the 
final dimension to the Deleuzian proposition; “sense” functions as the condition of 
the possibility of denotation, manifestation and signif cation, as that which serves as 
the link between propositions and events. Sense, what Deleuze calls as “the 
expressed of the proposition,” is an incorporeal, complex, and irreducible entity a  
the surface of things; it is a pure event which inheres o  subsists in the proposition 
(19). Deleuze asserts what is expressed by sense is the event and treats them almost 
identically by saying they are “two sides without thickness” (22).  
Gottlob Frege’s notion of “sense (Sinn)” is useful to understand Deleuze’s 
own notion of “sense.” In his seminal article, “On Sense and Reference (Über Sinn 
und Bedeutung)” written in 1892, Frege distinguishes between the “mode f 
presentation” of a sign and that “which the sign designates”; the former he calls 
“sense” and the latter “reference.” For example, “the morning star” can refer Venus 
as its reference but at the same time, due to the mod of representation that “the 
morning star” takes, it is different from saying “the evening star” (Frege 57). We 
may say the morning star is the evening star; however in addition to its reference, 
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each expression possesses what Frege calls a “sense,” which is not an attribute of 
the referent. Although this “sense” cannot be found in the object, Frege ascribes to 
sense objective existence, noting that the sense is different from “the associated 
idea,” which is “wholly subjective” (59). For Frege, senses are objects every bit as 
real as tables and chairs, and their existence is not dependent on language or the 
mind. Frege concludes this because, though senses are obviously not physical 
entities, their existence likewise does not depend on any one person’s psychology. 
In other words, it can be, and is, interpersonal. Different people are able to grasp the 
same sense and communicate them, and it is even possible for expressions in 
different languages to express the same sense or thought.25 Frege concludes that 
senses are abstract objects, incapable of full causal interaction with the physical 
world. They are actual only in the very limited sen that they can have an effect on 
those who grasp them, but are themselves incapable of ing changed or acted 
upon. They are neither created by our uses of language or acts of thinking, nor 
destroyed by their cessation. In short, according to Frege, between meaning and 
referent, “there lies the sense, which is indeed no lo ger subjective like the idea, but 
is yet not the object itself” (60). Although many commentators of Deleuze point to 
Frege’s notion of sense as a conceptual approximation of Deleuze’ notion of sense, 
Deleuze bestows a more fundamental role to sense than Frege does. While Frege 
cannot think of nonsense, Deleuze sees it as essential resource of sense.26  
                                                
25  Frege equates “sense” with “thought.” However, “thought” is not understood 
as the result of a mental activity of a thinker but something that a thinker “grasps.” 
26  See John Rajchman, The Deleuze Connections (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2000) 64. 
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The Stoics were the first to create a philosophical concept of the event. They 
drew a fundamental distinction between actually existing bodies (tensions, physical 
qualities, actions and passions, state of affairs) and incorporeal effects, which are 
not things or facts, but events (Deleuze The Logic of Sense 4). If events are not 
physical qualities, properties, or things, but are surface effects or incorporeal 
entities, then Deleuzian “events” seem rather inconsequential. If they are mere 
surface effects, it means that they are unrelated to ssence or at least far away from 
it. However the implication of the Deleuzian “event” is far greater than it seems, as 
it questions the very notion of essence as a ground for further philosophical inquiry. 
Plato’s dualism, for example, consists of Idea and matter, essence and 
appearance, or models and copies. The real motive of Plato’s dualism is, according 
to Deleuze, to sort out between true and false copies; namely, a copy which receives 
the action of an Idea and a false copy (Plato’s simulacra) which fails to receive this 
action. In other words, there are bodies (matters, copies) which represent the eternal 
essence of the pure forms by participating in that essence; and there are bodies that 
are merely copies of copies, simulacra, and illegitima e copies (Deleuze’s events). 
Therefore, Platonic dualism accomplishes sending what “remains rebellious 
[simulacra]… repress[ing] it as deeply as possible, to shut it up in a cavern at the 
bottom of the Ocean” (259). Deleuze’s rebellion against Pla onism is to propose 
different dualism of bodies and events and to make the fals  copy, which eludes the 
Idea, climbs to the surface.   
Events can be best expressed by infinitives, such as “to cut” or “to die.” For 
example, the precise moment of death is ungraspable. A person is either about to die 
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or already dead. When a knife cuts flesh, it is impossible to isolate the exact 
moment of cutting; either the knife has not yet cut or has already cut the flesh. 
Similar to Zeno’s paradox, the knife never reaches the flesh, but it cuts. The event 
of “to cut” is instantaneous and insubstantial with no present, but always divided 
into past and future.27 Still, the sense of “to cut” determines the meanings of “about 
to cut” and “being cut.” 
Also, when the knife cuts the flesh, there is an intermingling of bodies which 
can be explained by saying that cutting is an attribute of the knife and the state of 
being cut is also an attribute of the body. However, the statement, ‘The knife is 
cutting the flesh’ expresses “incorporeal transformations of an entirely different 
nature (events)” (Deleuze and Guattari A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia 86), because “it does not simply represent the world but acts upon it 
or intervenes in it in certain ways” (Patton 13). The event of “to cut” is a change of 
an entire equation involving the knife, flesh, and the cutting. This event does not 
belong to either the knife or flesh. Thus, as a product of the synthesis of forces, 
events signify the internal dynamic of their interactions. An event is not a thing, not 
a particular state or happening itself, but something made to subsist in the state of 
affairs or happening itself. In other words, an event is the potential immanent within 
a particular confluence of forces. In this sense, the event is not an inconsequential 
non-being, nor a disruption of a stable state, but an “extra-being” which underlies 
                                                
27  I am indebted to Brian Massumi’s A user’s guide to Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia for this interpretation of Deleuze’s concept of “events.” Brian 
Massumi, A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from 
Deleuze and Guattari, A Swerve ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992) 20. 
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the state and transforms it. In this sense, as stated by Deleuze, events are essence: 
“they are no longer corporeal entities, but rather form the entire Idea. What was 
eluding the Idea climbed up to the surface, that is, the incorporeal limit, and 
represents now all possible ideality” (Deleuze The Logic of Sense 7). 
Although Deleuze often talks about the event of “May 1968 in Paris,” other 
events he talks about are less eventful, similar to the many examples of the Stoics, 
from which Deleuze develops his concept of the event. The event can be as eventful 
as “The Great Pyramid” and as uneventful as “its duration for a period of one hour, 
thirty minutes, five minutes…” (Deleuze The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque 76). 
However, most of Deleuze’s other examples of the event involve a certain type of 
wound, pain, suffering, and death. The prime example of Stoics which Deleuze 
frequently adopts is “to cut” (Deleuze and Guattari A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia 86). In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze starts the section 
on the event (“twenty-first series of the event”) with the quote from Joe Bousquet 
who “apprehends the wound that he bears deep within his body in its eternal truth as 
a pure event” (148). The translator Tom Conley of The Fold: Leibniz and the 
Baroque interprets the event close to “trauma” in the discussion of the near death 
experience of Montaigne (Conley 303-07). Foucault also takes similar examples 
when he comments on Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense in Theatrum Philosophicum: 
 
The event – a wound, a victory-defeat, death – is always an effect produced 
entirely by bodies colliding, mingling, or separating, but this effect is never 
of a corporeal nature; it is the intangible, inaccessible battle that turns and 
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repeats itself a thousand times around Fabricius, above the wounded Prince 
Andrew. The weapons that tear into bodies form an endless incorporeal 
battle. Physics concerns causes, but events, which arise s its effects, no 
longer belong to it. Let us imagine a stitched causality: as bodies collide, 
mingle, and suffer, they create events on their surfaces, events that are 
without thickness, mixture, or passion; for this reason, they can no longer be 
causes. (Foucault 349) 
 
Deleuze eventually asks himself “Why is every event a kind of plague, war, wound, 
or death?” (Deleuze The Logic of Sense 151). That is because they are results of 
actions and passions, in other words, results of mixtures and colliding. Considering 
that the event has to confront common sense and good sense, it is understandable 
that event evokes a certain violence, shock, alienatio-effect, or cruelty. In fact, 
“violence” is an exemplary event in Deleuzian sense. Violence occurs when bodies 
collide. When violence is discussed, it does not belong t either subject or object, 
weapon or body. When flesh is cut by a scalpel in an emergency room, this physical 
happening of “being cut” does not constitute violence. In other words, “violence” is 
an “extra-being,” which does not belong to either scalpel or flesh, but still exists on 
the surface of colliding bodies.  
Although the notion of the event might be in use immediatly for the 
discussion of the cinematic images of violence, it is not tailored for the discussion 
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of arts.28 Rather it belongs to philosophy whose task is, according to Deleuze, to 
create concepts. Creating concepts is none other than “o extract an event from 
things and beings, to set up the new event from things and bei gs, always to give 
them a new event” (Deleuze and Guattari What Is Philosophy? 33). Although the 
event is not an aesthetic term but a philosophical one, its similarity to “affect” is 
unmistakable, as it will be discussed in the following sections. In short, Deleuze 
uses almost the same language for both “events” and “affects.” 
 
3. Crocodile 
In many interviews, director Kim has confessed thathe had to learn how to 
make a film by making his first film Crocodile (K.-D. Kim 81). In fact Crocodile 
has all the clumsiness which we can expect from a first time director’s  low-budget 
film. In retrospect, however, Crocodile seems to have all the elements, which 
constitute the uniqueness of Kim’s films. Particularly important coordinates are the 
                                                
28  A different route can be taken. In “What Is an Event?” Deleuze gives 
conditions that make an event possible: “Events are produced in a chaos, in a 
chaotic multiplicity, but only under the condition tha a sort of screen intervenes”. 
Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993) 76. Subsequently, film images are in a fundament sense 
events. Film at its basic mechanism filters chaos to make something emerge from it. 
Framing is a fundamental intervention of cinema in reality, and images captured by 
camera lens are liberated from their milieu, that of the actual. Furthermore, film can 
be characterized by multiple collisions such as the encounter between camera and 
pro-filmic reality and the relation between film images and viewers. Viewers 
confront film images as a singular power by dissolving o eself as an observer. If we 
do not bring clichés of viewing and interpretation to a theater, we might encounter 
events in the cinema. Viewers are in a privileged position to encounter and grasp 
events impersonally, because events befall on screen, not onto us.  
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notions of “muteness,” “setting and location” and “wound and death,” which his 
later films repeat, revisit, and modify. 
Crocodile’s main character “Ag-O” (literally “crocodile” in Korean) is a 
homeless man living under one of the many bridges in Seoul. He lives with an old 
man who is a soda-can-collector and an orphan boy, a street peddler selling chewing 
gum. Similar to The Golden Gate Bridge or Niagara Falls, the Han River bridges 
have been the location of choice for many suicide victims in South Korea. The 
colloquial expression “going to the Han River Bridge” in Korean means “I want to 
commit suicide.” Traditionally, the Han River has been the symbol of energy, 
prosperity, and the history of Korea. However, after d cades of pollution from rapid 
industrialization and from the ever expanding and overpopulated mega city Seoul, 
the Han River has become a gigantic sewer; a symbol of the dark side of modernity. 
Similar to the Han River, which collects the end of Capitalism’s circulation, its 
industrial and household wastes, Ag-O collects the end of life. His job is to fish out 
dead bodies of suicide victims and selling them to the family of the deceased. Just 
as the crocodile lives in both water and land, Ag-O lives in both the realms of the 
living and the dead. Similar to a real crocodile patiently ambushing its prey, Ag-O 
waits patiently for his prey until he exhausts all his options. 
At the beginning of the film, there is a peaceful night s ot of the Han River 
reflecting city lights. Suddenly, something plunges into the water with a splash. The 
camera cuts to a medium shot of Ag-O looking for the source of the splash with a 
telescope. He slowly pulls out a cigarette and lights it. Then he spends all the time 
in the world to give the suicide victim enough time to die, before jumping into the 
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water. Unsympathetic to the suicide victims and to their families, Ag-O makes a 
living out of their misery. If somebody jumps off the bridge to commit suicide, he 
waits until the suicide victim completes his mission. Subsequently, he jumps into 
the river to locate the body and to find out if the victim has any money in his 
pocket, then hides the body. The next morning when police, rescue divers and 
family members are frantically looking for the body, he waits until their anxiety 
reaches despair and asks for a reward for information of the missing body.  
One day, when a beautiful young girl jumps off the bridge, Ag-O rescues her 
instead of letting her die. The first thing Ag-O does, after he rescues the main 
female character out of the river, is to rape her while she is still unconscious. 
Despite the disapproving looks of the old man and the orphan boy, Ag-O forcefully 
rapes her and she suddenly regains consciousness. The old man moves away after a 
little protest and the boy, who already likes the girl, bites the exposed buttock of 
Ag-O, while he is still engaging in sex. Ag-O continues to rape her anyway. The 
violence in this scene is unwarranted, uncalled for, unjustified, and mostly 
gratuitous. There is no moral message, no hidden meaning. It does not even satisfy 
audiences’ voyeuristic desire; rather it disturbs them. 
As it is often the case in dealing with Kim’s films, Crocodile frustrates the 
viewer with its under-developed characters and the lack of motivation for their 
actions. The film never explains why those three people live together or why each 
of them has become homeless. They sleep at the same pl ce, eat together, and 
occasionally help each other. Although they form a sort of family, they are not 
related, nor do they particularly enjoy each other’s company. They appear without 
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any personal history or social background and their act ons often lack clear 
motivations. Other minor characters appear and disappear without any explanation. 
For example, after squandering his money at an illegal gambling site, Ag-O rescues 
a girl on a busy street, who is being harassed by a street thug. As soon as he has a 
chance to be alone with her that night, it is his turn to rape her, although his attempt 
is thwarted by a couple of hoodlums who appear out of nowhere. The film does not 
tell whether the girl is safe or whether she is in even deeper trouble.   
The central story line of Crocodile is that Ag-O slowly develops affection 
toward the girl he has rescued and finds out the reason of her attempted suicide. 
Then he seeks a revenge on her ex-fiancé, who is responsible for her misery. It turns 
out that she has tried to commit suicide, because she was gang-raped, and that the 
rape was orchestrated by her fiancé. Without knowing hs involvement, she 
attempted suicide out of shame and guilt. However, the film never explains the 
reason for her decision to stay under the bridge, aftr the failed suicide attempt. Nor 
does the film explain the reason why she eventually commits suicide, after she feels 
a deep connection with Ag-O. 
In general, screen violence is often tolerated, if portrayed in a certain manner 
or justified by certain moral imperatives and legitim zed by certain narrative 
structures. However Kim makes no effort to make violence in a socially and 
culturally sanctioned manner, with the proper aesthetic and narrative coding. In 
Crocodile, many scenes of violence have no real narrative logic. This lack of 
narrative cause and effect leaves the viewer without a clue of what will happen 
next. After Ag-O dives into the water following the main female character, the 
   
67 
 
camera follows him to the bottom of the river where the girl lies. As experienced 
viewers, we can easily expect a point of view shot of Ag-O looking at the girl and a 
reaction-shot of him enthralled by her beauty. However, Kim uses one continuous 
long shot to capture the entire rescue scene, avoiding the subjective point of view 
shot. There are not many dialogues in this film, which further frustrates an 
audience. The characters keep silent at the very moment when an audience expects 
a verbal explanation. In fact, most dialogues in Crocodile are inconsequential, 
because they neither give an audience necessary infomati n, nor advance the 
narrative. The audience is forced to accept whatever happens on screen. Because of 
the lack of careful character developments, compounded with their unmotivated 
bizarre, violent, and often despicable behaviors, the viewer is easily alienated from 
the story. This alienation of the viewers does not necessarily draw our attention to 
the form or structure of the film itself, or the absurdity of the situation, as, for 
example, Jean-Luc Godard’s films often do for political purposes. Rather, Kim 
seems to make a choice not to make a coherent narrative and not to engage the 
viewer emotionally. Instead of asking approval and uerstanding, Kim’s film 
confronts the viewer. It asks viewers to bring a different set of expectations to a 
theatre.  
Just like artists who often repeat a cliché, viewers bring their own set of 
clichés to a theatre. What is worse is “we… normally perceive only clichés” 
(Deleuze Cinema 2: The Time Image 20). According to Deleuze, we do not 
perceive the image in its entirety. We always perceive less of it because of our 
economic, ideological, psychological interests and demands (20). With regards to 
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Crocodile, the morally suspicious characters put the viewer in an uncomfortable 
position. Why do they (the orphan boy, the old man and the girl) stay together while 
tolerating his violence? Will they change the behavior of Ag-O with love? Why do 
they have to die one by one?29 Our own expectations about causality and 
redemption are in conflict with the film. Consequently, here is no one to 
sympathize within the film. 
Our normal viewing experiences and expectations are basd upon, what 
Deleuze calls “the action-image.” “The action-image” is narrative oriented, the 
dominant mode of commercial filmmaking. It establishes the relationship between 
the environment or milieu and various modes of behavior. A difficult situation is 
given to the character, and he reacts in response to th  challenge by changing the 
situation or his relation with the other characters. The character must raise his mode 
of being to the demands set by the situation. He must achieve a new kind of 
consciousness, attitude, or power. If based upon these familiar criteria of “the 
action-image,” Crocodile is simply a clumsy production which does not deserve any 
critical consideration. However, for Deleuze, “the action-image” is simply one 
possibility among many other images to relate movement to a center of 
indetermination.30 
                                                
29  In the later part of the film, the old man gets a broken coffee vending 
machine for free. He hides himself inside the vending machine and sells coffee 
manually. One day he witnesses a murder which is completely unrelated to the main 
story. The killer, who later realizes there is a witness, lures the orphan boy to shoot 
the vending machine as a target practice and to kill the old man. 
30  Deleuze’s idea of “the movement-image” is based upon the identity of the 
image and the movement. The living image (our brain) is un que in the sense that it 
contains an interval, the gap between action and reaction. Deleuze thus calls the 
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The lack of a coherent narrative is not a deficiency, a cording to Deleuze, 
but one of the major symptoms of the crisis of the action-image. Most notably, 
Italian Neo-realist film, which appeared around the Second World War, has that 
characteristic. Deleuze identifies the setting of post Second World War films such 
as Italian Neo-realism as “deserted but inhabited, disused warehouses, waste 
grounds, cities in the course of demolition or reconstruction. And in these any-
spaces-whatever a new race of characters was stirring, [a] kind of mutant” (Deleuze 
Cinema 2: The Time Image xi). The lack of causality is due to the situation which 
“we no longer know how to react to” and spaces “which we no longer know how to 
describe” (xi).31 If, however, we account for neo-realism in terms of its political 
interests (to be anti-fascist) and the purpose of its documentary-like production (to 
be anti-studio, anti-‘white telephone’ comedies32), Kim’s film situates itself on the 
opposite side of everything neo-realism exemplifies. However, despite the clear 
differences in styles and themes between neo-realism and Kim Ki-duk’s oeuvre, 
                                                                                                                                          
brain, following Bergson, “a center of indetermination n the acentred universe of 
images.” Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image  62-63. 
31  Tom Conley claims that the dividing line of the movement-image and the 
time-image is “the event”; “The event, a point that hadbeen central, decisive, even 
unique in the regime of the movement-image, suddenly “multiplies” and 
“proliferates” in the new world of the time-image…. All of a sudden, in the time of 
the crisis of the “action-image,” cinema was not able to transcribe events that had 
already happened, but had to attain the event as it was happening”. Tom Conley, 
"The Film Event: From Interval to Interstice," The Brain Is the Screen: Deleuze and 
the Philosophy of Cinema, ed. Gregory Flaxman (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2000) 307. 
32  Telefoni bianchi (white telephone) films refer to 1930s’ Italian comedy films 
made under the Italian Fascist government. Since their sets were furnished with 
white telephones which signified the conspicuous wealth, “w ite telephone” later 
became the symbol of ignorance of those comedies which refused to comment on 
urgent social issues. Robert Sklar, Film: An International History of the Medium 
(New York: H.N. Abrams, 1993) 225. 
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they share the same attitude toward their incomprehensibl  surroundings. Kim’s 
characters feel the same way about reality as those of post-Second World War 
films.  
Kim always locates his films at the edge of society such as under a bridge 
(Crocodile), a decrepit rural inn (The Birdcage Inn), a remote fishing lake (The 
Isle), a military camp on the seashore (The Coast Guard), a temple in a deep 
mountain (Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring), or a boat in the middle of 
ocean (The Bow). These places are inhabited by characters that are stuck in their 
inescapable habitation. The red bus which cannot move in Address Unknown is the 
perfect example of their immobility. Even when they are ble to leave, they refuse. 
When they do leave, they keep coming back to their places, though what is waiting 
for them is violence, pain, misery, or death. They appear without much personal or 
social background, only with scars which have inscribed past events and memories 
on their bodies. They feel lost and they no longer know h  to give a coherent 
description of the world around them. Their actions are instead driven by primordial 
desires and instincts.   
 
4. Affect and the Affection-image 
In Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Deleuze describes his study of film as 
“a taxonomy, an attempt at a classification of images and signs” (xiv) and identifies, 
initially, the tripartite division of the movement-image into “the perception-image,” 
“the affection-image” and “the action-image.” The perception-image shows, most 
notably with a long shot, how a character or the camer  observes the world. The 
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action-image displays, with a medium shot, the actions and reactions between 
characters themselves, and between characters and elements. The affection-image 
occupies the interval between the perception-image and the action-image. It 
converts external movements in space into movements of expression with a close-
up shot. Deleuze further identifies three more images that complicate this tripartite 
divison: the impulse-image, the relation-image and the refl ction-image. The 
underlying principle of this classification belongs to the early 20th American 
semiotician Charles Peirce. 
Peirce distinguishes basically three kinds of images, which he calls 
“firstness,” “secondness” and “thirdness.” Firstness is “something that only refers to 
itself, quality or power, pure possibility.” Secondness is “something that refers to 
itself only through something else, existence, action-reaction, effort-resistance.” 
Thirdness is “something that refers to itself only by comparing one thing to another, 
relation, the law, the necessary” (Deleuze Cinema 2: The Time Image 30). Firstness 
corresponds to “the affection-image,” secondness corresponds to “the action-image” 
and thirdness goes to “the relation-image,” which is an image of delay or hesitation 
– a sort of mental image. “The reflection-image” is between action and relation, and 
“the impulse-image” occurs between affection and action. Although a film never 
consists of a single kind of image – even a simple moveent of camera can change 
the image from one kind to another – it is still possible to say a certain film or a 
certain director has a dominant type of image. In caseof Crocodile, it is “the 
affection-image” of Peircean firstness. The relationship between Peircean division 
of images and Deleuze’s taxonomy of images can be summarized as follows: 




Table 3: The relationship between Peircean division of images and Deleuzian 
taxonomy of Images 
Peirce Deleuze 
 Perception-image  
Firstness Affection-image  
  Impulse-image 
Secondness Action-image  
  Reflection-image 
Thirdness  Relation-image 
 
The affection-image can be easily identified by the close-up of the face: 
“The affection-image is the close-up, and the close-up is the face…” (Deleuze 
Cinema 1: The Movement-Image 87). A face usually plays three roles in film. First 
“it is individuating (it distinguishes or characterizes each person); it is socializing (it 
manifest a social role); it is relational or communicating (it ensures not only 
communication between two people, but also, in a single person, the internal 
agreement between his character and his role)” (99). However, the close-up of the 
face, according to Deleuze, loses all three roles; whereby, it deterritorializes the 
face; it “abstracts it from all spatio-temporal coordinates” (96). The face either 
reflects what the face sees, in other words, reflects what is happening in the 
cinematic space (quality), or expresses the intensity by making a minute movement, 
from one quality to another (power). In both cases what is expressed is not the face 
itself, but something else, which Deleuze later identifies as affect.  
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The affect is the entity, that is Power or Quality. I  is something expressed: 
the affect does not exist independently of something which expresses it, 
although it is completely distinct from it. (97) 
 
Notice that this definition of “affect” repeats almost verbatim the definition of the 
“sense/event” in The Logic of Sense. 
  
Let us consider the complex status of sense or of that w ich is expressed.  
On one hand, it does not exist outside its expression. This is why we cannot 
say that sense exists, but rather that it inheres or subsists. On the other hand, 
it does not merge at all with the proposition, for it has an objective which is 
quite distinct. What is expressed has no resemblance whatsoever to the 
expression. Sense is indeed attributed, but it is not at all the attribute of the 
proposition – it is rather the attribute of the thing or state of affairs. (Deleuze 
The Logic of Sense 21) 
 
Just as the event/sense results from the mixture of bodies but independent from 
them, the affect which is expressed by the face is independent from its spatio-
temporal coordinates. In this way, “affect” expresses omething else, which is not 
represented and cannot be represented. Thus, the affection-image makes visible 
what Peirce calls firstness, a quality or power considered for itself, without 
reference to anything else, independent from actualization. Deleuze acknowledges 
that even for Peirce firstness is difficult to define “b cause it is felt rather than 
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conceived: it concerns what is new in experience, what is fresh, fleeting and 
nevertheless eternal” (Deleuze Cinema 1: The Movement-Image 98). However, 
because the affection-image is abstracted from spactio-temporal coordinates and the 
face is abstracted from individual, we can say “the aff ct is impersonal and is 
distinct from every individuated state of things” (98). It is singular. It is the quality 
of possible sensation, but not a sensation yet. 
Affect is neither a personal feeling nor an emotion. Feeling is personal and 
biographical because it is already checked and interpreted by the person’s own 
personal and biographical data. Emotion is social becaus it is a social display of a 
feeling. Affect is something like the emotion an infant shows. Even though it might 
resemble adult emotion, it is an affect, insofar as the infant does not have the 
experience to check and to interpret coming affects. In other words, “affect” is 
prepersonal. As discussed earlier, “event” is an ontolgical term which elevates 
itself to essence, thus anchors both, what Western philosophy calls, “essence” and 
“appearance.” “Sense,” which is a linguistic expression of “event,” is neither 
denotation nor manifestation nor signification, but nonetheless makes these 
propositions possible. Likewise, affect resides betwe n the action and the reaction 
(feeling and emotion). 
Since Deleuze does not define “affect” in any practical way in the Cinema 
books, it is necessary to look at his other work. The most extensive contemplation 
by Deleuze on his theory of “affect” can be found i one of his lectures given in 
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1978.33 The proximity between the event and the affect becomes clearer in this 
lecture. Deleuze explains an “affect” in relation to an “idea” following Spinoza. For 
Spinoza, what is called an “idea” is a mode of thought, w ich represents something, 
in other words, a representational mode of thought. Te idea, insofar as it represents 
something, is said to have an objective reality. On the contrary “affect (affectus)” 
means any mode of thought which does not represent anything. For example, the 
idea of triangle represents the triangle, the objectiv  reality, but there is no way to 
represent “a pain” or “a love.” There is an idea of s meone in pain or a loved thing, 
but a pain or a love as such represents nothing. “Idea” and “affect” are two kinds of 
modes of thought which differ in nature, which are irrducible to one another, but 
simply taken up in a relation such that affect presupposes an idea, however 
confused the idea may be.   
Spinoza also distinguishes “affect” from “affection.” According to Spinoza, 
“affection (affectio)” is a state of a body insofar as it is subject to the action of 
another body. Therefore, affectio is a mixture of two bodies; whereby, one body is 
said to act on another, and the other receives the trac of the first. When a body 
reacts to another body, the affection indicates the nature of the affected body much 
more than it does the nature of the affecting body. For example if a knife cuts my 
skin, this encounter tells about skin’s capacity to be cut rather than knife’s capacity 
to cut. Since the affected body knows the “effect” of the affecting body, but only 
knows effect (not the cause), Spinoza says that affection-ideas are representations of 
                                                
33  http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/sommaire.html. The Logic of Sense was 
originally published in 1969, Anti-Oedipus in 1972, Thousand Plateaus in 1980. 
The Cinema books came later in 1983 and 1985. 
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effects without their causes. They are inadequate ideas, according to Spinoza, but 
nonetheless they are still ideas. An affect (affectus) refers to the passage from one 
state to another, taking into account the correlative variation of the affecting body.  
Whether it is joy or sadness, an affect marks the passage from one state to another; 
as an increase or decrease in the body’s power as a function of its affection. The 
affection envelops an affect.  In other words, within the affection there is an affect. 
We can find the relationship between the events and the affected bodies (or states of 
affairs) are same to the relationship between the affect and the affection. 
In Deleuze’s Cinema books the difference between affection and affect are 
not always emphasized and Deleuze often treats them as same, even though the 
Cinema books came after his publications on Spinoza (Expressionism in Philosophy: 
Spinoza (originally in 1968), Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (originally in 1970), 
and a series of lectures on Spinoza in the late seventies and in the early eighties. 
However, following his lecture, we may think “the affection-image” means the 
image which envelops an affect, which is not actualized, and which thus still 
remains as a possible sensation. Although Deleuze calls both poles of the close-up 
(quality and power) as affects, considering Spinoza’s definitions of affection and 
affect, the “reflexive face” which is basically an immobile receptive plate, which, in 
other words, expresses wonder, should be named as an “ ffection” because it is the 
affected body in Spinozian term. The “intensive face” which is an intensive series 
of micro-movements of expression is strictly speaking a  affect because it expresses 
the change of capacity of the body. 
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Also, since affect refers to a moment of passage, it necessarily demands an 
interval, which Deleuze describes as “a motor effort on an immobilized receptive 
plate” (66). Thus, the in-betweeness of the affection-image is not only taxonomical 
(between the perception-image and the action-image) but also temporal. That 
understood, we are now ready to consider how the affection-image illuminates, and 
is illuminated by Kim’s Crocodile. 
 
5. Any-space-whatever and Crocodile 
The close-up abstracts the face and extracts a pure quality. If the close-up of 
the face is a sort of “effacement” then the close-up of any object may extract such a 
quality. Furthermore the close-up tends to flatten the background, which might be 
still present behind the face, and make it unrecognizable or incomprehensible; 
which Deleuze calls “any-space-whatever.” Deleuze also mentions in discussion of 
Dreyer’s Passion of Joan of Arc (1928) that it is possible to “treat the medium shot 
and the full shot as close-ups – by the absence of depth or the suppression of 
perspective” (Deleuze Cinema 1: The Movement-Image 107).  
 
Any-space-whatever is not an abstract universal, in all times, in all places. It 
is a perfectly singular space, which has merely lost its homogeneity, that is, 
the principle of its metric relations or the connection of its own parts, so that 
the linkages can be made in an infinite number of ways. It i  a space of 
virtual conjunction, grasped as pure locus of the possible. (109) 
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It is through the sense of any-space-whatever that Crocodile exemplifies Deleuze’s 
affection-image, rather than being a film populated by facial close-ups. 
The setting of Crocodile is, in Deleuzian sense, any-space-whatever. The main 
space of Crocodile, under the bridge, is presented as an isolated, disconne ted space 
from outside world. Although characters move in and out the location, their entries 
and exits are always presented as entries from off-screen space and exits to off-
screen space. The space loses its own coordinates and its metric relations. It can be 
assumed that it is under one of the Han River Bridges, but there is no marker that 
can validate the assumption. The camera usually takes dir ct frontal shots of 
characters against the huge wall (a part of bank), which flattens the space as well as 
characters. Still there is a possibility that viewers can make easy assumptions about 
the space, because the term “under the bridge” already h s a number of cultural and 
social connotations. Kim thwarts those assumptions by transforming the familiar 
space into a sort of museum. There is a clear affinity between the cinematic affect 
and the Russian formalist notion of defamiliarization, in terms of transforming 
something familiar to something unfamiliar.34 However, while defamiliarization in 
general works by forcing the audience to take a different perspective, the Deleuzian 
affect exists even without a perceiver. The affect may suspend audiences’ process of 
                                                
34  Defamiliarization is usually understood as an aesthetic t chnique to force the 
audience to see common things in an unfamiliar way. In an influential essay “Art as 
Technique” Shklovsky claims that art exists in order to ecover the sensation of life 
which is diminished in the familiar routine of everyday experience. Lee T. Lemon 
and Marion J. Reis, Russian Formalist Criticism; Four Essays (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1965) 3-24. See particularly pp 12-3. 
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recognition, but it does so not to frustrate them but to guide them to the matter-of-
factness of the event.  
Crocodile is a low-budget mediocre film with second-rate actors, an 
inexperienced director and a poorly written screenplay. Most parts of the film are in 
fact forgettable. Nevertheless, Kim’s latent talent becomes evident when he is away 
from actions and lets images become the affects. As it becomes more evident in his 
later films, Kim’s films are full of the creative uses of living and non-living bodies 
freed from normative significations. Every object can make creative connections, 
and can be diverted to more painful uses. In Wild Animals the frozen fish in the 
freezer is not food for the body but a weapon to abuse a helpless body and to 
eventually murder another body. In The Isle, fishhooks are used to catch fishes, but 
at the same time, they are suicide devices. In The Bow, the bow is simultaneously a 
musical instrument and a killing device. A less painful b t equally creative use of 
the tail of a cat appears in Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring. The title 3-
Iron, although the original Korean title is Bin-jip (literally “empty house”), 
highlights Kim’s keen interest in a creative usage of an object. As anyone who plays 
golf might understand, a 3-iron is probably the least used club in the bag; in other 
words, it has no use-value. Freed from its usual usage, “3-iron” becomes the only 
item the main character steals from the many break-ins of empty houses, who 
transforms it into a weapon.   
In Crocodile, the creative usage of objects is most evident in the main 
setting. The place is humble and dirty, but is full of peculiar items such as a 
luxurious Italian style sofa repainted with abstract patterns, a plaster torso of naked 
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woman that Ag-O uses as a pillow, a broken billboard of a Moulin Rouge type 
cabaret, a tent painted in bright colors. The wall is aso full of exotic images and 
letters such as two gigantic unknown faces of a man and a woman, a huge open 
mouth with highlighted red lips, scribbles, and graphite. They are not related in any 
way to narrative, nor are they composed by any internal logic. Any attempt of 
semiotic interpretation cannot but help feel the possibility of futility. What do the 
images mean? This is not the right question. The right question i , what do they do? 
They transform the place of cliché into a singularity; that is, any-space-whatever. 
The lack of coherent narrative and character development does not hurt, either. 
Because things and actions are not necessarily tightly connected by any underlying 
logic, they freely collide with each other. As such, the image’s indeterminacy 
prevents fixity and it resists structure, analysis, and meaning. Without meaning, the 
space is turned into a collection of affects. 
Kim also transforms wound and death into affects. The opening sequence 
shows a close-up of Ag-O with a big bruise on his left cheek. His bruise stays there 
untreated, and he adds several more bruises. Throughout the film, Ag-O is at the 
center of violence. He commits violence against the weak such as the boy, the old 
man, and the girl and receives even more violence from many others who are 
stronger than him. We do not know where Ag-O gets his first bruise. It is useless to 
ask the origin of violence in this film which is characterized by an ongoing dynamic 
in which one gratuitous violence is constantly followed by another. Violence just 
happens. In most cases, the meaning of it is in suspense; violence does not question, 
nor answer. Violence presents itself in-between the cause and the effect as an affect. 
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We get the affect of violence but are off-limit from its meaning. In any-space-
whatever, Kim’s characters are presented neither as p e-determined entities nor as 
manifestations of a certain character type. Rather, t y collide with each other. 
Without much dialogue, violence becomes their language. However this language 
does not entail meanings for an audience. Viewers are not forced to identify with 
any character in the film and violence appears as impersonal.   
The affect of death is particularly prominent because of the presence of the 
Han River coupled with the film’s ubiquitous violence and wounds. Although death 
is never actualized until the final sequence of the film, death as an affect is lurking 
all the time. The beautifully filmed final scene completes the affect of death. This 
final sequence is rather carefully set up, as if the w ole film is constructed to show 
this scene. In the middle of the film, Ag-O throws the Italian sofa into the river out 
of rage. Later, he hangs a picture frame which he stol  above the sofa in the water. 
Ag-O makes a gracious living room under the water.   
With the help of Ag-O, the girl realizes that her fiancé is responsible for her 
misery and finally opens her heart and makes love with Ag-O. That night while Ag-
O is sleeping, she jumps into water and commits suicide. Ag-O soon follows her, 
but he is too late. Ag-O drags her to the underwater living room, then puts her on 
the Italian sofa and sits beside her. He puts handcuffs on her and on himself and 
drowns. They build a picture perfect family in death. This fantasy place might 
signal the unattainable stability and the impossibility of making a secure family. 
Before any interpretation and any judgment, however, this fantasy image grasps our 
attention by inventing new affects from every single item in the frame. Nothing is 
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supposed to be there. Everything including the human bodies is out of place. This 
place is supposed to be sewage: the filthiest place you can imagine. However, 
unlike the dirty surface, this bottom of the river is clean and lights pervade 
iridescently. Death and beauty coexist or rather theycollide. There is nothing sad or 
happy about death. Kim does not glorify death, nor condemn the dead. The death 
does not make it an unhappy ending. Since viewers have not made any emotional 
investments to the characters, their death does not appeal to our emotion. The death 
sequence does not bring about any narrative conclusion, because there is no 
narrative logic explaining why the characters have to die. However the death in 
Crocodile is exhausted of content and gives birth to affect, a pure event.  
Still a question lingers. Why does Deleuze talk about the affect exclusively 
with the affection-image? Affect is basically a becoming [“Affects are becomings” 
(Deleuze and Guattari A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 256)]; it 
is an increase or a decrease of the capacity of the body. Therefore it already implies 
a certain movement. Shouldn’t the film image itself be the affect? It seems Deleuze 
is reluctant to use the affect on a medium of movement. The close-up is the least 
mobile shot in film. When the close-up of the face fills the screen, there is no room 
for movement. Furthermore the close-up not only arrests the face but also 
movement itself. However at the same time only when everything else stops, the 
slight movement of the face can be felt. Deleuze seems to find that it is almost 
impossible to talk about affect in the moving image; he needs to stop the motion to 
have the necessary interval between action and reaction. Thus, as Deleuze says, “art 
preserves” and the affect “is preserved in itself” (Deleuze and Guattari What Is 
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Philosophy? 163). Crocodile’s lack of causality, whether it is intentional or 
unintentional, creates any-space-whatever in which the link between action and 
reaction is suspended. It draws our attention to the surface of the image in which 
signs, freed from their significations and meanings, collide with each other and 
create affects.  
The final underwater death scene also prefigures Kim’s later films as well as 
Deleuzian sensation. In the scene, water makes everything move as if they were 
alive. While everything is dead, everything is also moving. When everything is 
supposed to stop moving, Kim makes them move again. At this point the affect of 
death becomes “sensation,” which I will explain furthe in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four: Sensation and Becomings in The Isle and Spring, 
Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring. 
 
1. Introduction 
A man (Hyun-sik) hides in a floating house-raft on a fishing lake after he 
kills his wife (or girlfriend) and her lover. One day local policemen come to check 
up the floats one by one to see whether any fugitive s hiding. Realizing he has 
nowhere to run, he tries to kill himself by swallowing fishhooks and pulling out the 
attached fishing line violently. A woman (Hee-jin)35 who runs the fishing lake finds 
him vomiting blood in pain. She hides him in the water andl ter, after the police 
have gone, pulls him out of water using the fishing rod to which the fishhooks are 
connected. Several days later, the man who has survived and recovered decides to 
leave the lake. The girl, who has developed affection for him and now is in dismay, 
thrusts fishhooks into her vagina and pulls out the connected fish line as if her 
vagina is the mouth of fish. Then, she stands up in a white skirt soaked with blood 
and collapses into the lake. Hearing the sharp scream of the woman, the man hurries 
back and pulls her out of water with the fishing rod, which is connected to the 
fishhooks, as if he is fishing.   
These horrifying scenes in The Isle (2000) have given director Kim Ki-duk 
an instant fame as well as notoriety. A mystic aura was added when some press 
members at the premiere of The Isle at the Venice Film Festival (2000) screamed, 
vomited and passed out. Since then, the screening of The Isle, even in the film 
                                                
35  Although the ending credit sequence identifies two main characters as Hyun-
sik and Hee-jin, their names are not revealed in the film. 
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festival setting, is usually preceded by a festival programmer’s in-person disclaimer 
advising audience members to leave the theater if the n ensity of the images 
become unbearable. It is true that these scenes are visceral enough to make viewers 
quiver. However, the visceral reaction of viewers of The Isle seems especially 
peculiar, since anyone can easily name one or two films which are much gorier, 
blood-drenching, and ultra-violent films. What makes these scenes so visceral? 
There are some signs in The Isle that invite a psychoanalytic reading. A 
hypothetical psychoanalytic interpretation of The Isle might work like the following. 
The Isle is about a mute woman working as a manager of a fishing lake and as a 
prostitute, and a fugitive who hides from his double murder. They meet, feel 
affection, and escape together. At first, they meet as criminals outside of the family 
and the Law. They fall in love and are re-Oedipalized by building a new “home” 
(symbolically presented as painting a yellow float in he film). When this re-
Oedipalization is halted because they have already trnsgressed the Law, they 
regress to the pre-Oedipal stage; woman becomes Nature itself, and man returns to 
the origin, the womb. If we read The Isle through such motifs within a 
psychoanalytic framework, then we can see a trajectory comprised of Freudian 
ideas on origins, repetition-compulsion strategies, the death instinct and its 
allegiance to desire as the need for a return to lost plenitude. The film might be read 
as such, in terms of traditional film theory, using the wo basic paradigms of 
conventional representation, subjectivity and identity. 
However, such psychoanalytic readings, which are concerned with the molar 
plane of organization such as family and Law, limit the film as a plane of 
   
86 
 
organization, through which the problematic nature of gender relationships are 
encapsulated and re-enforced while losing the sight of the molecular plane of 
immanence, or the perceptual and fluid semiotics upon which Kim’s film draws. 
Notice that the psychoanalytic reading of The Isle has little to talk about many 
violent scenes in the film. The girl rips off a live frog and feeds it to a caged bird. A 
fisherman fillets the sides of a live fish to feed sashimi to his girl before throwing it 
back into the water. What about the two scenes which involve fishhooks? My claim 
is that these scenes refuse to be subsumed simply in the Oedipal paradigm or to be 
symbols of ultimately something else. These scenes do not allow us to seek and to 
be satisfied with the meaning of this image or the underlying meaning of that image. 
In The Isle, these images do not call for meaning. Meaning is mute like many 
characters in his films. Or like the letters in Address Unknown, those images do not 
have pre-determined destinations or recipients (we the audience do not even know 
what the content of the letter is). While the meaning is held in abeyance, those 
bodies, which are big or small, live or dead, or fast or sl w, collide and interact with 
each other. They mutate and transform into something other than themselves. 
Traditional film theories seem inadequate in being able to deal fully with them. 
Before turning to Deleuze, let us first consider similarities between The Isle 
and Crocodile. Hee-jin rules the lake like Ag-O does in Crocodile; Hyun-sik fishes 
and Ag-O fishes dead bodies; Hyun-sik comes to the lake to commit suicide, so 
does the unnamed beautiful girl who jumps off the bridge; Ag-O builds a living 
room at the bottom of the river and Hyun-sik and Hee-jin decorates the floating 
house-raft on the lake, although both houses are rootless and unstable. Like 
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Crocodile, small items are put into use for different purposes. Hyun-sik makes 
small items such as a bicycle and a swing out of a steel wire. In other words, he 
creates new affects out of steel wire by nullifying ts signification. Kim’s characters 
relate each other by creating and sharing such affects. In Crocodile the first non-
violent relationship between Ag-O and the girl comes when the girl draws a portrait 
of Ag-O and Ag-O paints the shell of a small turtle. The same affective movement 
of drawing connects them. In The Isle the affective relationship between characters 
comes when they share the figurines and that is why Hee-jin and the prostitute want 
his figurines. However if the relationship between human beings consists of various 
affects, that relationship is not always clear to an observer of both Crocodile and 
The Isle. The themes of “muteness,” “setting and location” and “wound and death” 
also play important parts for each respective story, whose elements are repeated 
again by Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter… and Sping (2003), though no other film 
has generated so much controversy and polarized so many viewers as The Isle.   
The difference is that the sense of abstraction and impersonality which 
pervades in Crocodile disappears in The Isle. In other words, the any-space-
whatever of Crocodile is turned into a naturalistic setting, though a not too familiar 
one. Still, the dominant images of The Isle are not “the action-image” in which 
qualities and powers of the affection-image are actualized in states of things. 
Although they do not obscure the setting and location deliberately, still they are not 
exactly determined in spatio-temporal co-ordinates. There is an uncomfortable 
mixture. While the cinematic world of The Isle seems to be more concrete than 
Crocodile, the world of The Isle seems to hide something ominous, although it is 
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not immediately clear what brings about this tension. Is this unsettling but 
unidentifiable impression the same “affect” which we saw in Crocodile? Earlier, the 
affect is expressed basically through freezing the move ent figuratively and 
literally. In other words, Crocodile severs semiotic, linguistic and spatio-temporal 
links between the space of Crocodile and the off-screen space (the world). Every 
sign in the film loses its meaning and floats on the flat surface. The world devoid of 
meaning also thwarts our nominal understanding of human rel tionship and ethics 
and rushes toward death. The affect reveals itself by way of disjunction and through 
the increase/decrease of the capacity to affect or to be affected. However, The Isle 
achieves the affect not by severing itself from the outside world (although the 
fishing lake is already separated from the society to some degree) but by revealing 
something hidden. Thus, while Crocodile achieves its effect by freezing the motion, 
The Isle does that by giving movement to something dormant. Deleuze calls this 
type of affect “sensation.”  
Some scholars influenced by Deleuze claim that the film image is basically 
tactile and visceral, and our cinematic experience is bodily sensation.36 However, 
the problem is that Deleuze himself does not use the word “sensation” in his two 
cinema books, even though they were written (1983 and 1985) right after the 
publication of Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (1981). Why did Deleuze 
avoid “sensation” in his discussion of cinema? In what condition, can we 
appropriate it for our purpose? I will try to answer these questions by recourse to 
                                                
36  See Shaviro, The Cinematic Body  51 and Kennedy, Deleuze and Cinema: 
The Aesthetics of Sensation  109. 
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examining Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation a d “the impulse-image” which 
is developed in Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.  
This chapter first explains how Deleuze conceptualizes “sensation” in his 
study of Francis Bacon’s paintings. Deleuze identifies “isolation” and “violent 
movement” in Bacon’s paintings as the main vehicles of ensation which is 
transmitted directly to our nervous system. However despite the affinity between 
the technique of isolation and the close-up, Deleuze nev r associates sensation with 
cinema. The second part of this chapter seeks the link between sensation and 
cinema through a close reading of “the impulse-image” which appears in Cinema 1 
and the reason why Deleuze is reluctant to use the term s nsation in cinema. The 
next section identifies Kim Ki-duk’s film The Isle as an impulse-image which is the 
cinematic equivalent of sensation in painting. The violent images of The Isle are 
explained through “impulses” which reveal “originary world.” The next film 
Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring, while it shares many similarities with 
The Isle, transforms the clash between “originary world” and “derived milieu” into 
the plane of consistency, in which various becomings occur. The notion of the plane 
of consistency is explained through “haecceity” and “fold” using the floating temple 
as an allegory. Finally it discusses the beoming-animals in Spring and how it goes 
toward to becoming-imperceptible.  
 
2. Sensation in painting 
In What Is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari claims that art preserves “a 
block of sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects” (Deleuze 
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and Guattari What Is Philosophy? 163-4). As usual, Deleuze is less interested in 
defining what something is than describing what it does. An art is able to “undo the 
triple organization of perceptions, affections, and opinions in order to substitute a 
monument composed of percepts, affects, and blocs of sensations that take the place 
of language” (176). According to Deleuze, “percepts” are not perceptions, which 
means percepts are independent from the perceiver;37 and “affects” are not feelings 
or affections, which means that “affects” go beyond the subject who experiences 
them. Thus, to extract sensation from representation is to discover something 
impersonal in it, prior to the “I think” or the “we judge,” unhinged by the relation of 
subject and object supposed in the conception of “repres ntation,” and by the 
subordination to judgment.   
While the word “affect” has been widely used for various subjects, Deleuze 
narrows the usage of “affect” so as to apply it to only art in What Is Philosophy?. 
He adds that affects are harmony, consonance and dissonance, harmonies of tone or 
color. Meanwhile Deleuze suggests sensations as the vibration which is the simple 
nervous sensation, the embrace or the clinch which means the resonance between 
two sensations, and withdrawal, division, distention which is separation of two 
sensations (168). Although Deleuze gives us an overview to utilize his concepts, he 
does not discuss cinema at all in What Is Philosophy?. Those three elements of 
                                                
37  Then, Deleuzian idea of percept is, in a sense, reminiscent of 
phenomenology, since we can say phenomenology also strives to rescue “sensation” 
from the enclosure in representation, or its subordinatio  to the subject of 
representation.  However Deleuze, who is always critical o phenomenology, thinks 
it still rest upon the division of subject and object, and more importantly, in essence, 
it imposes transcendence onto the “life-world.”  
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sensation might be useful for sculpture as they are intended, but it is not clear 
whether they can be used in cinema too. 
Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation gives us better examples of how 
Deleuzian sensation might relate to the cinematic image. Deleuze notices in 
Bacon’s paintings that those painted on the canvas have nothing to do with 
representation; they are neither figurative, nor narrative, nor illustrative; they are 
figural, in other words, “Figures.”38 Imagine any painting of the crucifixion of Jesus. 
In most cases, we may immediately identify cross, Jeus, and the Virgin Mary, and 
also easily recall the story behind the event. It is difficult to escape from these 
denotational signs and accompanying narratives as Deleuze cautions that “a story 
always slips into, or tends to slip into, the space betwe n two figures in order to 
animate the illustrated whole” (Deleuze Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation 3). 
However it is possible to paint the same event by obscuring those figurative 
elements and by drawing our attention to its lines and colors, those are what 
Deleuze calls the “Figures.” 
To get a pure Figure, Deleuze says, there are two possibilities – abstraction 
and isolation. One is pursuing an abstract form as in the paintings of Wassily 
Kandinsky or Piet Mondrian. However, Deleuze finds thi method problematic, 
                                                
38  According to John Rajchman, The Deleuzian distinction betwe n 
“figurative” and “figural” is indebted to Lyotard. For both Lyotard and Deleuze, 
“figurative” is related to “representation,” while “figural” is something freed from 
the visible, the sensible, representation, or “discourse” traditionally associated it.  
Thus, the figural problematizes the cores of Western thought – discourse and 
representation – and “exposes something “indigestible” a public can’t easily 
“consume,” appealing to another public or another view of what is public. John 
Rajchman, "Jean-Francois Lyotard's Underground Aesthetics," October 1998: 9. 
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because abstraction necessarily goes through the brain. The other way to get the 
Figure is exemplified by Francis Bacon’s paintings. He starts Francis Bacon: The 
Logic of Sensation with the explanation of “isolation,” which gorges out the Figure 
from figuration, illustration, and narration, as the Lyotardian figural does.39 
Isolation is necessary to get to the Figure. Without isolation, the Figure tends to be 
figurative. Deleuze says, “the entire surface is already invested virtually with all 
kinds of clichés, which the painter will have to break with” (11). Therefore, the 
Figure should be earned by fighting against representatio , narration and 
illustration. In Bacon’s paintings, we often find the distorted, deformed, monstrous 
images. These images resemble the object of reference, but they never stay in the 
world of resemblances; they tend to become something else – animals (by way of 
dismantling the face)40 or a zone of indiscernibility. Bacon’s Figure is not simply 
                                                
39  Lyotard describes the figural as the primary processes of the unconscious, 
similar to what Freud called the id, versus the discursive that he describes as the 
secondary process, or similar to what Freud called th  ego. Thus, what Lyotard 
suggests in the term of the figural in art is the “de-codification” and subsequent “de-
colonization” of the libidinal energies that language, text, and the intellect codify, 
censor and repress. To do so, Lyotard claims that postmodern art switches from 
modernism’s emphasis on signifiers to an emphasis on the signified and thus the 
preference of image over narrative. With this collapse and de-differentiation of 
signifiers into the signified comes a loss of meaning, of depth, and interpretation, 
because no longer is there an interplay between repres ntations of reality 
(signifiers) and reality itself (signified). This de-differentiation increases the impact 
of the art, because no longer are there signifiers that mediate, distance, and disinvest 
viewers’ desire. Art becomes then a participatory experience, one in which the 
audience receives, and handles as they may, the flows of libidinal energies which 
the artist set free. 
40  “Bacon is a painter of heads, not faces, and there is a great difference 
between the two… It is not that the head lacks spirit; bu  it is a spirit in bodily form, 
a corporeal and vital breath, an animal spirit. It isthe animal spirit of man: a pig-
spirit, a buffalo-spirit, a dog-spirit, a bat-sprit.” Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The 
Logic of Sensation (London: Continuum, 2003) 20. 
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distorted representation; it is also an active deterritorialization of signification. For 
example, Bacon often draws a human body with a head but without a face, because 
the face is not only the privileged part in human body but also the foundation of 
signification and subject formation. By dismantling the face, Bacon escapes from 
the codification of the human body, and subsequently deterritorializes the subject. 
Once the Figure is obtained, “sensation is that which is transmitted directly, and 
avoids the detour and boredom of conveying a story” (36). The sensation, Deleuze 
says, acts “directly upon the nervous system” (36). In other words, the Deleuzian 
principle of aesthetics is that there is “sensation” prior to the establishment of codes, 
languages, and mediums.   
It is interesting to see that Deleuze does not mention anything about the 
close-up of cinema in his discussion of isolation in painting or vice versa, despite 
the obvious similarities between the technique of isolati n in painting and the 
cinematic practice of the close-up. Similar to the round contours that isolate the 
Figures in Bacon’s paintings, the close-up in film isolates and abstracts the face. 
The close-up is the easiest way to achieve the affection-image, just like the round 
area is simplest technique to isolate the Figure in Bacon’s painting. Are they same? 
Is the Deleuzian affection-image an example of Deleuzian sensation?  
Deleuze notices those Figures in Bacon’s paintings are not spectators. They 
are not waiting for something to happen but something inside i  already moving: 
 
Now it is inside the body that something is happening; the body is the source 
of movement. This is no longer the problem of the place, but rather of the 
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event…. It is not I who attempt to escape from my body, it is the body that 
attempts to escape from itself by means of… in short, a spasm. (15) 
 
In other words, when the close-up in film isolates the face, it tends to freeze the 
movement of the body, while the isolation in Bacon’s paintings rather prepares a 
violent eruption. There are a series of paintings of Bacon in which the body 
attempts to escape from itself through one of its organs in order to escape the 
contours. Thus, the answer to the question about sensatio  and the affection-image 
is both yes and no. The close-up and the isolation both produce the Figure, however 
they do so for exactly the opposite purpose.  
Let’s first look at the similarity between Bacon’s paintings and Kim’s films 
and how extensively Kim employs the sense of isolati n. As mentioned earlier, Kim 
Ki-duk is not, by any means, a director of the close-up. He does not use close-ups 
frequently, nor does he use them in conjunction with any considerable long-takes 
(as in Carl Dreyer) or with any conspicuous techniques (as in Jean-Luc Godard). 
However he elevates his characters to Figures through “isolation” by way of 
location and setting. The most prominent location setting for Kim is water, whether 
it is a lake, a river, sea, or a small fish tank. In Crocodile Han River in the middle of 
Seoul is the main background. Wild Animals, which features Koreans on French soil, 
visits the river Seine repeatedly. The Birdcage Inn is a small seaside Inn and Bad 
Guy revisits the same seaside. The Coast Guard is set on the coast. The Isle and 
Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring are shot on a lake and The Bow is set in 
the middle of ocean. Samaritan Girl repeatedly shows a public bathhouse. These 
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settings sever the cinematic space from the rest of ociety. On top of that, Kim’s 
films repeatedly emphasize the image of confinement, which incarcerates characters 
even more tightly. The design of the inn which compactly encloses the characters in 
The Birdcage Inn; the peep-show room in Wild Animals; the dog cages which are 
used to keep dogs and sometimes human beings in Address Unknown; the room of 
the prostitute with an adjacent surveillance room in Bad Guy; the barb wired 
military camp, the barb-wired boxing ring and the fish tank in which the 
traumatized female confines herself in bleeding in The Coast Guard; a small prison 
cell in 3-Iron; a single boat in the middle of ocean in The Bow. The list goes on. 
Isolation is the most ubiquitous and conspicuous visual motif of Kim’s film. Let me 
explain more in detail Kim’s sense of visual isolation by using The Isle. 
The film opens with an extreme long shot (ELS) which portrays a 
picturesque lake and house-rafts in the early mystic morning. In general, the ELS 
gives an audience information about the time and space of the setting. However in 
this case, the ELS obscures the setting; there is no marker to tell where it is and 
when it is. Nothing occupies the center of the frame and nothing peculiar grabs out 
attention; rather the early morning mist covers the entire area, further obscuring its 
spatio-temporal clues. The subsequent long-shots (LS) show an isolated lake on 
which fishing house-rafts, separated from each other, ar  floating. (The title The Isle 
is a misnomer since there is no “isle” in the film; the name, however, highlights the 
sense of isolation that the movie produces.) This opening sequence establishes the 
location as a Deleuzian singular plane.  
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Isolation works not only at the level of visuality, but also at the level of each 
character. All characters are presented without either personal history or memory.  
Only a brief flashback, which glimpses the dead bodies slain by the main male 
character (Hyun-sik), ties him to his past. Besides that, there is no social, personal, 
or psychological background for spectators to weave through the events. The only 
connection between the isolated characters is a small motor-boat which traffics from 
one float to another to carry food, water, bait for fishing and the female bodies for 
sexual appetite. The sense of isolation is further enhanced by the lack of dialogue. 
Like all his other films, dialogue is minimized to the d gree that the main female 
character (Hee-jin) in The Isle does not have a single line. Characters are mute and 
isolation becomes a complete breakdown of verbal communication. Thus, there are 
many evidences that The Isle and Bacon’s paintings share the same visual motif of 
isolation. If it is so easy to connect Bacon’s technique of isolation to a film, why 
didn’t Deleuze utilize the notion of “sensation” in the Cinema books? Can we call 
Kim’s films “the cinema of sensation”? 
 
3. Sensation and the Impulse-image 
In Francis Bacon, Deleuze never mentions anything about cinema. On the 
other hand, he mentions the name Francis Bacon only once in his two Cinema 
books in passing, when he discusses “the impulse-image” nd the violence of 
Joseph Losey’s film: 
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In Losey, what appears first is a very special violence which permeates or 
engulfs the characters, and precedes any action. It is the opposite of the 
realist violence of action. It is a violence in act, befor  coming into action.  
It is no more linked to an image of action than it is to the representation of a 
scene. It is a violence which is not merely internal or innate, but static, 
whose only equivalent is that of Bacon in painting, when he summons up an 
‘emanation’ which arises from an immobile character. (Deleuze Cinema 1: 
The Movement-Image 136– original italic and my bold) 
 
Like a lightning flash, Deleuze recalls the name Bacon in the discussion of Losey’s 
violence under the category of the impulse-image, but never looks back at it again. 
The brevity might be explained by the word, static. It not only explains the brevity 
of Bacon’s sudden appearance but also the exclusion of the term “sensation” in the 
Cinema books. A painting cannot move; it can only show still images. However the 
reason that Bacon’s painting interests Deleuze is that it not only gets a Figure away 
from the figurative, but it also makes the Figure strive for escape: “The important 
point is that they do not consign the Figure to immobility but, on the contrary, 
render sensible a kind of progression, an exploration of the Figure within the place, 
or upon itself” (Deleuze Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation 2). Thus, Deleuze 
says that sensation is what passes from one “order” to another, from one “level” to 
another, from one “area” to another. This is why sensation is the master of 
deformations, the agent of bodily deformations (36). Deleuze adds in the chapter 
named Athleticism, “the body is the source of movement” (15). 
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The reason that Deleuze completely ignores sensations in hi discussion of 
cinema is that cinema has always been a medium of move ent. Therefore there is 
no reason for Deleuze to use “sensation” whose primary goal is to give a still image 
movement (sensation of movement). However the static violence of Losey 
reminded him of Bacon, as if Losey’s image of violenc is not moving at all and 
needs “sensation.” In the previous chapter, we have already seen the affects do the 
opposite for film images. Since the affection-image (the close-up) abstracts the face 
from its spatio-temporal coordinates, it tends to loseits mobility. But if the image 
itself is not moving, if it is static, it might need sensation. That is why the last scene 
of Crocodile in which the dead bodies seem to move because of the current is 
sensation prefigured in the film of affects. 
While the Cinema books allude to sensation with a brief ref rence to Bacon, 
Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation also has a very subtle reference to “the 
impulse-image” which was yet to be written. While cautioning that sensation is not 
“sensational,” that is “the figuration… which provokes a violent sensation” (38), 
Deleuze suddenly evokes “naturalism”: “Sensation has one face turned toward the 
subject (the nervous system, vital movement, “instinct,” “temperament” – a whole 
vocabulary common to both Naturalism and Cezanne) and one face turned toward 
the object (the “fact,” the place, the event)” (34 – my bold). Coincidently, 
naturalism reappears in Deleuze’s discussion of the impulse-image. 
Deleuze locates “the impulse-image” in-between Piercian firstness and 
secondness; “it is no longer the affection-image, but is not yet the action-image” 
(123). It appears as the “Originary Worlds/Elementary Impulses pair” between “the 
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Any-Space-Whatevers/Affects pair” of the affection-image and “the Determined 
Milieux/Modes of Behaviour pair” of the action-image. Although it is positioned 
between two major images, 
 
this new set is not a mere intermediary, a place of transition, but possesses a 
perfect consistency and autonomy, with the result that t e action-image 
remains powerless to represent it, and the affection-image powerless to make 
it felt. (Deleuze Cinema 1: The Movement-Image 123) 
 
The originary world, according to Deleuze, coexists within the real milieu (the 
world derived from the originary world). Although usually hidden, it can be marked 
by “the artificiality of the set (a comic opera kingdom, a studio forest, or marsh)” or 
“a preserved zone (a genuine desert, a virgin forest)” (123). In other words, the 
originary world has no existence independent of the real milieu, but the real milieu 
is in fact a world derived from the originary world. Thus, while people live in real 
milieu (the derived world), they still carry the impulses and fragments of the 
originary world. Deleuze sees an affinity between the impulse-image and literary 
Naturalism, where an originary world of instinctual force is combined with a 
derived world of language and history: 
 
Naturalism in literature is essentially Zola: he had the idea of making real 
milieux run in parallel with originary worlds. In each of his books, he 
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describes a precise milieu, but he also exhausts it, and restores it to the 
originary world. (124) 
 
Although naturalism is not opposed to realism, it “accentuates its features by 
extending them in an idiosyncratic surrealism” (124). Thus, the setting of the 
impulse-image represents the co-existence of the real milieu and originary world 
and the sense of excess is the characteristic of the impulse-image.  
Deleuze confesses that the impulse-image is not only difficult to reach but 
also difficult to define or identify (Deleuze Cinema 1: The Movement-Image 134). 
Deleuze mentions only three directors (Luis Bunuel, Eric von Stroheim, and Joseph 
Losey) under the category of the impulse-image, which makes it the most selective 
category among his images. Deleuze calls them the great masters of naturalism in 
cinema. Film history usually associates Luis Bunuel with surrealism, Eric von 
Stroheim with psychological realism and Joseph Losey, tenta ively,41 with 
naturalism. While Deleuze admits that their styles are quite different from each 
other, he sees from all of them the implosion of impulse onto the real milieu. 
Deleuze makes a relatively clear distinction between the impulse-image and the 
action-image: “the action-image represses the impulse-image, which is too indecent 
because of its brutality, its very restraint, and its lack of realism” (134). However, 
there is no attempt to separate the impulse-image from the affect-image. In fact, it is 
very difficult to distinguish them on the level of each image without considering 
                                                
41  No one in film study hesitates to call Bunuel and Stroheim great directors. 
However what about Losey? Dan Callahan says emphatically “no” to the question. 
Dan Callahan, "Joseph Losey," Sense of Cinema  (2003). 
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whole film to locate the origninary world. The difference between the affection-
image and the impulse-image can only be measured by whether it increases or 
decreases the movement. The difference between affect nd sensation can be 
explained in the same way.  
Although Deleuze never gives a clear-cut definition betwe n affects and 
sensations, there are several paragraphs in Fra cis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation 
from which we can extract the difference between them. Deleuze says “sensation 
has one face turned toward the subject … and one face turn d toward the object” 
(34). This is an extraordinary statement considering it is made by Deleuze, because 
he seldom uses the “subject” and the “object” as if they are separate entities. Since 
sensation is a virtual concept, it is absurd to put them so ewhere in relation to the 
subject and the object. Deleuze quickly corrects himself “Or rather, it has no face at 
all… I become in the sensation and something happens through the sensation” (35). 
Thus, Deleuze consistently uses sensation as if it is always on the move, while 
affect always refers to an interval or a pause. In a sense, the relationship between 
affect and sensation is similar to that between event and sense. As event and sense 
are “two sides without thickness,” affect and sensation refer to the same impersonal 
experience with two different speeds of movement. 
 
4. The Isle and the Impulse-image 
Many casual reviewers point out either an excess or a deficiency of The 
Isle.42 Some grumble about the excessive violence, the unfiltered excessive emotion, 
                                                
42  See Park Sung-su, “Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring or naturalism in cinema” 
Sung-Il Chung, ed., Kim Ki-Duk: An Untamed or a Scapegoat (Seoul: Happy Reading, 2003). 
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and excessive colors, while others complain about the lack of coherent narrative, the 
lack of character development, or the lack of motivation. The co-existence of excess 
and deficiency might be the key to understand The Isle. Simply, the lack of 
information of The Isle accentuates the sense of excessive violence. The excess of 
The Isle can be understood as an equivalent to the exhaustion of naturalism. As the 
excessive description of naturalism eventually exhausts the sense of realism and 
heads towards the originary world, the excessiveness coupled with the deficiency in 
narrative coding in The Isle accentuates the violence and brings about the originary 
world.  
The primary function of the Figures is to make invisible forces visible 
(Deleuze Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation:58). Deleuze mentions that “the 
task of painting is defined as the attempt to render visible forces that are not 
themselves visible” (56). In Bacon’s paintings, this rend ring of invisible forces 
means “to paint the scream more than the horror”: not the representation of horror 
but a scream which forebodes the invisible forces. When Bacon paints the 
screaming Pope (“Study after Velasquez’s Portrait of Pope Innocent X, 1953”) he 
does not include the cause of horror, as if the Pope himself sees nothing, and 
screams before the invisible (8). The invisible forces become more visible when 
Bacon’s Figures undergo deformation by the forces of pressure, inertia, weight, 
attraction, gravitation, and germination. However, it does not mean that Deleuze 
wants to make a theology out of such “invisibility,” as though it were the mark of 
some Law, or some transcendental void or emptiness. The force is at the most basic 
level the difference itself. For a body to affect another body or to be affected by 
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another body, those bodies should be different bodies. Thi  difference is called 
throughout Deleuze’s oeuvre by many different names: event, sense, intensity, 
duration, affect or sensation. They are virtual entities but appear by way of different 
encounters in various situations. And that is the moment of becomings in Deleuzian 
philosophy. The reason that Bacon’s paintings fascinate Deleuze is that Bacon 
makes the invisible forces visible through their effects on the flesh and through the 
relationship of materials and forces, not the relationship of form and matter. 
Bacon’s painting expresses the invisible forces on the body, which undergoes 
becomings such as the body’s becoming-animal by losing its human traits and 
becoming-imperceptible by losing its contours. 
The impulse-image is designed to show the invisible force; it is the image of 
the impulse of the originary world. Because the originary world is not always 
clearly revealed, it needs what Deleuze calls sympto s or idols (or fetishes). 
Symptom designates the qualities or powers related to an riginary world defined 
by impulses. Deleuze asserts that “impulses are extracted from the real modes of 
behavior current in a determinate milieu, from the passions, feelings and emotions 
which real men experience in this milieu” (124). Kim’s characters are not conscious 
decision makers. Things happen without human controls, like the golf ball, which is 
tied to a tree for swing-practice in 3-Iron (2004), and that sets itself free and hits a 
moving car and its passenger. Violence finds its course and characters can only 
respond to it by instinct and impulse. The more they try to play their given roles, the 
more they become inadequate to the roles. The soldier in The Coast Guard (2002) 
tries to fulfill his duty by killing the intruder whom he misidentifies as a North 
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Korean spy, but who turns out to be a local punk. They ar  unable to anticipate 
coming events. Things go off in unforeseen direction, and characters act as if 
certain violence has engulfed or permeated them.   
 
Impulses have the same goal and the same destiny: to smash into fragments, 
to tear off fragments, gather up the scraps, form the great rubbish dump and 
bring everything together in a single and identical death impulse. Death, the 
death impulse – naturalism is saturated with it. (Deleuze Cinema 1: The 
Movement-Image 130) 
 
Likewise the death impulse overwhelms other impulses in The Isle. When the death 
impulse dominates, other small impulses lose their layers and become simplified. 
That is why even the sexual impulse takes a violent form. More precisely, the 
sexual impulse comes with the death impulse. This violence cannot be attributed to 
simply the aggressor and the victim or to “the return of the repressed” as 
psychoanalysis often interprets such action. Nor can this violence be determined by 
fixed qualities, nor by the real it represents, nor by a certain essence. Swallowing 
fishhooks is not a result of a conscious decision. However, for those characters that 
live in a world devoid of meaning and overwhelmed by the death instinct, the only 
way to become aware of what is happening to them is to suffer themselves. Not 
because pain is pleasurable in some sadomasochistic way, but because it is the only 
language they can share.  
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Here the characters are like animals… because their acts are prior to all 
differentiation between the human and the animal. These are human animals. 
And this indeed is the impulse: the energy which seizes fragments in the 
originary world… It is thus a world of a very special kind of violence. 
(Deleuze Cinema 1: The Movement-Image 124) 
 
Secondly, fetishes (or idols) are the fragments torn away, by the impulse, 
from a real milieu. So they correspond to an originary world. In The Isle, “fishing” 
is the fetish. In a determined milieu, fishing is a sport or a hobby. However, it also 
reminds us of the cruelty of the originary world, because after all it is the life and 
death struggle between fisherman and fish. Pulling fish out of water is akin to 
pulling out an originary world onto a derived milieu, with the fish strings 
connecting the two worlds. It is a violent and painful process; the more the fish tries 
to escape, the more the fishhooks pierce its skins and organs. The desperate 
writhing is transmitted to the hands of fisherman. The sign becomes tactile and the 
originary world gets nearer. Hee-jin teaches Hyun-sik how to fish, in other words, 
how to open up an originary world of impulse and instinct. However this ritual is 
double-edged; Hyun-sik becomes violent to the degree that he chops the live fish 
but, at the same time, the violence engulfs him and pain soo  becomes his own. The 
ritual is completed by their respective rescue sequence, which connects one’s 
agonizing pain to the other through the vibration of the fish pole.  
Sensation depends on a sort of clashes. These clashes can be the result of 
various techniques such as isolation, of visibility andinvisibility, of mobility and 
   
106 
 
immobility, excess and deficiency, or becomings. From these clashes a rhythm is 
generated. The basic rhythm of The Isle is created by the clash between the water 
and a house-raft. The house-raft is an unstable fetish of the derived milieu. Despite 
its house-like external appearance, it has a flap door on the floor. It is not a 
coincidence that two fishhook scenes happen when a chara ter either fails to escape 
from the float or does escape from it. If I borrow Deleuze’s language on Bacon’s 
painting, the clash is between the systolic force, which moves from the field (that is, 
that background) to figure, and the diastolic force, which moves from the figure to 
the field as the body undergoes intensive pain. Subjectivity is distanciated, or 
subsumed, through a process of flux and oscillation of forces, rhythms, movements 
and intensities.  
Sensation is also experienced by the becoming-fish. The whole film is about, 
in short, becoming-fish. At first, fish has no affect to Hyun-sik; he has no interest in 
fishing. When he catches his first fish with the help of Hee-jin, he lets it go. In his 
botched suicide attempt, his becoming-fish starts, although he refuses to 
acknowledge it. However, when he mangles fishes, he encounters the fish being 
filleted for sashimi and then released. Right before the encounter, Hyun-sik has 
made a hangman with steel wires and Hee-jin shows her preference – drowning. It 
is at this point that he realizes that his becoming-fish is his destiny. 
 
When the visual sensation confronts the invisible force that conditions it, it 
releases a force that is capable of vanquishing the invisible force, or even 
befriending it. Life screams at death, but death is no longer this all-too-
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visible thing that makes us faint; it is this invisible force that life detects, 
flushes out, and makes visible through the scream. (Deleuz  Francis Bacon: 
The Logic of Sensation 62) 
 
Although he sometimes resists and shows his intention to leave, she disagrees and 
they fight. While Hee-jin electrocutes fish out of the fishtank without any apparent 
reason, Hyun-sik’s becoming-fish continues. Thus, the second fishhook scene can 
be explained as Hee-jin’s becoming-fish. If he feels affects from fish, then she can 
be one by hooking herself with fishhooks.  
The final scene of The Isle completes their becoming-fish. Hyun-sik 
suddenly appears in a gigantic swamp and finds a shelter in a rove of reeds. The 
camera catches his move from aerial point of view, and we see the naked woman is 
lying down in a boat full of water. It is obvious that he has disappeared into her 
womb. The important point is not that man returns to his origin as a psychoanalytic 
approach might interpret, but that he becomes invisible. As Deleuze says, all 
becomings start with becoming-woman and goes on to bec ming-imperceptible. 
Such an explanation, consisting of “sensations” and “affects,” does not impose 
narrative onto a block of sensation. It is an explanatio  of a series of paratactic 
events that eschew causality. 
Admittedly, those two fishhook sequences are closer to the action-image 
rather than the affect-image or the impulse-image because of their analytical editing 
style. They use conventional technique, such as several successive close-ups for the 
fishhooks, Hyun-sik’s eyes, open mouth and his face in pa . Yet, those scenes 
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differentiate themselves from typical Hollywood cinema. Hyun-sik draws the 
curtains before he swallows fishhooks, and Hee-jin pushes fishhooks into her 
vagina, after Hyun-sik, the only person in the vicinity, has left the float. In other 
words, there is no other witness to the violence except the filmic viewer. Both 
scenes avoid a witness who fixes the emotional response and meaning for viewers: a 
witness I would call “the embedded spectator”. I will explain this dominant motif of 
conventional mainstream cinema using Mel Gibson’s The Passion of the Christ in
the next chapter.  
At the beginning of this chapter, I asked whether the visceral reaction of 
audiences can be explained by sensation. If an audience has responded bodily to the 
fishhook scene because the images are gross, “sensational” is the right word to 
explain that reception. However if an audience has re cted to those scenes because 
they are incomprehensible, then the “sublime” might be a better term to describe 
their response. If those scenes have forced an audience to think about the invisible 
forces of the originary world, such as the death instinct or becoming-animal, only in 
that case, can we use the word “sensation.” 
 
5. Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring and Becomings 
At first glance, Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring (2003) looks by 
Kim Ki-duk’s previous standards to be a much milder film. There is no rape and no 
abuse. Although a murder is committed, it is only referrd to by an article in a 
newspaper. Set entirely on and around a tree-lined lake in which a tiny Buddhist 
temple is floating, Spring captures the tranquility and beauty of Jusan Pond amidst 
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an exquisitely beautiful landscape in North Kyongsang province in South Korea.43 
The film is divided into five segments with inter-titles “Spring,” “Summer,” “Fall,” 
“Winter,” and “…And Spring.” Each segment is about a decade or so apart, 
corresponding to “childhood,” “adolescence,” “adulthood,” “middle-age” and “old-
age.” 
A complicated narrative has never been associated with Kim. In Spring the 
simplicity reaches its bare minimum. The spring segment introduces an old monk 
and his child disciple. While exploring the world on and around the lake, the child 
monk plays an innocent but cruel game: torturing small animals by tying them to a 
pebble. The old monk punishes the child by weighing him w th a stone, and tells 
him that if any of the creatures die “you’ll carry the stone in your heart for the rest 
of your life.” In the summer segment, the monk, now a young man, meets a girl 
who comes to the temple to recover her health. They ar  drawn to each other and 
become involved sexually. The old monk discovers their relationship and lets the 
girl go, who is now healthy enough to leave. The young monk follows her. In the 
fall segment, the monk who is now an adult returns to the temple as a fugitive after 
killing his unfaithful wife in a fit of passion, and soon police follow. After his 
arrest, the old monk enters nirvana. With winter, the younger monk, now in middle-
age, returns and atones for his past actions. An unknown woman leaves her baby at 
                                                
43  The film’s production company had to negotiate with South Korean Ministry 
of Environment for six months for permission to build that floating monastery set 
on Jusan Pond, because the pond, which was artificially made more than 200 years 
ago, was in a national park.  After shooting, the production company had to remove 
the set right away (from personal interview). 
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the temple and dies by accident. With a new spring, the cycle starts anew. In the 
tranquility of nature, human actions also achieve ser nity.  
Leslie Felperin of Sight & Sound writes that Spring is “a poetic departure” 
and David Jays of the same magazine calls it an “anomaly” in Kim’s oeuvre, “a 
complete departure from the violent canvases of his earlier work.” They are not 
alone. Although some missed the excessive and visceral violence that Kim’s films 
usually offer, most film critics inside and outside of Korea welcomed Kim’s new 
film and considered it a change in Kim’s style, a signif cant departure from his 
tormented world, and a sign of an artistically mature Kim Ki-duk.  
When director Kim Ki-duk visited Washington D.C to promte his film 
Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring, he met several local film critics and 
reporters for one-on-one interviews.44 Many questions were asked based on each 
interviewer’s interest and knowledge of director Kim and his films. One question, 
though, was asked repeatedly by all of them: “Where did you get the inspiration for 
the film Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring?” Considering the unique 
setting and exotic rituals (exotic even to native Koreans, because they are not 
traditional Korean or Buddhist rituals), it was a legitimate and expected question. 
To the translator’s surprise, he gave each interviewer a different answer, ranging 
from one of his dreams to his accidental trip to Jusan Pond which has become the 
location of the film. The real inspiration might be one of them, all of them or none 
                                                
44  I accompanied him during his stay in DC and worked as a translator from 
March 23 to 25, 2004. I was also able to interview him myself for this project. 
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of them. Regardless, it seems that Spring recalls his early film The Isle, although 
many reviewers see a dramatic break from, rather than continuation, his earlier film. 
 
After his first film Crocodile, which pays homage to Léos Carax’s Les 
Amants du Pont-Neuf (The Lovers of the Bridge, 1991)45 with the story of a tramp 
and a girl on the bridge, Kim’s films have become increasingly inter-textual, 
frequently citing each other. For example, in the later part of Bad Guy (2001), the 
main characters visit the same inn in The Birdcage Inn (1998). (Although 
prostitution is the central motif of both films, the characters and stories are not 
connected in any meaningful way.) In Time (2006), the main character is shown 
editing a scene from Real Fiction (2000) on his computer. Breath (2007) uses the 
head statue used in Wild Animal (1996) again as a simple ornament.46 Although 
there is no direct quote, Spring has many noticeable similarities to The Isle. Both 
films are set on a lake guarded by a goddess or an old m nk. Both of them stage an 
uprooted and unstable house in the middle of a lake. Most actions happen either on 
a floating house-raft or a floating temple. In both films, a man commits a murder 
                                                
45  His second film Wild Animals casts Denis Lavant who was also in Les 
Amants du Pont-Neuf. 
46  Like the title Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring, Kim often recycles 
his theme with an interval. For example, Crocodile (first film), The Isle (forth film), 
Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring (eight film), and The Bow (eleventh 
film) have similar setting and theme. The Birdcage Inn (third film), Bad Guy 
(seventh film), and Samaritan Girl (tenth film) all deal with “prostitution.” Wild 
Animal (second film), Real Fiction (fifth film) and 3-Iron (eleventh film) separate 
themselves from other films in terms of character mobility, while Address Unknown 
(sixth film) and The Coast Guard (2002) are set around military camps. 
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and hides in the lake, and policemen follow him. Beside these apparent similarities, 
the Deleuzian impulse-image is the dominant image of both films.  
In Spring, each segment opens with an intertitle telling the name of the 
season followed by an opening of a gate at the lake’s entrance with a laboriously 
creaking sound. This gate-opening reveals a floating-temple in the middle of the 
lake. This shot, repeated with every new segment, tells that Spring remains in a 
naturalism similar to The Isle. Deleuze says, “the originary world may be marked by 
the artificiality of the set (a comic opera kingdom, a studio forest, or marsh) as 
much as by the authenticity of a preserved zone (a genuine desert, a virgin forest)” 
(Deleuze Cinema 1: The Movement-Image 123). While the gate and the floating-
temple show a strong artificiality, the extreme long shot captures the temple and 
accentuates the authenticity and remoteness of the location with the depth of the 
field. The gate opens itself and no human being is in sight. This odd mixture of 
artificiality and authentic nature makes the setting what Deleuze calls “a pure 
background” or “a without-background” which is the characteristic of the impulse-
image (123).  
Although both films belong to the impulse-image, there is a difference. 
While the originary world only seeps through a crack in The Isle, like the flap door 
used as a lavatory in the floating house-raft, the originary world overwhelms the 
derived world in Spring. High water claims the giant gate leading to the dock and 
frozen water freezes the mobility of the temple. The gate no longer guards the 
derived milieu because it has no wall. It marks only the trace of it. Thus, in the 
world of Spring, the derived milieu and the originary world are indistinguishable. If 
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the analytic codeword for The Isle is the crash between excess and deficiency, the 
codeword for Spring is indiscernibility. Rather than clashing with each other, the 
originary world and the derived world blend with each ot er to the degree that the 
subjective point of view shot becomes indistinguishable from the objective point of 
view shot. 
As a technique of continuity editing, the shot/reverse shot not only makes 
the fragmented nature of editing invisible, but also guides our gaze during the story-
telling and through the narrative space of the film. This type of suturing device has 
been an object of intensive scrutiny in film studies bcause of its ideological 
implication, and many politically inspired directors have either tried to avoid, 
deconstruct or play with it.47 In Spring, Kim rarely uses the shot/reverse shot 
formation. Although it is partly due to the lack of dialogue, Kim uses it only briefly 
when it is absolutely necessary and moves to the different camera setup quickly. 
The reason is not out of a modernist interest that intends to prevent an audience 
from emerging within discourse; rather, Kim does so in rder to minimize the 
subjective point-of-view shots.   
In general, the point-of-view shot consists of two sht ; a shot is taken with 
the camera placed where the character’s eyes would be and a shot of the character is 
looking before or after the first shot. Because of its affinity to the first person 
narration, it is also called a subjective point-of-view shot. In Spring the subjective 
point-of-view shot is minimized. Moreover, many seemingly subjective point-of-
                                                
47  See Dayan, Daniel. “The Tutor-Code of Classical Cinema” and Silverman, 
Kaja. “On Suture.”  Early films of Godard such as Breathless (1960) show playful 
deconstructions of continuity editing. 
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view shots turn out to be, after all, non-subjective. In the interior scene right after 
the outdoor opening shot, the camera first shows the small tone fishtank and fishes 
in the close-up, then tilts upward to reveal the small statue of Buddha, as if 
somebody is watching fishes and moving its head upward to see the statue of 
Buddha. The camera cuts to the close-up of old monk praying with bowing 
movement from the Buddha’s point-of-view. This shot confirms our speculation 
that the first shot was the old monk’s point-of-view shot imitating his upper-body 
movement. The next shot is the long-shot with depth where we can see the old 
monk praying to Buddha with eyes closed while the child is still sleeping in the 
background. The first shot which is supposed to belong to old monk turns out to 
belong to no one. Thus, many point-view shots in Spring take non-human positions. 
They are not simply non-subjective point-view-shots; they are non-human point-
view-shots such as the Buddha’s point-of-view shot and the gate’s point-of-view 
shot.  
Kim also often puts obstacles between the camera and the object to be seen. 
When the child monk walks toward the camera with the sone tied on his back, he 
stands in-between the camera and the old monk and masks the old monk. In another 
scene, when the young monk pulls out the girl out of water, she is hidden by the 
boy. A simple camera movement or a different setup of camera could have easily 
solved this kind of problem. Instead of taking the best s at in the set, Kim’s camera 
accepts its limitations. Kim deliberately gives the camera a certain consciousness. 
This type of image is what Deleuze calls, a dicisign, or what Pasolini calls a “free 
indirect proposition”; a perception in the frame of another perception (Deleuze 
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Cinema 1: The Movement-Image 76). These images appear as neither too 
expressionistic (no oblique angle, no impossible camera position, etc.) nor too 
realistic (an audience still can feel the presence of the camera). Although these 
point-of-view shots may be understood as a self-reflexive device that reveals film’s 
own production mechanism, Kim’s usage of the point-of-view shot is aligned with 
“the plane of consistency” which is opposed to the plane of organization and 
development:  
 
Organization and development concern form and substance: t once the 
development of form and the formation of substance or a subject. But the 
plane of consistency knows nothing of substance and form: haecceities, 
which are inscribed on this plane, are precisely modes of individuation 
proceeding neither by form nor by the subject…. In another sense, 
consistency concretely ties together heterogeneous, disparate elements as 
such: it assures the consolidation of fuzzy aggregates, in other words, 
multiplicities of the rhizome type. (Deleuze and Guattari A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 507) 
 
Kim’s characters always lose their social traits in the film. They often appear 
without recognizable social subjectivity. Even when they enter the screen with 
traces of society, they quickly lose them in Kim’s cinematic space. The suicide girl 
in Crocodile who might be a “normal” (Deleuze might call subjectified [262]) girl 
becomes a different girl in the film after being rescued. She does not bring the 
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social codes into the filmic space. Thus the first scene in which the girl and Ag-O 
make a connection is presented by their movements; the girl draws a portrait of Ag-
O and Ag-O paints the shell of a small turtle. In The Isle Hyun-sik the ex-policeman 
arrives at the fishing lake as a fugitive. However, as the film goes on, the facts that 
he was a policeman and he is a fugitive are not important anymore. Spring also 
gives us as little information as possible about characte s’ backgrounds, pasts, and 
social roles. Kim even intentionally covers the face of the woman who leaves her 
baby in the winter segment. Characters act not from their conscious subjectivities 
but by the interactions they make with other charactes, animals, organic and non-
organic things, and nature. Kim pushes the fixed plane of cinema to the state where 
forms dissolve and the remaining particles communicate e ch other based upon 
their movement and rest and speed and slowness. In other words, they are Spinozian 
bodies: 
 
A body is not defined by the form that determines it nor as a determinate 
substance or subject nor by the organs it possesses or the functions it fulfills. 
On the plane of consistency, a body is defined only by a longitude and a 
latitude: in other words the sum total of the material elements belonging to it 
under given relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness (longitude); 
the sum total of the intensive affects it is capable of at a given power or 
degree of potential (latitude). Nothing but affects and local movements, 
different speeds. (Deleuze and Guattari A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia 260) 




Deleuze calls this type of nonpersonal individuation a haecceity; “there is a mode of 
individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing, or substance. We 
reserve the name haecceities for it” (261). Thus, the plane of consistency which is 
the opposite of the plane of organization and development is teemed with 
haecceities which are not subjects but degrees of intensity that, by combining with 
other degrees of intensity, brings about individuations. Thus haecceities consist 
entirely of movement and rest, and they have the capacity to affect and to be 
affected. Even a season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date can be haecceities as 
long as they consist entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules 
or particles, capacities to affect and be affected. Although Deleuze does not clarify 
anywhere in his writings, we may conclude that “longitude (movement and rest, 
speed and slowness)” signals “sensation” and “latitude (power and quality)” refers 
to “affect.” Thus, haecceities embody both sensation and affect in the plane of 
consistency. 
Kim’s characters often exhaust themselves physiologically, losing their 
names, their memory, and their purpose in a decomposition of the self; individuality 
loses its contour and dissolves into the background. If a character develops a certain 
consciousness, it is through the encounters with haecceities. There is no essence or 
subject. Thus, individuality appears as “sensations” ad “ ffects.” Then, there is no 
difference between characters and other organic and no -organic things in film: 
animals, water, trees, temple, boat, statue, etc. The entire film then is an assemblage 
of haecceities. The camera does not give characters any privilege.  
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The senses of nonhuman individuation and indiscernibility become 
particularly palpable by the design of the temple in which the inside and the outside 
are effectively merged. Deleuze calls this merging the fold. The notion of the fold is 
developed through two books published in the same year of 1986: Foucault (1988) 
and The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1993). While typical accounts of 
subjectivity presume relatively stable “interiority” and “exteriority” or “essence” 
and “appearance,” Deleuze’s fold proclaims that the int riority is not so secure 
since the inside is nothing but the folded outside. This concept of the fold allows 
Deleuze to produce a new kind of subjectivity, a particularly non-human form of 
subjectivity. Deleuze uses the idea of a “house” as an allegory to illustrate his 
concept. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the house is where: 
  
[T]he forces of chaos are kept outside as much as possible, and the interior 
space protects the germinal forces of a task to fulfill or a deed to do. This 
involves an activity of selection, elimination and extraction, in order to 
prevent the interior forces of the earth from being submerged, to enable them 
to resist, or even to take something from chaos across the filter or sieve of 
the space that has been drawn. (Deleuze and Guattari A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia 311)48 
 
                                                
48  Almost the same description appears in The Fold as a way to explain 
“events”: “Events are produced in a chaos, in a chaotic multiplicity, but only under 
the condition that a sort of screen intervenes.” Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the 
Baroque  76. 
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This general description of house is developed into what Deleuze calls Baroque 
House, an allegory to explain how the Baroque mind folds. According to Deleuze, 
the Baroque house is a humble two stories building. The low r level is composed of 
organic matter with several small openings (five senses) and the upper level is 
where the folds of the soul reside without windows (Deleuze The Fold: Leibniz and 
the Baroque 5-8). The lower level and the upper level are connected by the “low 
and curved stairs that push into space” (4). The stairs are the space where events are 
not yet represented and apprehended but no longer purly bodily. They are the folds 
in the proper sense: neither inside nor outside, neither body nor thought, but 
something that emerges when both body and mind leave themselves. As Helene 
Frichot explains, “the event wanders about, ghost-like, ungraspable, in-between 
floors, surveying the flexible membrane that has been developed by Deleuze and 
Leibniz” (66). It is upon this surface that we discover the circulation of events and 
the creation of innumerable surface effects. There are folds within folds, infinitely 
scaled like fractals, in which matter never dissolves into atomistic grains. Deleuze 
affirms that it is this surface that renders things possible (66). Thus, the fold not 
only explains the connection between mind and body, but also explains, as an 
operative function, a becoming.  
In all three Kim’s films we have discussed, the “house” is an allegory of the 
fold. In Crocodile, neither the resident area under the bridge nor the und rwater 
living room has walls or rooms. They are only the traces of house. The underwater 
living room has no entrance, no wall; only the remaining furniture and the picture 
frame tell that there was a house or the house has never b en built from the first. 
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Allegorically, the space lacks a filter or a sieve. There is no room for the soul; no 
wonder the residents of the room are dead bodies. In The Isle, although the house-
raft has walls so that it can protect the inside from the outside, it has only one room. 
The lack of ground floor makes not only the filtering difficult, but also 
communication impossible.  The inside and the outside continue to clash on the 
small foyer on the raft where all the violence happens.  
With the floating temple in Spring, Kim achieves the Baroque house better 
than Deleuze’s own allegorical Baroque house, with the inside and the outside 
becoming truly indiscernible. The temple does not have an upper floor, and it does 
not have a proper foundation because it is floating. Although it has two rooms, they 
do not have walls, which would separate the inside into different chambers and 
rooms. However, the floating-temple is different from the floating-raft because the 
outside is already folded into the interior of the temple. In other words, the temple is 
made of, borrowing Deleuze’s allegory, only stairs, in which the inside (mind) and 
the outside (body) are indiscernible.  
Inside the temple, we see a stone statue of Buddha wit  a small stone fish 
bowl in which a couple of small fishes swim. If we zoom ut, we see now how the 
temple takes the position of the Buddha and a bit larger stone bowl on the outside 
floor in which a couple of carps play. In a bigger picture, the whole floating-temple 
becomes the Buddha and the lake becomes a fishbowl. At the end of the film, the 
camera climbs nearby mountain and captures the entire lake and temple in a 
spectacular aerial view. The stone statue of Buddha now takes the entire lake as a 
fish bowl and the tiny temple in the middle of the lake takes the position of the fish. 
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If we follow the reverse direction, the temple, although it is uprooted and floating, 
contains the whole world within itself. This is what Brian Massumi, following 
Deleuze, calls a fractal.49 The originary world and the derivative milieu become 
indistinguishable. While the title Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring gives 
us a strong sense of time with its chronological but circular connections, the film is 
more topological than chronological. 
 
6. Becoming-imperceptible 
The ending sequence of Spring is reminiscent of the ending in The Isle. In 
Kim’s earlier film, the man disappears into a turf of grass, and subsequent aerial 
point of view shot reveals that turf of grass covers the woman’s pubis, who is lying 
inside of the submerged boat. The lake becomes a boat, and a turf of grass becomes 
an island. When Hyun-sik and Hee-jin in The Isle are caught in an Oedipal trap 
(symbolized by the domestic painting of the house-raft), they seek a line of flight, a 
means of transforming a situation through their becoming-fish. They do not imitate 
fish, nor do fish become assimilated to them. However a mutual deterritorialization 
occurs. Hyun-sik does not turn into fish, but remains a man-becoming-fish, engaged 
in an deterritorialization of the human which leads him towards becoming-
imperceptible. 
                                                
49  Massumi calls fractal as “a web of proliferation fissures in infinite regress 
toward the void.” Massumi, A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: 
Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari  22. While a fractal is a momentary 
suspension of becoming, it is also the principle of becoming which should be 
coupled with a “dice throw” (21-23). 
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The motif of disappearance can be found in many of Kim’s films such as 
The Coast Guard (2002), 3-Iron (2004) and Time (2006). In The Coast Guard, the 
accidental killing of a local boy drives not only his girl friend insane but also the 
trigger-happy soldier. After being discharged from the military service because of 
his mental condition, he reappears at the military camp like a ghost in the pitch-
black night and starts to shoot other soldiers. At first, his point-of-view is marked 
by the green vision of his night-vision goggles. However, soon every soldier wears 
night-vision goggles; the green vision does not solely mark the presence of the 
insane soldier. In the end, neither soldiers nor audiences can tell who is who. 
Everyone goes insane, and the killer becomes literally indiscernible. The later film 
3-Iron goes even further by figuratively making the main character a ghost; he 
becomes invisible by training himself to conceal himself. Time tells a story of a girl 
who continuously remakes herself through repeated plastic surgeries to the degree 
that she loses her face.  
Against the predominant and unjustifiable focus on bei g and identity in 
western thought, Deleuze claims that being is becoming. In The Logic of Sense, 
Deleuze lays out his project of overturning Platonism by the affirmation of 
becoming and simulation. In other words, there is no lo ger an origin or being that 
then becomes or goes through a process of simulation. This means we pass over the 
idea that there is a foundation of being, and lean toward the idea that there is only a 
becoming without ground or foundation. In other words, there is nothing other than 
the flow of becoming. If anything looks stable, it is, according to Deleuze, just a 
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relatively stable moment in a flow of becoming. This idea of becomings is further 
developed in The Thousand Plateaus. Deleuze lays out various becomings: 
 
On the near side, we encounter becomings-woman, becomings-child 
(becoming-woman, more than any other becomings, possesse  a special 
introductory power; it is not so much that women are witches, but that 
sorcery proceeds by way of this becoming-woman). On the far side we find 
becoming-elementary, -cellular, -molecular, and even b comings-
imperceptible. (248) 
 
In Spring the most prominent becoming is becoming-animal. Confusion arises when 
we think “becoming” in the “actual” world. When Deleuze says “becoming-
animal,” it does not mean suddenly a human being starts walking on four-feet or 
starts flying.  What Deleuze says is a becoming-animal and not a being-animal. This 
process is to be understood in terms neither of imitation nor of assimilation. 
Deleuze is not speaking of a mimetic relationship betwen man and animal, but of 
“a zone of indiscernability, of undecidability, between man and animal” (Deleuze 
Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation 20). It is a-parallel evolution of two beings 
which have absolutely nothing to do with one another. In other words, “becoming” 
means exchanging affects among multipliticities: “these multiplicities with 
heterogeneous terms, cofunctioning by contagion, enter certain assemblages; it is 
there that human beings effect their becomings-animal” (Deleuze and Guattari A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 242). 
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In Spring each season has its own animal: a dog for spring, a rooster for 
summer, a cat for fall, a snake for winter, and a turtle for another spring. The 
important point is that these animals have no intrinsic connection with each 
respective season. For example, a dog refers neither cultu ally nor linguistically to 
either spring or childhood in Korea. The cycle of seasons, the prominent theme of 
the film, suggests these animals might be parts of the Chinese Zodiac that is also 
used in Korean culture. However, the cat and the turtle do not belong to the zodiac 
table. In other words, these animals are picked solely by because they are different 
resisters of speed, and because they have the capacity of affecting and being 
affected. The same goes to the other set of animals tht the child monk ties the stone 
to: the fish, frog, and snake. There is no hidden meaning, cultural or religious 
connotation or narrative logic behind the choice of these animals. They are 
haecceities. Those seasonal animals appear in each segment based upon the speed 
of each animal. As the monk ages and becomes slower, so does the animal he 
accompanies. The sole purpose of the animals tied with a s one is that by death they 
make an alliance with the child monk. 
The death of various animals sticks with him, as the old monk prophesizes: 
“you’ll carry the stone in your heart for the rest of y ur life.” The boy ties himself 
with a large stone in his becoming-animal. As Deleuze says in the story of 
Hofmannsthal, “This is not a feeling of pity… nor is identification. It is a 
composition of speeds and affects involving entirely different individuals” (258). 
The weight of the stone slows him and it hurts him; he is the Spinozian body in the 
middle of his becoming-animal. Surely, there is a resemblance between man and 
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animal when the child monk carries a stone. However, this resemblance is just 
secondary. In the winter segment, he carries the stone to the top of the mountain, 
just like those animals did. Admittedly the stone is astatue, but that does not matter 
as much as its presence as a weight that merges with the monk’s own speed or 
force. He does not become an animal by imitating the characteristics of the animal. 
His movement resembles the affect those animals had, resembling them only in 
terms of their movement and rest, speed and slowness not by the imitation of a 
subject or a proportionality of form.  
The girl in the summer segment appears as a threat to his becoming-animal, 
because she represents the great molar power of family nd conjugality: borrowing 
Deleuze’s words in his explanation of Willard in the Hollywood horror film 
Willard: “Willard [the boy] then experiences a pause in his de tiny, in his 
becoming-rat [becoming-animal]” (233). Through sexual and emotional encounters, 
the young monk enters Oedipalization. This violation is particularly highlighted by 
his transgression of the invisible wall inside of the temple. This violation shakes off 
the plane of consistency and concludes the halting of be ming-animal. 
Appropriately he sets the rooster free when he leaves the temple for the Oedipal 
Law of the outer world.50 
His becoming-animal continues when he returns to the temple, by tying 
himself to a big stone. By climbing the mountain with the stone, his becoming 
                                                
50  It is still possible to interpret those animals which represent each season as 
an allegory of the monk. The dog symbolizes the youthfulness of the child monk, 
the rooster is the finding of desire which should be fre , and the cat’s agonizing 
body when its tail is used as a writing brush resembls the adult monk’s body. The 
snake is re-incarnation of the old monk, etc. 
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becomes a “becoming-imperceptible”. The notion of becoming does not simply 
refer to the fact that the self does not have a static being and is in constant flux. 
More precisely, it refers to an objective zone of indistinction or indiscernibility that 
always exists between any two multiplicities, a zone that immediately precedes 
their respective natural differentiation.  
 
What are they [various becomings] rushing toward? Without a doubt, toward 
becoming-imperceptible. The imperceptible is the immanent end of 
becoming, its cosmic formula… Becoming-imperceptible means many 
things. What is the relation between the (anorganic) imperceptible, the 
(asignifying) indiscernible, and the (asubjective) impersonal? (279) 
 
Becoming-imperceptible is a molecular style of perception that transforms our 
notion of freedom. Becoming-imperceptible is the challenge of abandoning or 
transforming the perceived image of thought or point of view from which we judge 
and order life – perception opens beyond itself. Becoming-imperceptible means no 
longer knowing who or what we are; it means seeing with greater openness the 
differences, intensities and singularities that travese us.  
For the most part, we do not perceive becoming. However it is possible, 
especially through art, not just to refer our sense experiences to a world of 
experienced thing, but the experience of sensibility itself. Deleuze refers to this as 
the ‘being of the sensible’. A singularity is just this becoming of the sensible, the 
virtual power of the sensible, its untimely possibility. 
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In all of Kim’s films one particular kind of image stands out. The camera is 
often stationed underwater and looks up at the film characters through moving 
water, or if the characters are underwater, the camer  captures them from the above. 
The result is that the human face keeps changing its contour, and that the boundary 
between the face and its surroundings becomes blurry. In Crocodile the last scene is 
the underwater scene in which two drowned bodies slowly move following the 
current.  In The Birdcage Inn the last scene shows two female characters at the top 
of the diving board in the middle of ocean. These two young women sit side by side 
and laugh as if they mock the world. This scene is captured by the underwater 
camera. The only time these characters are out of the stultifying confinement to 
open water, they become indistinguishable from the vast sky. In Spring this 
signature frame appears in the first outing of the girl.Her face is filmed by the 
underwater camera through water while a couple of fishes swim. In these scenes, 
Kim’s characters slowly lose their contours, are blended into surroundings and 
undergo becoming-other. 
“Becoming” does not mean one being becomes the other being. Becoming-
fish does not mean a human being develops gills and swims like a fish. Sense, 
affect, sensation, and becoming all have their conceptual origin in the event, and the 
event is an incorporeal entity. Thus, becoming-other means exchanging affects and 
sensations with the other party. Once the exchange is established, they both undergo 
virtual changes. It might not be a physical change but nonetheless it is real. In short, 
Spring is the compound of nonhuman forces, of man’s nonhuman becomings.  
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Chapter Five: Three Hollywood Films 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter considers how Deleuzian ideas surveyed in the discussions of 
Kim’s films can be applied to the images of violence in contemporary Hollywood 
cinema. Since one of the interests of this project is to find a way to utilize Deleuzian 
concepts in the analysis of popular Hollywood films, I excluded more easily 
comparable non-Hollywood films such as Funny Games (Michael Haneke, 1997), I 
Stand Alone (Gaspar Noé, 1998), or Japón (Carlos Reygadas, 2002).  
The main criterion of the selection is that each film should be considered as 
violent as the Kim’s films that I have discussed. The second criterion is more 
tactical than strategic. I pick films which highlight violence against the male body 
to maintain a consistency. Last but not least, these three films relate to “affect,” 
“sensation,” and “beocmings” in different ways. Thus each film should be analyzed 
differently using and expanding the tools of the Deleuzian model I have discussed.  
The first film The Passion of The Christ (Mel Gibson, 2004) shows how 
affect and sensation can be easily canceled out by the simple shot/reverse shot. The 
second film Reservoir Dogs (Quinten Tarantino, 1994) demonstrates how affect and 
sensation moves back and forth and how “nooshock” can be a part of that exchange. 
Finally the third film Fight Club (David Fincher, 1999) deserves more attention. As 
the most complex film among those three, it opens another possibility of presenting 
affects and sensations in cinema. While Kim Ki-duk’s films achieve affect, 
sensation, and becomings by making his characters isolated, Fight Club achieve the 
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same result by making an isolated character come out of his subjectivity through 
pain. 
I in no way claim that all film should be read through Deleuzian ideas; nor 
do I mean to negate the significance of film’s semiotic r psychoanalytic plane (the 
plane of organization). Although Deleuze oftentimes privileges one over the other 
in many dyads he proposes (such as molecular over molar, rhizomatic over 
arborsecent, and becoming over being), it does not necessarily mean that, for 
example, “molecular” is always better than “molar.” Likewise I am not interested in 
saying that the impulse-image is better than the action-image. Most Hollywood 
films can be categorized according to Deleuze as “the action-image.” Movement is 
actualized and situated, and action takes places in a determined milieu. However 
Deleuze does not set up the action-image, that is, Hollyw od cinema, into some 
argument about the reprehensible shortcomings of dominant cinema. Still, we can 
build upon our study of Deleuze and Kim Ki-duk to begin to explore one defining 
trait of Hollywood cinema, the filmic representation f violence.  
Although numerous articles and books have been written about media 
violence and its impact on society, violence has receiv d less critical attention in 
film studies. One reason is that violence seems to arouse the viewer’s bodily 
response and film studies in general have tried to avoid the question of viewer’s 
bodily response. As Massumi says, there might be a fear “of falling into a ‘naïve 
realism,’ a reductive empiricism that would dissolve th  specificity of the cultural 
domain in the plain, seemingly unproblematic, ‘presence’ of dumb matter” 
(Massumi Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation 1). Linda Williams 
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writes that any genre that excites the body of viewer and brings up unmitigated and 
un-socialized emotions is considered as vulgar, and that subsequently the 
contemporary film theories put hierarchy in genres, which results in such body 
genres such as “weepie melodrama,” “horror” and “pornog aphy” at the bottom of 
the ladder (Williams 28-9). In other words, films whic  make the viewer respond 
bodily by crying, screaming or being sexually aroused are considered less artistic, 
less serious, less valuable, and not worthy for a critical investigation. Steven 
Shaviro also notes that contemporary film theories “t nd to equate passion, 
fascination, and enjoyment with mystification… as if there were something 
degrading and dangerous about giving way to images, and so easily falling under 
their power” (Shaviro 14-5). Film theories in general h ve tried to ward off the 
allure of the film image and to distance themselves from the emotional effects given 
by the image.   
Tom Gunning’s pioneering work on early cinema, what he calls as “the 
cinema of attractions,” can be considered as an exception. Unlike traditional film 
history which theorizes early cinema under the hegemony of narrative films, he 
argues that pre-1906 films directly solicit spectators’ attention and stimulate them 
by “inciting visual curiosity, and supplying pleasure through an exciting spectacle – 
a unique event, whether fictional or documentary, that is of interest in itself” 
(Gunning 384). He also argues that the system of attraction remains an essential part 
of popular filmmaking as evident in musical genre or chase film. He finds similar 
attractions in contemporary films of Speilberg, Lucas and Coppola, which he calls a 
cinema of effects – cinema of tamed attractions (387). In other words even in 
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narrative cinema, we do not simply respond to narrative logic and realism. We 
engage with and make sense of film through our sensory experi nce.51 
Gunning adopts his term “attraction” from Eisenstein; so does Deleuze when 
he picks up his idea of cinema’s ability to produce “a shock to thought,” which he 
calls “nooshock” (Deleuze Cinema 2: The Time Image 156). This is the first time 
Deleuze explicitly puts an audience into his discussion of cinema. The audience 
which Deleuze has only implied in Cinema 1 is discussed in relation to the 
sensation. Still Deleuze does not use the word “sensatio” but his definition of 
nooshock - “producing a shock to thought, communicating v bration to the cortex, 
touching the nervous and cerebral system directly” (156) – is almost identical with 
the definition of “sensation” developed in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation.  
Deleuze believes that cinema – the automatic movement – has the possibility 
to give viewers the shock wave or the nervous vibration. Viewers no longer say “‘I 
see, I hear,’ but I FEEL, ‘totally physiological senation’” (158). There are three 
possible reactions of viewers when they feel physiological sensation. One is to force 
viewers to produce a concept from the images, another is to make viewers realize 
that they are powerless to think or are unable to think, and the other is “to give 
discourse to the body” (172).  
                                                
51         Jonathan Auerbach cautions, however, that Gunning’s “the cinema of 
attractions” posits a “seamless circuit, at once visually assaulting and assaulted” 
between early film form and its spectators. Jonathan Auerbach, Body Shots: Early 
Cinema's Incarnations (California: University of California Press, 2007) 3. The 
result is that Gunning tends to “render the human body inert” (5). While Gunning 
has tried to break with the old apparatus theory which s tuates spectators within film 
text, Gunning’s later article “An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the 
(In)Credulous Spectator” ends up “evacuating the early cinema image of form or 
content, a position curiously akin to the apparatus theorist” (4). 
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The first route was developed by, most notably, Eisenstein. He believed that 
cinema could impose the shock on the masses through montage which produces a 
higher order from the given images. However Deleuze points out this kind of 
unmediated cinema of immediacy was dead almost as soon as it came into being, 
and that the early pioneers “foresaw that cinema would encounter all the 
ambiguities of the other arts” (157) with the pure power and immediacy of the 
nooshock being only, “a pure and simple logical possibility” (157). In fact, Deleuze 
is more concerned in degradation of cinema – experimental abstractions, ‘formalist 
antics’ and commercial configurations of sex and blood. Deleuze says; 
 
The shock would be confused, in bad cinema, with the figurative violence of 
the represented instead of achieving that other violence of movement-image 
developing its vibrations in a moving sequence which emb d itself within us. 
(Deleuze Cinema 2: The Time Image 157) 
 
When the violence is picked up by mediocre directors, the violence simply is the 
image of the represented. It becomes a “blood-red arbitr iness” (164). In other 
words, the intellectual montage becomes a sheer inflation of the represented and the 
masses simply accept the represented rather than give birth of thought. The 
nooshock becomes a tool for propaganda. Deleuze even links Hollywood to Hitler:  
 
The mass-art… has degenerated into state propaganda and manipulation, 
into a kind of fascism which brought together Hitler and Hollywood. (164) 




Deleuze considers the second possibility following Artaud. Deleuze thinks that 
violent images should be akin to the sublime, in which “imagination suffers a shock 
which pushes it to the limit and forces thought to think the whole as intellectual 
totality which goes beyond the imagination” (157).  Artaud saw a link between the 
spiritual automaton of cinema and automatic writing, “a higher control which brings 
together critical and conscious thought and the unconsciou  in thought’ (165). For 
Artaud cinema is not the association of clear-cut ideas through intellectual montage, 
but on the contrary a radical de-association, an ambiguous linking of unclear ideas, 
a decentred conflation of multiple voices and viewpoints, that cannot be assimilated 
into a unified whole. The nooshock for Artaud is a purely “neuro-physiological 
vibration’ brought about by the movement and speed of the images passing through 
the project. Cinema makes it impossible to think, because before we can interpret 
one image it is already replaced by another. Before we can grasp an image it is 
already passed, the process of association is constantly interrupted, deconstructed, 
dislocated. Thus, what cinema advances is not the power f thought but its 
‘impower’ (166).   
Deleuze argues that contemporary cinema is still capable of creating affect, 
as Artaud’s violent nooshock confront us with a fundamental gap in our thinking – 
the inability of thought to think whole, rather than leading us into thinking a unified 
whole. However, this physiological response must be produced through images in 
and of themselves, without narrative structure to qualify them. Thus we can 
conclude that Deleuze, while retaining the basic tenet of sensation which he 
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develops through the study on Francis Bacon, posits a r gorous condition for 
sensation to work.  
The third route is based upon the assumption that “we no lo ger believe in 
this world” (171). When the world looks like a bad cinema, in other words, we can 
no longer believe in a world, what is possible is to believ  in the body; “it is giving 
discourse to the body, and, for the purpose, reaching te body before discourses” 
(172).  
In the following sections, however, I will analyze three films corresponding 
to the three routes Deleuze suggests. 
 
2. The Passion of the Christ 
Reaching theatres under the cloud of the extremely polarized 2004 
presidential election, oftentimes coupled with Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 911, 
Mel Gibson’s unexpected blockbuster hit The Passion of The Christ has posed a 
number of questions for film historians, film theorists, theologians, psychologists, 
religious leaders, Jewish studies scholars, and political commentators. Gibson tries 
to make The Passion of the Christ an authentic representation of the last day of 
Jesus. Instead of English, he braves to use Latin, Hebrew and now-defunct Aramaic 
with subtitles, which the Hollywood industry considers as a financial suicide. 
Because of its claim to be authenticity, many debates has quickly converged into its 
historical (or biblical) accuracies of the film. Particularly, when the question went 
to “who killed Jesus?” the film garnered an extreme int rest from the media 
questioning whether it was anti-Semitic.  
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I am not in the position to discuss its accuracy or its eligious meanings.  
Neither do I plan to discuss Gibson’s political agenda, though it looms large. What 
interests me is the ways this film presents violence. In Braveheart (1995), Gibson as 
a director has already shown a penchant for spectacular images of war, tortures, and 
human sufferings. However, The Passion of the Christ urpasses not only the level 
of brutality of Braveheart, but also that of all other films which depict the life of 
Jesus. No other film of Jesus has ever been so relentlessly gory. No other artistic or 
cinematic Jesus has suffered more than Gibson’s Jesus. 
In The Passion, Gibson focuses only the passion, neither the life nor 
resurrection of Christ. By doing so, he leaves out most of stories which are well-
known to both Christian and non-Christian audiences. According to theologian Zev 
Garber, the brutality of The Passion comes from The Dolorous Passion of Our Lord 
Jesus Christ, a controversial diary written by Sister Anna Katharin  Emmerich, 
which Gibson utilizes in addition to the four gospels (Garber 2). Public debates 
have quickly moved from charges of anti-Semitism to criticism of the film’s 
violence. Jamie Russell of Channel4 Film calls her viewing experience as “the 
agony without any of the ecstasy”52 and David Edelstein of Slate Magazine calls the 
film “The Jesus Chainsaw Massacre” (Edelstein). 
What is interesting in The Passion of Christ is that the film shows religiosity 
through bodily pain, even though, for many religious ascetics, the body is a 
dangerous enemy of spiritual perfection. The film reminds us of how much the 
narrative of the scriptures is primarily based upon b dily pain. The Old Testament 
                                                
52  http://www.channel4.com/film/reviews/film.jsp?id=128424&section=review 
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has numerous examples of bodily pain, which results from the wrath of God. 
Unforgiving pain and its fear are transformed into a belief system. First it signifies 
the difference between God and its creature, as one has no body and the other has 
the body. The power and authority of the former is attested by its capability to 
wound the latter (Scarry 181-83). Since God has no body, it is immune to pain. 
Subsequently, human being is woundable or already deeply and permanently 
wounded. God’s invisible presence is asserted, made visible, by the signs He brings 
about in the human body. In a sense, the New Testamen is a  attempt to understand 
the brutal event, by giving the event a meaning.   
If the underlying theme of the film is spirituality, which defies 
representation, it must be affects expressed by religious spirituality. The crucifixion 
of Christ is, in a sense, a historical event. Gibson’ The Passion could be an attempt 
to renew the event by inventing new concepts to call forth the event. Particularly, 
one of the longest torture sequences in film history also would allow the filmmaker 
ample opportunities to produce affects through colliding bodies. However, The 
Passion fails to achieve any of these possibilities. Rather than reviving spirituality, 
the film’s overemphasis on the body and pain undermines t. 
At first, Gibson’s The Passion seems to share many characteristics of Kim 
Ki-duk’s films. Like most films of Kim’s, the narrative of The Passion is 
minimized. Partly because Gibson’s film is a modern presentation of a “Passion 
Play” and partly because the last day of Jesus is well-known to most people, the 
director could make a film which is not reliant on the narrative per se. Thus, The 
Passion has no narrative arc: there is no rise and fall, only e tropy. The Passion 
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spirals unrelentingly downwards through despair, humiliation and torture, to agony, 
both physical and spiritual, and finally to gruesome death. Thus, the viewing 
experience of The Passion is not the viewing pleasure associated with narrative 
development and resolution, but the pure impact of images. 
However the similarity between Kim and Gibson ends there. The images in 
The Passion cannot be called either the affection-image or the impulse-image. 
Admittedly, Gibson uses numerous close-ups in The Passion. However the role of 
the close-up is different from that of the affection-image. In the previous chapter, I 
discussed how the close-up or “any-space-whatever” abstr cts the image from its 
spatio-temporal coordinates. By doing so, the affection-image arrests the movement 
to produce affects which refuse to enter the action-image and challenge our habitual 
viewing experience. The close-up is the affection-image; however the close-up, 
unlike the affection-image also can be easily actualized in a determinate milieu, as 
Deleuze cautions us: 
 
We must always distinguish power-qualities in themselves, as expressed by a 
face, faces or their equivalents (affection-image of Firstness) and these same 
power-qualities as actualized in a state of things, in a determinate space-time 
(action-image of Secondness). (Deleuze Cinema 1: The Movement-Image 
106). 
 
Gibson never allows his close-ups to be freed from the narrative plane. There are 
basically two types of shots in The Passion: one is the shot of action and the other is 
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the reaction of the first shot. In the flogging sequence, for example, there are 
numerous close-ups which show the contact between a weapon and the body of 
Jesus. These brutal close-ups produce, without a doubt, strong sensations. However 
Gibson does not allow the audience to encounter unrepres ntable pain and 
suffering. He has to remove any pause or any intervals. In other words, for Gibson, 
power-qualities should be actualized immediately at any cost.  
Thus, every blow of flagellation is followed by the close-up of the witness. 
These second type close-ups do not abstract faces, either, but fix them not only in 
their spatio-temporal coordinates, but also in their social and historical grids, such 
as that of Jewish priest, Roman soldier, Mary, Madame Magdalene, and Satan. 
Gibson relentlessly links the suffering body of Jesus with witnesses, and they 
register different reactions to the action. On one side, thr e are Satan, Jewish 
priests, Roman soldiers, and the crowd, and, on the other sid , there are Mary and 
Mary Magdalene. We audiences become voyeurs. We track Jesus as witnesses do in 
the scene. Gibson also forces us to identify with one witness among others; Mary, 
who is the surrogate spectator. She interprets and gives meaning of the event to the 
passive voyeurs.  
The surrogate spectator, which I call as the “embedded sp ctator” is one of 
the main characteristics of the action-image, represent d by American cinema. In 
the action-image, the suspensiveness and non-actuality of the affection-image 
becomes intolerable and movement should be actualized and situated. To prevent 
the image-movement drifts away, American cinema often embeds a witness with 
whom audiences are forced to identify. Thus, in The Passion, affects and impulses 
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“only appear as embodied in behavior, in the form of emotions or passions which 
order and disorder it” (Deleuze Cinema 1: The Movement-Image 141).  
Rather than capturing the spiritual transformation of becoming-God, which 
is what Passion should be about, the film wastes no time in giving meaning to those 
scenes and characters, and subsequently to eliminate the chance of encounter for an 
audience. The potential sensation of affect and impulse becomes ensational. We 
feel guilty but it is not necessarily the kind of guilt Gibson might have intended to 
evoke. 
Eventually Gibson’s close-ups remain as simple shot-reverse shots which 
maintain the relationship from one face to another; whose shots belong to “the 
action-image” rather than “the affection-image.” This is the point where the 
sensational diverges from sensation through subordinating the affect under narrative 
and signification. Thus, the more the film succeeds in presenting the unbearable 
pain, the more it undermines affects and subsequently its spiritual message of an 
originary world of the divine. In other words, while t is a religious film which aims 
to revive spirituality, it fails to extract affects which might preserve the invisible 
presence of God and transform the suffering body into spiritual entity. It stays as a 
sensational film par excellence. Before it becomes an affect, it quickly moves to the 
action-image.  
Gibson’s Passion is full of violent images which might become “nooshock.” 
Rather than producing a shock to a thought, however, those images force viewers to 
accept a simple religious equation: the suffering of Jesus and our sin. However this 
“sin” has nothing to do with its religious gravity. The vi wer’s guilty comes from 
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his position as a voyeur. It also fails to evoke sublime; every event is organized in 
the narrative and every affect is checked by the identification with the witness. It 
has become a propaganda film.  
 
3. Reservoir Dogs 
Quentin Tarantino’s celebrated debut film Reservoir Dogs (1991) seem to 
stand for everything Kim’s debut film could not have: a film-buff’s film with 
excellent acting, dialogue colorfully written in vulgar gangster vernacular, the 
intricate narrative structure combining several flashbacks and the high production 
value. At the same time, there are also a couple of similarities. First, it features six 
career criminals with white shirts in black suits. The protagonists are strangers who 
address each other using false names assigned by the heist’s organizer. Like many 
Kim’s characters, their social and personal backgrounds are unknown not only to 
each character but also to the viewers. The actual heist is never seen, either. Thus, 
the film intentionally frustrates viewers by hiding the supposedly main event of the 
gangster genre convention. The hidden identities are enhanced by their 
conversations. They do not talk about gangster stuffs; they ramble about whether to 
tip a waitress. Secondly violence is gratuitous. As Mr. Blonde gleefully announces, 
he tortures Mr. Orange regardless of whether he confesses what he knows or not.  
As we said earlier, Deleuze finds the crisis of the action-image in Italian 
Neo-Realism, particularly in its setting. Deleuze also finds an equivalent in 1970’s 
Hollywood cinema: 
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The sensory-motor action or situation has been replac d by the stroll, the 
voyage and the continual return journey. The voyage has found in America 
the formal and material conditions of a renewal. It takes place through 
internal or external necessity, through the need for flight. But now it loses 
the initiatory aspect that it had in German journey (even in Wenders’ films) 
and that it kept, despite everything, in the beat journey (Dennis Hopper and 
Peter Fonda’s Easy Rider). It has become urban voyage, and has become 
detached from the active and affective structure which supported it, directed 
it, gave it even vague directions. How could there be an rve fiber or a 
sensory-motor structure between the driver of Taxi Driver and what he sees 
on the pavement in his driving mirror? (Deleuze Cinema 1: The Movement-
Image 208)53 
 
These seventies heroes are no longer tied to the actual milieu and moves from one 
place to another aimlessly. Deleuze calls this setting of the modern voyage “any-
space-whatever” (208). In Reservoir Dogs, this space is the warehouse in which the 
survivors converge to find out who is the rat when the heist goes awry. Gormley 
claims, however, the role of any-space-whatever in Reservoir Dogs is different from 
seventies cinema. While seventies’ cinema is characterized by the rootless 
protagonists, the gangsters of Reservoir Dogs are “powerless to leave” and 
“powerless to control” (Gormley 154). Those gangsters are in an awkward situation, 
                                                
53  I am indebted to Gormley for the link between any-space-whatever and 
Reservoir Dogs. Paul Gormley, The New-Brutality Film: Race and Affect in 
Contemporary Hollywood Culture (Bristol, UK: Intellect, 2005). 
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because they know one of them is an undercover cop but they cannot leave the place. 
Considering that for Deleuze immobility and an unfamiliar location are key 
elements of any-space-whatever, the warehouse certainly belongs to the place in 
which affect is created. However, Gormley treats the space as a mere backdrop for 
the power struggle between the gangsters. However, it seem  that the warehouse 
setting plays a much bigger role.  
Crucially the interior of the warehouse is very theatric l. The existence of 
the erect coffins and a covered hearse in the background transforms the 
claustrophobic space into a doomed space. Also it has an irregular shape completed 
with a slanted doorway. Although it should be somewhere in LA, the camera never 
shows outside which might give the place a certain spatial coordinates. The sense of 
isolation is coupled with the sense of incomprehension of the inside space. No 
close-ups are given to any small props in this place, either. Thus, the setting of 
Reservoir Dog resembles that of Crocodile. Although their locations can be 
assumed, they are presented as disconnected from the outside and their interiors are 
full of unusual props.  
Up until the infamous torture scene, the camera captures most actions in the 
long-shot with great depth, emphasizing the relationship between characters with 
almost no movement. The camera frees itself when the infamous torture scene starts. 
Mr. Blonde sat on an abandoned hearse jumps from his perch. The camera quickly 
takes his point-of-view and imitates his movement. As he moves closer to the cop, 
the camera movement gets faster, becoming unhinged from characters’ perspectives. 
Then, Mr. Blonde pulls out his gun and aims to the cop and we can see the struggle 
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of the cop to escape the line of fire. Interestingly at this point, the camera stops 
movement and catches both of them with a long-shot. This long-shot is quite 
effective because we can see an almost spasmodic boy m vement on the left side 
of screen and no movement at all on the right side. Th  reason that this shot looks 
more violent than an actual slapping or beating scene is b cause of the difference of 
movement within a single frame.  
We can see the camera movement and the movement of the character 
produce rhythms and vibrations. When the camera stops, the body starts to struggle; 
it brings about the sensation, as the sudden movement of the floating temple in 
Spring produces a rhythm and vibration. Next, we see an eve  more dramatic 
change of speed of the camera movement. The camera cuts to a close-up of Mr. 
Blonde’s boot as he takes out a razor. Until he actually cuts the cop’s ear, the 
camera repeats the same movement as before. However, in that exact moment of 
cutting, the camera pans away from the torture scene to the shot of alley and stands 
still, until Mr. Blonde finishes his job. Audiences can still hear the muffled cries of 
pain. This shot is without a doubt much more effective than showing every action, 
because audiences experience a sudden change of movement and a sudden switch of 
sense from the visual to the aural. The movement is arrested and the affect of pain 
lingers. 
The gangsters are powerless to leave, and no one has the decisive power to 
change their situation. The cop tied to the chair and being tortured cannot move, 
either. The result is the strong mimetic connection between the cinematic body of 
Mr. Orange and the body of the viewer. The temporal st ucture in which Orange is 
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imprisoned with no escape except death is the same as that of the viewer. The shock 
of images is transferred directly to the viewer’s nerve system, because the viewer 
does not have necessary information to understand the situation. The identity of cop 
is not revealed yet, and the violence is gratuitous. The sudden random eruptions of 
violence which even the gangsters cannot control result in the powerlessness which 
an audience has to feel being tied in his chair. These attempts make the viewer’s 
body act through an involuntary impulse and give it a shock. 
This shock is, however, not the shock coming from a forced identification as 
in The Passion. In the way this film sets itself up, there is no one to identify with, 
much as in the case of Kim Ki-duk’s films. The viewer can identify with neither the 
victimizer nor the victim, and is thus put in the position of the disaffected observers. 
Violence is not necessarily tied with narrative; it neith r advances, nor delays 
narrative. The torture scene becomes a stand alone, s g and dance spectacle of 
musical. 
The sensation of watching a brutal torture in a warehouse of any-space-
whatever, coupled with a fragmented plot animates a particular kind of cinematic 
affect. While the identification is not possible, the body f viewer mimics the 
actions on screen. As Deleuze argues, the affect is created through physiological 
response without narrative structure to qualify them. 
Still Reservoir Dogs differs from Kim’s films, because the unknown identity 
becomes an important narrative device of the film, as the story advances itself to 
find out who the undercover cop is. The neat ending in which everybody is 
effectively killed does not leave any room for becomings, either. Thus affect and 
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sensation wane quickly before they invoke the powerlessn ss of the sublime, or 
force us to think.  
  
 
4. Fight Club 
While Kim Ki-duk’s films have been criticized as misogynistic, David 
Fincher’s Fight Club (1999) has been condemned by many as an excessive display 
of masculinity. In Newsweek, under the title, “It’s Thelma & Louise for Guys,” 
Susan Faludi compares David Fincher’s Fight Club (1999) to Ridley Scott’s Thelma 
& Louise; as Thelma & Louise crystallized the common experience and pain of 
women, Fight Club does that for men. She concludes “beneath the violent surface of 
the controversial film Fight Club is a surprising message about how to be a man 
today” (Faludi 89). Faludi notices the frustration of modern males behind the bare-
knuckled fighting; nowadays men are trapped in a cubicle in an anonymous 
corporate job, trying to scrape together an identity from Ikea brochures, 
entertainment magazines, self-help gatherings and, most of all, “fatherless”. Fight 
Club exploits much of its tormented male characters’ sense of abandonment. Tyler 
Durden (Brad Pitt) says in the film, “We’re a generation of men raised by women… 
We are God’s unwanted children.” The male species is onthe verge of extinction. 
Understandably, the main story evolves around the underground boxing club that 
desires the revival of “lost” masculinity. 
Masculinity is, without a doubt, the most visible issue in Fight Club: the 
sign of “Remaining Men Together” at the entrance of testicular cancer self-help 
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group meeting, Bob (who has big breasts) sobbing “We’re still men,” the gory 
depiction of underground boxing scene in which half naked guys fist-fight each 
other, the ubiquitous billboard images of sexy males in underwear, and to the final 
single frame insert of penis. Subsequently, masculinity has been almost a 
unanimous choice of topic among film critics of the film. However, the issue of 
masculinity guides many film critics to be disgusted by the disturbing sign, 
signaling the evolution of a previously unseen cinematic rticulation of masculinity, 
which is, to them, dangerously close to fascism. Particularly, the transformation of 
“fight club” into “project mayhem” worries many film critics. By recourse to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s terminologies, Diken and Laustsen deplore how fight Club 
“functions as a line of flight from the stratified society… Yet, in spite of a 
deterritorializing start, Fight Club ends up transforming nto a fascist organization 
with a new name: Project Mayhem” (Diken).  
In “Fascinating Fascism,” Susan Sontag identifies several characteristics of 
works of artists who embraced fascism. Firstly, fascist aesthetics valorizes two 
contradictory states, “egomania” and “servitude.” The relation of domination and 
enslavement takes the form of a characteristic pageantry: the massing of groups of 
people: the turning of people into things: the multiplication of things and grouping 
of people/things around an all-powerful, hypnotic lead r figure or force. Secondly, 
the fascist dramaturgy centers on the orgiastic transaction between mighty forces 
and their puppets and its choreography alternates between ceaseless motion and a 
congealed, static, and “virile” posing.  Also fascist art glorifies surrender, it exalts 
mindlessness, and it glamorizes death (Sontag 39-40). 
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Fight Club, in fact, fits well with these characterizations of fascist works. 
Tyler recruits people and turns them into de-individualized parts for his project. 
Tyler is obviously the powerful and mystic figure; he and his army constitute a 
strong dominant/dominated relationship. Furthermore, to be a part of Tyler’s army, 
“Fight Club” members should pass the “stay-still test” and endure the humiliation 
before the induction. They do glorify the death of one of their members; they 
hypnotically recite, “His name is Robert Paulson, his name is Robert Paulson….”  
Not every film critic, however, finds the political message of Fight Club 
dangerous. In case of Amy Taubin, the narrative conclusion of Fight Club to some 
extent alleviates her worries. The image of the bombing of financial corporate 
headquarters is, for her, enough evidence to prove the tragic consequence of 
fascistic masculinity, though she does not give us the reason why the ending works 
as a self-criticism of film. The ending is the culmination of “project mayhem” 
which Tyler (Jack’s doppelganger) designs and performs, while Jack (Edward 
Norton) tries to stop the explosion in vain. In the scene, Jack is triumphant by 
killing his double but at the same time has to face the consequence that his double 
has successfully orchestrated. Perhaps the bombing does criticize the film’s own 
fascistic tendencies. What happens, however, if we shift our focus away from a 
discussion of the significance of the film’s narrative conclusion?  
Whether it is a self-criticism or not, it is importan to note that the 
significance of the film’s narrative conclusion has been overrated. The moments 
that are remembered, the images that audiences may take from the cinematic 
experience, cannot be simply summed up within the terms of this or other moments 
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of conventional narrative resolution. For example, th usual final punishment of the 
femme fatale in film noir has a less lasting effect on the audience than the genr ’s 
extraordinary strong and seductive female image. Likewis , we arguably remember 
the spectacular scenes of surfing and skydiving of Patrick Swayze and his buddies 
in Kathryn Bigelow’s Point Break (1991), much more so that what happens to the 
film’s characters.  
In the history of film criticism, the association of masculinity with fascism is 
not new.  Yvonne Tasker makes an argument that suggests how the 80s’ disciplined 
male bodies in violent action films have generated the anxiety of fascism “through 
their implicit invocation of fascist idealization of the white male body” (Tasker 1). 
The important point to note here is that the idealization comes through the 
disciplined body rather than the violence and power that the action hero exerts. 
 
In contrast to the images of anarchic violence that have critically 
accompanies muscular movies, it is, in fact, the values of self-control rather 
than chaos, and the practices of training and disciplne which are extolled as 
central terms in the definition of bodybuilding and in the image of the 
muscleman hero of 1980s cinema. (Tasker 9) 
 
At first glance, Fight Club seems to be an another example of “muscular movies,” – 
half naked male bodies under the dimly lit basement ligh , the mixture of bloody 
violence and muscle, homoerotic solidarity, and de-individualized males restrained 
under a fraternity-like organization – whose images film critics have consciously 
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and unconsciously associated with those of fascism. As the 80s’ film critics found 
fascism in the disciplined male body, the late 90s’ film critics seem to find the same 
in Fight Club.  
However I suspect that the accusation of Fight Club as a fascist film actually 
speaks how film critics seem to have a certain anxiety about this film, similar to 
Korean feminist film critics have about Kim’s films and their seemingly 
misogynistic images. In Kim’s films, female characters a e victims of physical and 
sexual abuses. However, it is not because they are women caught in a sexual 
imbalance, gender hierarchy or misogyny. Although they often enter the filmic 
space as socially and conventionally stratified subjects, they soon undergo the event 
of becoming-other. In the process of various becomings, they often resort to their 
bodies and pain to communicate. If they resemble victims, that is simply the 
stratified reification of their weak intensity, just like the many animals in Kim’s 
films who become victims of violence from men, women and even children. The 
violence is simply how two bodies affect each other and are affected by each other 
on the plane of consistency, because their collisions happen on the molecular plane 
rather than on the genderized stratified plane. In fact, Fight Club spends most of its 
time trying to crack open the plane of organization, which is symbolized first and 
foremost in the film as a ubiquitous consumer culture. 
I am not closing off the possibility that Fight Club might be understood by 
some as a fascist film and that it might bring detrimental effects to the society. 
However, if finding the female subservience everywhere can result in simply 
   
150 
 
reaffirming the already existing structure, looking at the masculine body as always 
the fascist body might bring the same result.  
Fight Club does display bodies insistently and obsessively. However, the 
images of bodies in Fight Club are far from being the transparent signifiers of a 
simplistic sexual, racial and class hierarchy that some critics take them to be. Fight 
Club presents those bodies in their multiplicity but in an unsparingly visceral way. 
It shows the body in its crude, primordial materiality; t denies the myth of textual 
or signifying autonomy; it turns the signification back into the physiological and 
affective conditions. This is what makes the film so disturbing. What is even more 
disturbing is the fact that bodies arise in Fight Club through physical pain. Pain is 
the invitation to corporeality and it is the story of the body. 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault vividly describes pre-modern public 
punishment in which the power structures were maintained and reinforced by the 
display of corporeal punishment. Through the visual display of punishment, the 
state could manifest the control of both body and soul of the people, while the body 
became the surface on which social control was played out, on which power was 
invested and maintained. However the scars, wounds, cuts and chemical burns in 
Fight Club are not a return to the pre-modern form of inscription of power. Rather, 
they are affects, which resist the plane of organization and which disturb our 
complacence to meaning. 
Jack is big auto company “recall coordinator.” Working i an office and 
flying through different time zones, he almost loses a sense of time and space.  
Understandably, he develops insomnia. Living in-between sleep and wake, he buys 
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things from catalogue, most notably from “Ikea.” Being repulsed by the corporate 
take-over of culture, he speaks, at the same time, into a phone sitting on the toilet, 
“Yes, I’d like to order the Erica Pekkary dust ruffles.” Jack explains to himself 
through voice-over narration: “I would flip through catalogs and wonder, ‘what 
kind of dinning set defines me as a person?’ We used to read pornography.  Now it 
is the Horchow Collection.” Consumerism is the defining l festyle in Jack’s world. 
However, satisfaction never comes closer. Tyler angrily declares, “We have been 
raised by television to believe that we will be millionaires and movie gods and rock 
stars – but we won’t… And we’re very, very pissed off.” Jack is a victim of the de-
humanizing and desensitizing power of contemporary society in which identity is 
shaped by consumer culture.   
In the computer generated scene that Jack orders things and, at the same 
time, those goods immediately fill the room, the room transforms itself into the 
printed Ikea catalogue while Jack is floating through the room. By blending with the 
advertisement image, Jack becomes a part of consumer cultu e; the hyperreal 
spectacular consumer culture consumes him. However, it also suggests this total 
immersion into consumer culture allows him to connect with his belongings in 
unforeseen way. He is not the owner of his belongings, but he is a part of it. In other 
words, he retreats to the molecular level losing his subjectivity. Jack makes himself 
into the Deleuzian Body without Organs (BwO).54 In the preceding chapter, I used 
                                                
54  The Body without Organs is one of the key concepts introduced by Deleuze 
and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus (particularly in the sixth 
Plateau “November 28, 1947: How Do You Make Yourself a Body without 
Organs?”). Considering one of the main concepts of BwO is its reference to “egg” 
(egg as an “intensive multiplicity”), we may trace BwO to Bergsonism (1968), 
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the term “plane of consistency” instead of BwOs, because in Spring various 
becomings result from various elements including animals, a temple, and human-
beings, which make connection as heterogeneous haecceiti s. However Fight Club 
puts the bodies at the spot light that compose the plane. Deleuze and Guattari, in 
fact, treat BwO and the plane of consistency same thing, although they often say as 
if BwO belong to the plane of consistency. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s term “the Body without Organs” is somewhat 
misleading. The “body” in BwO does not necessarily refe  to the actual body, nor 
does “without Organs” entail the removal of organs. The BwO does not necessarily 
mean that we have to create bodies that no longer have any organs at all. Probably 
the better name is The Body without an Organism. Considering BwO’s reference to 
                                                                                                                                          
which equates “becoming” with “multiplicity.” If we consider the opposition 
between a plane of organization (a structure of organs developed in an 
overdetermined evolution) and a plane of composition (which goes beyond organs 
to pure materials that enter into various combinations), then we find the seed of 
BwO in Difference and Repetition (1969). Thus we may safely say that the idea of 
BwO is one of those ideas Deleuze has continuously developed throughout his 
oeuvres. However, it was in The Logic of Sense where that idea of BwO finds its 
expression thanks to Antonin Artaud. “November 28, 1947” in “November 28, 
1947: How Do You Make Yourself a Body without Organs?” is the date Antonin 
Artaud’s radio play “To Have Done with the Judgment of G d” was commissioned 
for French Radio. It was scheduled to air on February 2, 1948, but was cancelled by 
the director of French Radio, due to its scatological, vicious and obscene anti-
American and anti-Catholic pronouncements. The radio play which Artaud wrote 
after a long stay in psychiatric institutions is close to a rave from schizophrenia. 
Although it is almost incomprehensible, there are several segments which might 
have interested Deleuze. At first Artaud makes a dubious claim saying American 
children have to deposit their sperm before they enter i o public education to 
produce armies when it is necessary. Whether it is true or not in the 1940s’ US, 
what makes Artaud grunt is the implication that human body can be made for 
already determined purpose. Deleuze cannot agree more with him, whose idea of 
the body is based upon Spinoza’s idea of body – “we don’t know what the body is 
capable of”. 
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the body, we may consider BwO akin to the Spinozian body which challenges or 
resists fixed identities. BwO does not oppose the organs but rather opposes the 
limits of the organism and makes multiple connections that go beyond the 
organism’s organization as it is traditionally defined. Fight Club is about making a 
body without organs through pain and doing a deterritorialization of subject. On the 
other hand, it fills the plane of consistency with sc izophrenic desire, which is the 
condition of becomings. 
Pain is paradoxical. Pain destroys the self in its sheer aversiveness.  The 
annihilating power of pain is visible in “dying and death” or in “serious pain” where 
“the claims of the body utterly nullify the claims of the world” (Scarry 33).  
However, at the same time pain affirms the existence of the self by intensifying 
existence. In a day when many would dissolve the self without residue into 
historical and social relations, the inescapable quality of pain reveals that subject is 
burdened with its being. It does indicate the materiality of existence, a materiality 
that is not accidental to the self and that is not comprehensible in terms of an 
opposition of the self to the body. Therefore pain is the general condition of being 
alive, a state of sensation, a sensual monitoring of the body, a care or awareness of 
its health and its status, an attention to what are sometimes known as “raw 
feelings”. However it does not mean pain reclaims the subject through its 
affirmation of flesh. Rather it is a pure affect whic  resists subjectification. 
Pain first comes to Jack as the lost senses of space and time.  In insomnia, 
Jack feels nothing real; everything seems distant and far aw y; the world nullifies 
itself in his pain.  In front of the burned car in whic  the fat of the victim is burned 
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to the seat, one inspector says, “[it is] very modern art.” While Jack is sympathetic 
neither to the disturbing wreckage nor to the even more disturbing comment, he 
feels nothing. Everything is like “a copy of a copy of a copy”. While everything 
lacks reality, pain is the only sign that marks his exi t nce, however uncertain it 
may be.   
The uncertainty of Jack's pain is because it is only his own. Pain has 
perplexed many philosophers and others alike due to its inexpressibility. While pain 
exists as a sheer certainty to the one who is under extreme pain, its existence is 
elusive to others who must confirm the pain that one is experiencing. In Cries and 
Whispers (1972), director Ingmar Bergman tells the stories about a dying woman, 
Agnes, who is under extreme pain, and her two sisters and a maid. While the 
constant screaming and mourning suggest the existence of extreme pain, actually 
experiencing others’ pain is an utter impossibility. For the observers, the only way 
to relate Agnes's pain is to recall the most painful memories of their own. The film 
alternates between the “cries” of present pain and the “whispers” of past pain – the 
observers, in turn, have their own flashback sequence which starts with a close up 
of a face and inaudible whispering. As in Bergman's film, Jack's pain is unknown; 
the doctor does not recognize his pain and refuses to give him a sleeping pill. 
Instead his doctor suggests, “Do you want to know what re l pain is? Swing by First 
Methodist Tuesday nights.” The self-help group meeting, which Jack’s doctor 
recommends him to check out, is notably a testicular cancer group – a group of 
males whose hormones physically altered their bodies into unmanly shapes. This 
support group among others is particularly significant because pain is here 
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externalized onto the body and the externalization addsmore pain on already 
unbearable pain.   
The exposed pain of others puts Jack’s own pain off-guard. His pain is not 
something which needs regulation and needs to be hidden, but it is something to be 
shown. It becomes clear that the only way that Jack cn regain a sense of 
individuality is by pulling the primeval and barbaric instincts of pain and violence 
out of his imaginary cave. Jack not only reveals his pan but also actively makes it. 
One day Tyler asks Jack to hit him as hard as possible. Jack hits him and Tyler 
returns the favor. After repetitive fights, fighting becomes an addiction. They are 
exhilarated by violence and they discover through fit, the corporeality of their 
existence that consumer culture disguised. Broken teeth, bruises, chemical burns 
and bullet hole are not symbolic cuts, as psychoanalysis might suggest. Rather they 
are cracks of the social stratification and the hyper reality dominating our society. 
The stunning “brain ride” credit sequence opens with the sweeping movement of 
camera from molecular images of inner organ to the mouth f Jack, might be read 
as a journey from a molar subject to molecular one. 
The world which “Fight Club” fights against is a postmodern world, in 
which, as is often understood, simulacra devours reality. However, this 
overpowering of simulacra does not mean a total annihilation of reality. As Deleuze 
and Guattari (1983) suggest, simulacra disqualifies both the original and the copy: 
“It carries the real beyond its principle to the point where it is effectively produced” 
(Deleuze and Guattari Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 87).  Fight Club 
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produces precisely this real through the production of Tyler, who is a manic vision 
of schizophrenic but nonetheless undermines the existence of Jack.   
A doppelganger is symbolic personification of Kant’s idea that there are two 
wills or selves in Man – the phenomenal and noumenal self. In literature, it is 
understood as a motif that represents the faces of good and evil within a single 
individual as objectified in two characters at war with each other. Dr. Jeckyl and 
Mr. Hyde, the most well-known doppelganger, represent J an-Jacques Rousseau’s 
fundamental antithesis between Society and Man, where Man is alienated from his 
original nature and prevented from being his real self by the artificial uniformity 
that Society imposes. However, Jack and Tyler are not Dr. Jeckyl and Mr. Hyde in 
spite of their playful names – Jack/Jeckyl and Tyler/Hyde. While Dr. Jeckyl and 
Mr. Hyde is the result of a conflict between the ego and its id, and therefore are two 
separate individual subjects, Jack and Tyler presents themselves as an identical 
subject, which locates their difference in a sub-human, sub-individual level. 
Therefore, while the Jackyl/Hyde pair signifies the antithesis between society and 
nature, the Jack/Tyler dichotomy portrays a connection, a becoming in Deleuzian 
sense.  
Once Jack produces Tyler, Jack himself is produced again through Tyler. 
The more Tyler becomes the Body without Organs, the more Jack becomes an 
organ-machine. While desiring-machines connect with other desiring-machines in a 
connective synthesis, there is a disjunctive synthesis which is the body without 
organs. The desiring-machines and the BwO coexist as two eparate yet interrelated 
constituents of the psychic process of repulsion and attraction, antiproduction and 
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production, deterritorialization and reterritorialization, that extends beyond the 
individual and into the social world. 
 
The BwO theory maintains that there is an ideal to which all human beings 
continually aspire, whether consciously or not. This ideal is the psychic state 
in which we experience ourselves as nothing other than a deterritorialized, 
antiproductive, and uninterrupted continuum of excitant desire: there is no 
production; there is only the electric fervor of desir . Simply put, all human 
beings wish to become a body without organs. The BwO is what remains 
when you take everything away. (Deleuze and Guattari A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 151) 
 
The Body Without Organs (BwO), it must be affirmed, “is not at all the opposite of 
the organs. The organs are not its enemies. The enemy is the organism. The BwO is 
opposed not to the organs but to that organization of the organs called organism” 
(158). Sitting beside Tyler, Jack reads out loud an article written by Organs in the 
first person narration. Increasingly, we see Jack refer to himself as various organs; 
"I am Jack’s medulla oblongata, I am Jack's colon, I'm Jack's kinky shadow...etc." 
The beauty of Fight Club comes from its refusal to refer back to some 
authentic original. The human figures portrayed as Jack/Tyler are all the more 
thoroughly “deoriginated.” Their radical ambiguity precedes and ruins any split 
between being and representation, any opposition between phenomenal presence 
and linguistic signification. Jack/Tyler represents the subject work-in-progress, 
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undergoing the continuous variation of becoming-other. It is therefore both nomadic 
(without home or refuge) and rhizomatic (without roots r anchorage). 
Lines of flight cause the machinic production of human subjects to pass 
from paranoiac fragmentation to schizophrenic fractalization: nothing but 
movement, nothing but flux. They carry the ossified flows held within subject into 
open context of the entire real-history-of-the world, strangling arborescent 
hierarchies and instituting involuted rhizomes as they go: complication, 
experimentation, invention, singularity, alterity. 
Considering the fate of the subject in contemporary discourses associated 
with the advent of poststructuralism and postmodernism, the subject is clearly dead. 
However, it is important to remember that the funeral of the subject is for certain 
types of subject, such as an immortal, ahistorical, incorporeal, universal, and 
abstract one. Outside of this long obituary lies the subject that is bound within and 
pinned down by a plethora of social apparatuses.   
The theoretical dilemma of film representation, in which representation 
means the absence of the represented, has generated one of the fundamental 
questions of film studies. Deleuze’s answer is “But, if cinema does not give us the 
presence of the body and cannot give us it, this is perhaps also because it sets itself 
a different objective… it affects the visible with a fundamental disturbance, and the 
world with a suspension, which contradicts all natural perception.” Of course, the 
different objective means “producing” rather than “representing”. The absent body 
is an opportunity rather than shortcoming, particularly when there is no body to 
represent. In Cinema 2: Time-Image, Deleuze characterizes the modern political 
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cinema as “the people are missing”. For classical cinema “the people are there, even 
though they are oppressed, tricked, subject, even though blind or unconscious” 
(216). Despite the rise of Hitler who subjected the masses subjected, and despite of 
Stalinism which replaced peoples with the tyrannical unity of a party, people were 
already there with the hope of revolution and democracy and with the hope to be a 
true subject. However, the people no longer or do not yet exist. Therefore modern 
and postmodern political cinemas bestow themselves a new task – to find or to 
make people. 
 
Art, and especially cinematographic art, must take part in this task: not that 
of addressing a people, which is presupposed already there, but of 
contributing to the invention of a people. (217) 
 
In the context of Deleuze and Guattari's texts, the inv ntion of the schizophrenic 
tendency is the revolutionary tendency of capitalism. They are keen to stress, 
however, that it is not a case of identifying the revolutionary with the schizo, even 
if, in the course of their exposition, this is what they appear to be doing. They say, 
"this would be a bad reading, and we don't know which is better, a bad reading or 
no reading at all" (379). However what else can it be? Like their cautious warning, 
there is no guarantee of revolutionary-schizophrenia. At least we can find in Jack 
both deterritorialization and antiproduction, (and even d struction). Deleuze says,  
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Destroy, destroy. The task of schizoanalysis goes by way of destruction - a 
whole scouring of the unconscious, a complete curettage... D stroying 
beliefs and representations, theatrical scenes. And when engaged in this task 
no activity will be too malevolent. (Deleuze and Guattari Anti-Oedipus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia 311) 
 
“Project Mayhem” is the turning point of “Fight Club.” Regaining the sense of the 
body allows them to look at the outside world from their own point of view, as 
schizophrenia looks at the world from its own point of view (“Doubtless each organ 
machine interprets the entire world from the perspectiv  of its own flux, from the 
point of view of the energy that flows from it” (6).) Project Mayhem starts with 
harmless random fight with people on the street with the purpose to lose. Soon, 
Project Mayhem  evolves into a Situationist guerrilla network. As the 1960s’ 
Situationists warned us not to make new image but to plagiarize already existing 
spectacles in order to undermine them, “Project Mayhem” destroys the postmodern 
image culture. They erase the security device of video store, break satellite dishes, 
bomb computer display-window. They destroy corporate ar , change the meaning of 
billboard by altering letters, threaten city officials and ultimately bombs corporate 
office-structure in order to undermine the economic foundations of credit-card 
consumer society. 
The obvious omission in our discussion Fight Club so far is the fact that 
Fight Club is presented mostly through the eyes of a schizophrenic narrator. Fight 
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Club plays with the idea of an “unreliable narrator.”55 While most narrators in film, 
by convention, supply audience with most credible information and moral criteria, 
the narrator of Fight Club deceives audience until the last minutes. When film 
adapts the first person narrator as a prime vehicle of advancing its narrative, it is 
inevitable to expect a certain degree of distortion of information. However, 
sometimes this distortion goes beyond subjective opinion, experience, or personal 
bias. Like The Sixth Sense, Fight Club fools its audience for most of the time. Only 
when the character Jack realizes that he and Tyler are the same person, does the 
audience realize that the whole story has been deliver d through the eyes of a 
schizophrenic narrator. In this sense, Fight Club forces audience to experience 
schizophrenia, or more precisely to be schizophrenic. Ac ording to Deleuze and 
Guattari, we are schizophrenics, thought it is often hard to accept. Interes ingly 
enough, in film history, this device has been associated with fascism. Robert 
Wiene's 1919 film, The Cabinet of Dr. Calligari is the prime example. 
The Cabinet of Dr. Calligari has been a representative work of German 
Expressionism of early part of the twentieth century. As a part of modernist avant-
garde movements, it emphasizes the highly psychologized narrative, and abstract 
but elaborate set design; it creates grotesquely distorted spaces, tilting houses, 
misshapen furniture. Later it turns out that the unrealistic setting is the vision of 
madman, who happens to be a narrator. Once the narrative eaches its point of 
revelation, the mise-en-scene changes into a “relatively realistic” form. However, 
                                                
55  The term, “unreliable narrator” (a teller whose evaluations and reports are 
not endorsed by the implied author) is coined by Wayne Booth. Wayne C. Booth, 
The Rhetoric of Fiction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961). See pp 71 -
75. 
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The Cabinet of Dr. Calligari cannot be discussed without considering the 
authoritative interpretation of Sigfried Kracauer. In his earlier work, From Caligari 
to Hitler (1947), a study of the German cinema from 1919 to 1933, Kracauer traces 
the decline of German political cultures as reflected in the history of its cinema. 
From the tradition of realist aesthetics, Kracauer insists that it is the clear obligation 
and the special privilege of film to record and reveal, and thereby redeem, physical 
reality. By representing its story as a tale told by a madman, The Cabinet of Dr. 
Caligari reflects the general retreat from the facts of German life as well as the 
abuse of power and authority characteristic of the German political institution. The 
total organization of Caligari’s landscapes within studio walls, its scenery of the 
soul, reveals how the German cinema turns away from a reality which is haphazard, 
incalculable, and uncontrollable. In doing so, says Kracauer, German cinema helped 
prepare the way for Hitler’s rise by subtlly diverting the audience from a serious 
appraisal of social realities. By ignoring the claims of camera reality, according to 
Kracauer, the German cinema achieved the damnation, not the redemption, of 
German life. However, beside the use of an “unreliable narrator,” it is difficult to 
make a case that The Cabinet and Fight Club share anything in common. Rather 
Susan Sontag’s descriptions of aestheticization of the body in fascist arts  highlight 
the difference between them. 
 
Fascist art… is based on a utopian morality.  Fascist art displays a utopian 
aesthetics – that of physical perfection.  Painters and sculptors under the 
Nazis often depicted the nude, but they were forbidden to show any bodily 
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imperfections.  Their nudes look like pictures in male healt  magazines: 
pinups which are both sanctimoniously asexual and (in a technical sense) 
pornographic, for they have the perfection of a fantasy. (40) 
 
If, as Sontag suggests, fascist aesthetics emphasizes the ideal body, then, the 
aesthetics of Fight Club is quite the opposite of it. Rather than representing the 
immaculate perfect body, it engages a variety of bodily cuts, scars, and mutilation. 
The crude association of Fight Club and fascism is preemptive. It is not the “Fight 
Club” that reeks of fascism; it is the middle-urban-office-class commodity culture 
that is closely associated with the ego’s flight from coherence. Sontag admits that 
Riefenstahl’s pro-Nazi films are still effective in spite of its now well-documented 
complications with Nazism. It is because, according to her, their longing is still felt 
and because their content is a romantic ideal to which many continue to be attached.  
In this sense, Fight Club might be read as a direct critique of the longing itself 
rather than perpetuating it. It is not a Kracauerian flight from fascism, but a 
Deleuzian flight with the cultural industry of the Frankfurt School. Fight Club 
might best be understood as post-fascist, a rejoinder to fascism through psychosis, 
the response of a postmodern subject to the aestheticization of politics, which might 
actually be the ongoing impact of late capitalism on subjectivity. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Deleuze cautions that it would be a mistake to think that e painter works 
on an empty canvas. Rather, that surface “is already invested virtually with all kinds 
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of clichés, which the painter will have to break with” (11). For Deleuze, the role of 
art is to short-circuit our everyday perception and affection, and to draw our 
attention to what he calls “intensities.” For film, the task of setting itself free from 
figuration has proven to be more daunting, because, unlike modern abstract 
paintings, film images are mostly mechanical reproductions of the real. For both 
filmmakers and viewers, there is a danger to fall prey to “common sense” and “good 
sense” which tend to identify and recognize film images as their referents and 
meanings.  
Deleuze’s warning is particularly palpable for the films of Kim Ki-duk 
because his films have been routinely understood through the conventional 
conceptual tools of narrative, symbolization, representation, and signification. Thus, 
his violent images are quickly interpreted as immoral m le violence against women 
and effectively close off any further discussion. Thinking with the logic of sensation 
allows us to look at the flows of materials, forces, sensations and affects away from 
our usual edifice of subject and narrative.   
The same argument can be made for a few “violent” films of Hollywood. 
While many violent films remains as “sensational” as Deleuze worries, David 
Fincher’s Fight Club effectively foregrounds the body in pain, retaining both the 
affect and sensation coming from the invisible forces. Ju t as the molecularity of the 
male characters of Kim Ki-duk problematizes the male center d narrative of 
contemporary Korean cinema, the bodies in Fight Club suggest the possibility of 
putting the discourse back into the body in a postmodern society which has 
increasingly become “a bad cinema.”  
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Filmography of Kim Ki-duk 
1. Soom (2007) 
… aka Breath (International: English Title) 
2. Shi gan (2006)  
... aka Time (International: English title)  
3. Hwal (2005)  
... aka The Bow (USA: festival title)  
4. Bin-jip (2004)  
... aka 3-Iron (Canada: English title) (International: English title)  
5. Samaria (2004)  
... aka Samaritan Girl (International: English title)  
6. Bom yeoreum gaeul gyeoul geurigo bom (2003)  
... aka Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter... and Spring (International: English 
title)  
7. Hae anseon (2002)  
... aka The Coast Guard (International: English title)  
8. Nabbeun namja (2001)  
... aka Bad Guy (International: English title: literal title)  
9. Suchwiin bulmyeong (2001)  
... aka Address Unknown (International: English title)  
10. Seom (2000)  
... aka The Isle (International: English title)  
11. Shilje sanghwang (2000)  
... aka Real Fiction (International: English title) 
12. Paran daemun (1998)  
... aka The Birdcage Inn  
13. Yasaeng dongmul bohoguyeog (1996)  
... aka Wild Animals  
14. Ag-o (1996)  
... aka Crocodile (literal English title) 
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